Di Gregorio Food Products, Inc. v. John Racanelli, d/b/a Racanelli's Cucina Pizza Express, Racanelli's Cucina, Racanelli's Delmar, Racanelli's Kirkwood, Racanelli's Fenton, and Racanelli's New York Pizzaria

CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedNovember 3, 2020
DocketSC98443
StatusPublished

This text of Di Gregorio Food Products, Inc. v. John Racanelli, d/b/a Racanelli's Cucina Pizza Express, Racanelli's Cucina, Racanelli's Delmar, Racanelli's Kirkwood, Racanelli's Fenton, and Racanelli's New York Pizzaria (Di Gregorio Food Products, Inc. v. John Racanelli, d/b/a Racanelli's Cucina Pizza Express, Racanelli's Cucina, Racanelli's Delmar, Racanelli's Kirkwood, Racanelli's Fenton, and Racanelli's New York Pizzaria) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Di Gregorio Food Products, Inc. v. John Racanelli, d/b/a Racanelli's Cucina Pizza Express, Racanelli's Cucina, Racanelli's Delmar, Racanelli's Kirkwood, Racanelli's Fenton, and Racanelli's New York Pizzaria, (Mo. 2020).

Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc DIGREGORIO FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., ) Opinion issued November 3, 2020 ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SC98443 ) JOHN RACANELLI, d/b/a RACANELLI'S ) CUCINA PIZZA EXPRESS, RACANELLI'S ) CUCINA, RACANELLI'S DELMAR, ) RACANELLI'S KIRKWOOD, RACANELLI'S ) FENTON, AND RACANELLI'S NEW YORK ) PIZZERIA, ) ) Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY The Honorable Thea A. Sherry, Judge

John Racanelli appeals the circuit court's judgment in favor of DiGregorio Food

Products, Inc. Because the underlying action is governed by the five-year statute of

limitations set forth in § 516.120(1), 1 the circuit court erroneously declared the law when

it determined the 10-year statute of limitations contained in § 516.110(1) governed and

entered judgment. The circuit court's judgment is hereby reversed and vacated.

1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise provided. Factual Background and Procedural History

John Racanelli operates pizza restaurants in the St. Louis area. DiGregorio Food

Products, Inc. is a food manufacturing, retail, and service distribution business.

DiGregorio's food service distribution division sells its products to restaurants and grocery

stores in the St. Louis area. At some point in the late 1980s or mid-1990s, DiGregorio

became an ingredient supplier for Racanelli's pizza restaurants.

The course of business between DiGregorio and Racanelli's restaurants was as

follows. A manager from one of Racanelli's restaurants would call DiGregorio and place

an order. After receipt of the order, DiGregorio's warehouse employees would gather the

requested goods and prepare them for delivery on the following day. The next day, the

delivery driver would receive an invoice for the order, load the delivery truck, and transport

the goods to the appropriate Racanelli's restaurant. Upon arrival at the restaurant, a

Racanelli's manager would sign the invoice and return it to the driver.

Racanelli paid DiGregorio on "seven-day terms," meaning Racanelli would pay for

the requested goods at the end of the week and a new delivery would be made the following

week. While this arrangement worked for some time, Racanelli began making payments

sporadically and then, in 2009 or 2010, failed to make payments altogether. Racanelli's

unpaid invoices totaled $44,383.85. DiGregorio contacted Racanelli and his wife and

requested they pay for the unpaid invoices; they refused to pay. DiGregorio ended its

business relationship with Racanelli and his restaurants. 2

2 At trial, John DiGregorio, who is the corporation's secretary and treasurer, testified the business relationship with Racanelli ended in sometime in 2010. 2 On December 5, 2016, DiGregorio filed suit in the circuit court of St. Louis County.

The petition pleaded claims for suit on account and account stated. Racanelli moved for

summary judgment, arguing both of DiGregorio's causes of action were barred by the

five-year statute of limitations contained in § 516.120(1). 3 DiGregorio argued its lawsuit

was timely because the 10-year statute of limitations contained in § 516.110(1) applied.

The circuit court overruled the motion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to a

bench trial.

