DeZurik Corp. v. County of Stearns

518 N.W.2d 14, 1994 Minn. LEXIS 438, 1994 WL 278190
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedJune 24, 1994
DocketC2-93-1182
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 518 N.W.2d 14 (DeZurik Corp. v. County of Stearns) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeZurik Corp. v. County of Stearns, 518 N.W.2d 14, 1994 Minn. LEXIS 438, 1994 WL 278190 (Mich. 1994).

Opinion

OPINION

GARDEBRING, Justice.

This case asks us to review a fair market value determination made by the Minnesota Tax Court. DeZurik Corp. (relator) sought reductions in the assessed value for its manufacturing facility, located in Stearns County, for the. assessment dates of January 2, 1990, 1991, and 1992. At trial, the county claimed the value for each of the three years should be $4,035,000, while relator claimed the value should be $2,000,000. The tax court found the value to be $3,750,000 for the three years in question. Relator appeals this valuation.

DeZurik Corp., a manufacturer of industrial valves, is located in Sartell, Minnesota, on a parcel of land of approximately 14.49 acres. The property is the site of a foundry, machine shop, and manufacturing, assembly and painting facilities. The original building was constructed in 1941, and at least 18 additions were added at various times from 1950 through 1983. Buildings on the property total approximately 334,000 square feet. The facility is primarily configured as a single-story manufacturing facility, although a small portion of the space is located on the second and third floors. 1

*16 In 1989 Stearns County assessed relator’s property at approximately $4,600,000. In March of 1990 (prior to the time that the January 2, 1990 estimated market value had been fixed by the assessor) relator hired Cushman and Wakefield of Connecticut, Inc., to determine the value of the property. Relator provided the county with the appraisal (Cushman appraisal) which estimated the value of the property to be approximately $4,000,000. After reviewing the Cushman appraisal, the county assessor established an estimated market value of $3,990,900 for the 1990 assessment, an amount also used for the 1991 and 1992 assessments. Relator appealed this valuation to the tax court which determined the market value of the facility to be $3,750,000 for each of the three years.

Decisions of the tax court are accorded the same finality and deference as those of the district court. Minn.Stat. § 271.01, subd. 5 (1992); Matter of McCannel, 301 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn.1980). Review of tax court determinations is generally limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the. tax court’s decision. Red Owl Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 264 Minn. 1, 9, 117 N.W.2d 401, 405 (1962); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 245 Minn. 346, 366, 71 N.W.2d 797, 810 (1955). This court will not disturb the tax court’s findings on appeal where sufficient evidence supports the decision. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. County of Hennepin, 482 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Minn.1992). Further, it is not mandatory that the trier of fact accept any particular valuation approach as the sole basis for determining market value. Northerly Centre Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 248 N.W.2d 923, 927 (Minn.1976) (citing Schleiff v. County of Freeborn, 231 Minn. 389, 395, 43 N.W.2d 265, 268-69 (1950)).

In Matter of McCannel, this court defined ‘“market value,’ the basis for all assessment valuation, * * * [as] an attempt to create a fictitious sale of the subject property by assuming an owner willing to sell and a buyer desiring to buy.” 301 N.W.2d 910, 924 (Minn.1980). In other words “market value” is the value the property would sell for on that date in a sale from one not required to sell to one not required to buy. Schleiff, 231 Minn. at 395, 43 N.W.2d at 270. In the event that there is no actual buyer desiring to purchase the property for continuation of its special use, the property’s highest and best use as a special purpose property must still be considered for valuation purposes. McCannel, 301 N.W.2d at 924. While the property in this case was not found to be special purpose property, it does have many features adapted to its use as a foundry, and the presence of those unusual features was the source of significant disagreement' at the trial.

At trial, three appraisals were submitted into evidence: the Cushman appraisal; 2 a second valuation by relator (the Leirness appraisal) which valued the property at $2,000,000, and an appraisal prepared for the county by Peter Patchin and Associates (the Patchin appraisal), which valued the property at $4,035,000. All three appraisals made use of the three standard approaches to market value, 3 but because of the unreliability of the *17 data, the tax court did not consider the income approach. Further, the tax court did not rely solely on any of the three appraisals, nor any single method of valuation, but looked to all three appraisals in arriving at a fair market value of $3,750,000 for each of the three years at issue.

The parties in this matter disagree as to the highest and best use of the property, and therefore, as to the approach taken to both the market and cost valuation methods. Relator claims the highest and best use is as a general purpose industrial facility. From that premise, relator argues that the appropriate hypothetical sale scenario to utilize in determining the fair market value of the property is one in which the real estate is sold alone without any business in place. Relator characterized this as the “liquidation sale” scenario and it was the basis for the Leirness appraisal. In his appraisal, Leirness assumed that the present owner of the property would determine that it no longer needed the subject property and that it would then be sold to a buyer who would use it for whatever use the marketplace would find acceptable, not necessarily a foundry and valve manufacturing facility.

In contrast, Stearns County adopted a more traditional approach to valuation of property. Recognizing that the property has more value when put to its intended use, and that the foundry has economic value, the county’s appraiser, Patchin assumed the market price should reflect what a purchaser would pay for property adapted to foundry purposes, not the price likely to be paid by a buyer for general manufacturing and warehouse purposes. The county argues this is the appropriate approach where no evidence indicates DeZurik was under any pressure to close the plant, or that the facility had lost its value as a foundry and valve manufacturing facility.

In determining fair market value the tax court first looked to the cost approach. Under this method, the Leirness appraisal placed the value of the property at $2,200,000 and the Patchin appraisal at $4,000,000.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Menard, Inc., Relator v. County of Clay
886 N.W.2d 804 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 2016)
Marquette Bank National Ass'n v. County of Hennepin
589 N.W.2d 301 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1999)
Ferche Acquisitions, Inc. v. County of Benton
550 N.W.2d 631 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1996)
Evans v. County of Hennepin
548 N.W.2d 277 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
518 N.W.2d 14, 1994 Minn. LEXIS 438, 1994 WL 278190, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dezurik-corp-v-county-of-stearns-minn-1994.