Dewight Whiley White v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedOctober 20, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-01873
StatusUnknown

This text of Dewight Whiley White v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, et al. (Dewight Whiley White v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Dewight Whiley White v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, et al., (N.D. Ohio 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Dewight Whiley White, Case No. 1:25cv01873

Plaintiff, -vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

MEMORANDUM OPINION U.S. Dept. of Justice, et al., AND ORDER

Defendants.

Pro se plaintiff Dewight Whiley White filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the U.S. Department of Justice; Immigration and Naturalization Service; and Kristi Neom, Secretary of Homeland Security. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). The Court grants the application, but for the following reasons, the Court dismisses the action. I. Background Plaintiff, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States as an immigrant in November 1989. On March 28, 1996, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to burglary and theft in Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-95-333432. The Court scheduled his sentencing for April 11, 1996. Plaintiff claims that neither defense counsel nor the trial court advised him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. On April 6, 1996, Plaintiff advised defense counsel that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not fully comprehend the nature of his plea. Plaintiff claims that defense counsel indicated that he would file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. However, according to Plaintiff, on April 11, unbeknownst to Plaintiff, counsel moved to withdraw from his representation of Plaintiff, rather than file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and counsel “abandoned … Plaintiff’s case.” (See Doc. No. 1 at 4-5). While this may be true, the docket reflects that Plaintiff failed to appear for his sentencing scheduled for April 11, thereby making it difficult for counsel to move to withdraw Plaintiff’s guilty plea or to advise Plaintiff that he moved to withdraw representation. See State of Ohio v. White, Case No. CR-95-333432 (Cuyahoga Cty.

Ct. Comm. Pl. Feb. 5, 1996). The docket also reflects that on November 19, 1996, Plaintiff was picked up on a capias and sentenced to a prison term of 3 to 15 years. Id. According to the complaint, Plaintiff received a notice to appear in removal proceedings pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act on May 2, 2002. Plaintiff was then deported to Jamaica on June 13, 2005. (Doc. No. 1 at 5). More than 20 years after his deportation, Plaintiff claims that his deportation was unlawful because the court relied on a “fraudulent criminal judgment” issued by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in 1996. (Id. at 3). He alleges that Defendants’ actions constitute a violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Plaintiff was wrongfully deported, an order requiring the defendants to facilitate Plaintiff’s return to the United States, and compensatory relief. II. Standard of Review Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The Court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed- me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998). III. Law and Analysis Plaintiff alleges that his deportation was “wrongful” because it was based on a fraudulent state court judgment of conviction. To the extent Plaintiff seeks review of the final order of removal, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s claims. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and they do not have general jurisdiction to review all questions of law. See Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). Rather, federal courts have only the authority to decide cases that the Constitution and Congress empower them to resolve. Hamama v. Adducci, Nos. 17-2171, 18-1233, 912 F.3d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986)). Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the REAL ID Act, to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts. Section 1252(g) provides:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

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Elgharib v. Napolitano
600 F.3d 597 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Boag v. MacDougall
454 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District
475 U.S. 534 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
525 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ohio Ex Rel. Skaggs v. Brunner
549 F.3d 468 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Usama Hamama v. Rebecca Adducci
912 F.3d 869 (Sixth Circuit, 2018)

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Dewight Whiley White v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dewight-whiley-white-v-us-dept-of-justice-et-al-ohnd-2025.