Dewitt Williams v. A-Jax Lumber Company

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: May 2, 2007
• Docket: WCA-0007-0001
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

WCA 07-1

DEWITT WILLIAMS

VERSUS

A-JAX LUMBER COMPANY

**********

APPEAL FROM THE OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - # 2 PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 06-02405 JAMES L. BRADDOCK, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

BILLY HOWARD EZELL JUDGE

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and J. David Painter, Judges.

REVERSED.

Maurice Blake Monrose Hurlburt, Privat & Monrose P. O. Drawer 4407 Lafayette, LA 70502-4407 (337) 237-0261 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: A-Jax Lumber Company George Arthur Flournoy Flournoy, Doggett & Losavio P. O. Box 1270 Alexandria, LA 71309-1270 (318) 487-9858 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Dewitt Williams EZELL, Judge.

In this workers’ compensation case, Dewitt Williams appeals a judgment which

found that his request for payment of a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) was

barred under the doctrine of res judicata. For the following reasons, we reverse.

FACTS

The facts of this case are sufficiently detailed in our previous opinion.

Williams v. A-Jax Lumber Co., 05-935 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/10/06), 930 So.2d 300, writs

denied, 06-1486, 06-1498 (La. 9/29/06), 937 So.2d 865, 866. Therefore, we will not

repeat them here.

Before an opinion was rendered by this court, Mr. Williams filed another

disputed claim form on April 18, 2006. The purpose of this claim was to procure the

reimbursement of the cost of an FCE which had been requested by two doctors. A-

Jax Lumber Company, and Southeastern Claims Services excepted to the claim on the

basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, prematurity, lack of procedural capacity

to be sued, and res judicata.

A hearing was held on the matter on October 2, 2006. The trial court granted

the exception of res judicata, dismissing Mr. Williams’ claim. He appeals that

decision.

RES JUDICATA

Defendants argue that the claim for the cost of the FCE is res judicata because

Mr. Williams unsuccessfully tried to admit the FCE into evidence at the first trial. It

claims that a cause of action for the cost of the FCE existed at the time of trial and

when the judgment became final.

Mr. Williams argues that it was the admissibility of the FCE that was

previously litigated. The issue of reimbursement of the FCE was not a concern at the

1 first trial.

In Metoyer v. Roy O. Martin, Inc. 03-1540, p.2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/1/04), 895

So.2d 552, 564, on rehearing, writ denied, 05-1027 (La. 6/3/05), 903 So.2d 467

(quoting Prudhomme v. Iberville Insulations, 93-778, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/94),

633 So.2d 380, 382), this court discussed the concept of res judicata and its

applicability in the workers’ compensation setting, observing that “the doctrine of res

judicata must be applied to workers’ compensation ‘in light of the rule that the Act

must be construed liberally in favor of the employee.’”

In Metoyer, the question of whether claims for incorrect and untimely payments

in January, June, and July 1999 were barred by res judicata was at issue. Ms.

Metoyer asserted that the judgment of dismissal rendered in August 1999 addressed

only the first untimely payment of benefits for the period from December 27, 1998

through January 3, 1999, and that other incorrect or untimely payments were not

concluded by that judgment. This court held that the only matter concluded by the

August judgment was the first untimely payment of benefits and that the subsequent

incorrect or untimely payment of benefits was not barred by res judicata.

At the hearing on this matter, the attorney for Mr. Williams stated that the bill

for the FCE was not submitted to the Defendants until after trial. He explained that

he had tried to introduce the FCE into evidence at trial, which was denied because

Defendants had not previously received a copy of the report. Mr. Williams argues

that the subject of payment of the FCE bill was not an issue at the first trial, only its

admissibility.

We agree with Mr. Williams that the matter of the payment of a medical

expense, i.e. the FCE, would not be precluded by res judicata simply because an

attempt was made to submit it into evidence. However, this court does not have a

2 copy of the record of the first trial. Without a copy of the record, we cannot

determine whether the issue of payment of the FCE was raised.

“When a party raises an objection of res judicata, the court must examine not

only the pleadings but also the entire record in the first suit, to determine whether the

second suit is, in fact, barred by res judicata.” Union Planters Bank v. Commercial

Capital Holding Corp., 04-871, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 907 So.2d 129, 130.

It was the Defendants’ duty to introduce the record from the first suit as the parties

raising the exception of res judicata. Id. Without this evidence, Defendants failed in

their burden of proof.

For these reasons, the trial court judgment sustaining the peremptory exception

of res judicata is reversed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to A-Jax Lumber

Company, and Southeastern Claims Services.