After trial, the circuit court declared the 10-year statute of limitations applied and

concluded Racanelli was responsible for the amount of the unpaid invoices as damages.

Additionally, the circuit court noted "it has considered all of Racanelli's defenses, but finds

nothing compelling or credible in those defenses." Racanelli appealed, and the court of

appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, holding the 10-year statute of limitations

applied because the signed invoices evidenced a written promise by Racanelli to pay

DiGregorio. This Court granted transfer and has jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.

Standard of Review

Racanelli argues the circuit court erred in concluding § 516.110(1)'s 10-year statute

of limitations—as opposed to § 516.120(1)'s five-year statute of limitations—applied to

DiGregorio's claims. "The circuit court's judgment will be upheld unless there is no

3 Racanelli also argued for the first time in his "Reply in Further Support of his His Motion for Summary Judgment" that the four-year statute of limitations contained in Missouri's Uniform Commercial Code, § 400.2-725(1), barred DiGregorio's causes of action. Because the five-year statute of limitations in § 516.120(1) applies and bars DiGregorio's lawsuit, this opinion will not address whether § 400.2-725(1) applies. 3 substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it

erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." Karney v. Dep’t of

Labor & Indus. Relations, 599 S.W.3d 157, 161 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The applicability of a statute of limitations is a question of law this Court reviews

de novo. Bateman v. Platte Cnty., 363 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Mo. banc 2012).

Analysis

"Missouri has two statutes of limitation relating generally to contract actions:

sections 516.110(1) and 516.120[(1)]." Hughes Dev. Co. v. Omega Realty Co., 951 S.W.2d

615, 616 (Mo. banc 1997). Section 516.120(1) requires "[a]ll actions upon contracts,

obligations or liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in section 516.110,

and except upon judgments or decrees of a court of record, and except where a different

time is herein limited" to be brought within five years. Section 516.110(1) requires "[a]n

action upon any writing, whether sealed or unsealed, for the payment of money or property"

to brought within 10 years.

This Court discussed the interplay between § 516.110(1) and § 516.120(1) in

Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc.:

Section 516.110(1) is an exception to the general five-year limitations period established by section 516.120(1). The exception mentioned in section 516.110(1) consists of actions upon a written contract ... for the payment of money or property. The plain language of section 516.120(1), however, applies generally to all breach of contract actions, including written contracts containing a promise for the payment of money or property.

4 437 S.W.3d 180, 182 (Mo. banc 2014) (alteration in original) (internal footnote and

quotation marks omitted). Said differently, § 516.110(1) "applies when a plaintiff files suit

to enforce a written promise to pay money." Id. at 183.

The issue presented in this case is whether the signed invoices actually contain a

written promise to pay money. 4 If so, § 516.110(1)'s 10-year statute of limitations applies,

and DiGregorio's claims were timely filed. If not, § 516.120(1)'s general five-year statute

of limitations applies, and DiGregorio's claims are barred.

"[T]he essence of a promise to pay money is that it is an acknowledgment of an

indebtedness, an admission of a debt due and unpaid." Martin v. Potashnick, 217 S.W.2d

379, 381 (Mo. 1949); see also Silton v. Kansas City, 446 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Mo. 1969)

(stating a promise to pay money is comprised of two elements: "an acknowledgment of a

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Related

Silton v. Kansas City
446 S.W.2d 129 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1969)
Hughes Development Co. v. Omega Realty Co.
951 S.W.2d 615 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1997)
Bateman v. Platte County
363 S.W.3d 39 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2012)
Randy Spalding v. Stewart Title Guaranty Company
463 S.W.3d 770 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2015)
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. American Surety Co.
236 S.W. 657 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1921)
Martin v. Potashnick
217 S.W.2d 379 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1949)
Community Title Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.
977 S.W.2d 501 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1998)
Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc.
437 S.W.3d 180 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2014)

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Di Gregorio Food Products, Inc. v. John Racanelli, d/b/a Racanelli's Cucina Pizza Express, Racanelli's Cucina, Racanelli's Delmar, Racanelli's Kirkwood, Racanelli's Fenton, and Racanelli's New York Pizzaria, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/di-gregorio-food-products-inc-v-john-racanelli-dba-racanellis-cucina-mo-2020.