Dial Away Co. v. O'Connor

3 Mass. L. Rptr. 153
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedNovember 3, 1994
DocketNo. 94-00140
StatusPublished

This text of 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 153 (Dial Away Co. v. O'Connor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dial Away Co. v. O'Connor, 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 153 (Mass. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

Butler, J.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. In September 1993, Dial Away Co., Inc. (Dial Away) applied for a building permit to construct a single-family residence on its 5,023-square-foot parcel of land located in Auburn, Massachusetts. The Building Inspector denied the application, and the Town of Auburn’s Zoning Board of Appeals (the Board) affirmed the Inspector’s decision. The Board also denied Dial Away’s application for a variance. Plaintiff Dial Away subsequently appealed to this court. (Mass. Gen. L. c. 40A, §17). For the reasons discussed below, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is Allowed.

FACTS

The undisputed facts as established by the summary judgment record are as follows. In July 1969 Dial Away purchased a 5,023-square-foot parcel of land with a dwelling and a detached garage thereon, located at 274 Oxford Street in Auburn, Massachusetts. In 1969 the Town of Auburn granted a permit to demolish the dwelling and Dial Away proceeded to raze it. On March 5, 1990, Dial Away applied for and received a permit to demolish the garage on the property. Since Dial Away razed the garage in 1990, the land has remained vacant.

In September 1993, Dial Away applied for a building permit to construct a single-family dwelling on the property. The Town of Auburn’s Zoning Board of Appeals upheld the decision of the Building Inspector not to issue a permit, finding that (1) the dwelling and garage became “grandfathered,” nonconforming structures when the property became subject to amended zoning by-laws in 1947; (2) the structures were razed and abandoned in 1990; and (3) the structures lost their “grandfathered,” nonconforming status because Dial Away failed to rebuild them within two years. The Board also declined to issue a variance, finding that the property comprised approximately fifty percent (50%) of the square footage required under the current Town of Auburn Zoning by-laws.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment shall be granted where there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and where the moving parly is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991); Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422 (1983); Community Nal’l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553 (1976); Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the absence of a triable issue “and [further,] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989). Where both parties have moved for summary judgment and “in essence there is no real dispute as to the salient facts or if only a question of law is involved,” summary judgment shall be granted to the party entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cassesso, supra.

This court’s primary task in construing local zoning regulations is to determine the intent of the legislative body which enacted the regulation in question, and to avoid, if possible, negating that intent. Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 354-55 (1973). Dial Away argues that the Town of Auburn Zoning By-Law 8.1 (1993) in conjunction with paragraph four of M.G.L.c. 40A, §6* should govern the decision in this case. The Board contends that the applicable sections are M.G.L.c. 40A, §6 paragraphs 1 and 32 and the Town of Auburn Zoning By-Laws 8.2-8.3 (1993) (nonconforming uses and nonconforming structures, respectively).

Paragraphs one and three of Mass. Gen. Laws c. 40A, §6 apply current zoning provisions to nonconforming uses and structures. In contrast, paragraph four involves the applicability of current zoning regulations to nonconforming lots. Neither the enabling act, M.G.L.c. 40A, §6, nor the Town of Auburn Zoning By-Laws define these terms. “In the absence of an express definition, the meaning of a word or phrase used in a local zoning enactment is a question of law . .. and is to be determined by the ordinary principles of statutory construction.” Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Framingham, 382 Mass. 283, 290 (1981) (citing Kurz v. Bd. of Appeals ofN. Reading, 341 Mass. 110 (I960)).

Provisions of a zoning enactment should be read in the context of the law as a whole and interpreted according to common and approved usage. Framing-ham, supra, 382 Mass, at 290; see Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977) (as long as consistent with statutory purpose). The court can derive a term’s usual and accepted meaning from sources presumably known to the statute’s enactors, such as a dictionary definition. Commonwealth v. Zone, supra, 372 Mass, at 369. In the absence of statutory direction, this court is persuaded that the property in issue, devoid of all buildings since 1990, falls within the ambit of the common and approved usage of the term “lot” for purposes of paragraph four of M.G.L.c. 40A and Town of Auburn By-Law 8.1.3

More specifically, the Dial Away property is appropriately characterized as a nonconforming lot under current zoning laws. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “nonconforming lot” as “[a] lot the area, dimension or location of which was lawful prior to the adoption, revision or amendment of a zoning ordinance, but now fails to conform to the requirements of the zoning district in which it is located by reason of such adop[155]*155tion, revision, or amendment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 948 (5th ed. 1979). The Dial Away properly, which was a conforming lot in 1945, became nonconforming in 1947 when the Town of Auburn Zoning By-Laws were amended to require a minimum lot area of 7,500 square feet for the purpose of building a single-family dwelling. The lot remains nonconforming today, as current by-laws require 10,000 square feet for this purpose. Because this court characterizes the Dial Away property as a nonconforming lot, paragraph four of c. 40A, §6 and Town of Auburn Zoning By-Law 8.1 are applicable.4

Upon analysis, it is apparent that the property meets the requirements of the Town of Auburn Zoning By-Laws 8.1, which provides:

8.1Nonconforming Lots. Any lot which complied with the minimum area, frontage, and lot width requirements, if any, in effect at the time the boundaries of the lot were defined by recorded deed or plan may be built upon or used for single-family residential use, notwithstanding the adoption of new or increased lot area, frontage or lot width requirements, provided that:
8.1.1 At the time of the adoption of such new or increased requirements or while building on such lot was otherwise permitted, whichever occurs later, such lot was held, and has continued to be held, in ownership separate from that of adjoining land; and
8.1.2 The lot had at least 5,000 square feet of area and 50 feet of frontage at the time the boundaries of the lot were defined; and
8.1.3 Any proposed structure is situated on the lot so as to conform with the minimum yard requirements, if any, in effect at the time the boundaries of such lot were defined. In the case where no minimum yard requirements were in effect at the time the boundaries of such lot were defined, the minimum front yard shall be 20 feet and the minimum side and rear yards shall be 10 feet.

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Related

Willard v. Board of Appeals of Orleans
514 N.E.2d 369 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1987)
Pederson v. Time, Inc.
532 N.E.2d 1211 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1989)
Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals
415 N.E.2d 840 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1981)
Sturges v. Town of Chilmark
402 N.E.2d 1346 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1980)
Parrish v. Board of Appeal of Sharon
223 N.E.2d 81 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1967)
Community National Bank v. Dawes
340 N.E.2d 877 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1976)
Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp.
575 N.E.2d 734 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1991)
Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction
456 N.E.2d 1123 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1983)
Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc.
361 N.E.2d 1239 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1977)
Kurz v. Board of Appeals of North Reading
167 N.E.2d 627 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1960)
Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm.
294 N.E.2d 393 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
3 Mass. L. Rptr. 153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dial-away-co-v-oconnor-masssuperct-1994.