Dewayne Scott Cunningham v. Yes Care, et al.

• Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama
• Decided: May 14, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00153
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

DEWAYNE SCOTT CUNNINGHAM, ) AIS # 190108, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CASE NO. 2:26-CV-153-WKW ) [WO] YES CARE, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Dewayne Scott Cunningham, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. (Doc. # 1.) Based upon screening of that complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), it was determined that the complaint had to be dismissed prior to service of process; however, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to amend. (Doc. # 4.) On April 7, 2026,1 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Doc. # 5.) The amended complaint is before the court for screening under § 1915(e)(2)(B). After screening Plaintiff’s amended complaint, this action must be dismissed prior to

1 “Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009). Absent evidence to the contrary, the court must “assume that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date that he signed it.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff dated his amended § 1983 complaint “04-07-26.” (Doc. # 5 at 4.) Therefore, his amended complaint is deemed filed on April 7, 2026, even though it was not received and docketed until April 9, 2026. service of process as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP). (See Doc. # 3.) Under the IFP provisions of § 1915, any complaint filed is subject to mandatory court

review. Section 1915 requires that the court dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, on its own initiative, if the allegations are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).

A complaint is subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) “for both frivolousness and failure to state a claim” if it “lacks even an arguable basis in law.” Toussaint v. U.S. Attorney’s Off., 2025 WL 2237376, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025)

(per curiam) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989)). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law when it relies on “an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Such claims include those where “it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit and claims of infringement of a legal interest

which clearly does not exist.” Id. (citation omitted). A complaint also must be dismissed at the statutory screening stage if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This

review follows the same standard governing dismissals for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008). Hence, to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The

plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. To meet the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must plead factual content that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations should present a “plain

statement possessing enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held “to less stringent standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, the

allegations still “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. The court cannot “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v. Escambia Cnty., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662.

III. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT’S ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff’s amended complaint is no less threadbare than his original complaint. He claims that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights are being

violated because his medication, which is supposed to be administered every twelve hours, is being “illegally” administered. (Doc. # 5 at 2–3.) He provides nine dates, presumably on which his medications were “illegally” administered: December 21, 2025; February 27, 2026; March 8, 2026; March 9, 2026; March 14, 2026; March

15, 2026; March 20, 2026; April 1, 2026; and April 2, 2026. (Id. at 2.) He further claims that the entire nursing staff at Staton Correctional Facility “illegally” administers twelve-hour medications and that Ms. Peterson, the Director of Nursing,

is “very aware of it.” (Id. at 3.) He asserts that he “can show through the co[m]puter [system] that they a[re] knowingly admin[istering] Dr. ordered med[i]ca[t]ion illegal[l]y,” and that the “illegal” administration of his medication could cause harm to him in the future. (Id.) As relief, Plaintiff requests $50,000 for mental anguish

and a court order directing “them” to call him at 4:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. so that his medication will be administered as prescribed by the doctor. (Id. at 4.) IV. DISCUSSION In its Order giving Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint (“amend

order”), the court explained the pleading deficiencies (see Doc. # 4 at 4–8) and provided Plaintiff with specific instructions on amending the complaint (id. at 9). Each of the identified deficiencies and how Plaintiff failed to correct these

deficiencies will be addressed in turn. A. The Named Defendants In his original complaint, Plaintiff named three Defendants: “Yes Care Corp.”; the “Director of Nursing Staff”; and the “Nursing Staff at Staton Corr. Facility.” (See

Doc. # 1 at 1, 2.) Plaintiff names the same three Defendants in his amended complaint, albeit differently: “Yes Care”; “DON of Nursing Ms. Peterson”; and “Nursing Staff, names not known due to too many.” (Doc. # 4 at 1.)

1. YesCare: Municipal Liability In the amend order, Plaintiff was informed that YesCare “is treated as a municipality for purposes of § 1983 claims.” (Doc. # 4 at 4–5 (quoting Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 2022)).) Plaintiff further was informed that to impose

liability on YesCare, he “must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that [YesCare] had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” (Id.

at 5 (quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)).) As will be discussed further in Part IV.B, Plaintiff still has not sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation, and even if he had, he has not alleged that YesCare has a

custom or policy constituting deliberate indifference, let alone that any custom or policy caused a constitutional violation. Therefore, despite being afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint, Plaintiff has not stated an Eighth Amendment

deliberate-indifference claim against YesCare. 2. “Nursing Staff”: Impermissible Fictitious-Party Pleading

Plaintiff changing the Defendant’s name from “Nursing Staff at Staton Corr. Facility” to “Nursing Staff, names not known due to too many” still constitutes impermissible fictitious-party pleading. Plaintiff was put on notice by the amend order that “[a]s a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.” (Doc. # 4 at 5 (quoting Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir.

2010)).) The amend order also explained the Eleventh Circuit’s limited exception to the general rule: “when the plaintiff’s description of an unnamed defendant is specific enough to allow service of process on that defendant.” (Id. (citing Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 1992)).)

Plaintiff continues to rely on an overbroad label—“Nursing Staff”—rather than asserting factual allegations against specific, identifiable actors. Thus, his pleading fails to meet the plausibility standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and likewise fails to state a claim against these purported Defendants. Moreover, the complaint neither identifies members of nor sufficiently describes the “Nursing Staff.” Instead, he conclusorily asserts that “all

the nursing staff at Staton Corr. Facility” are “illegally” administering his medications. (See Doc. # 5 at 3.) Plaintiff’s “description” of these Defendants is insufficient to allow service of process, and it does not fall within the Eleventh

Circuit’s fictitious-party pleading exception. Therefore, Plaintiff will not be allowed to proceed against these fictitious-party Defendants. 3. Ms. Peterson, Director of Nursing: Failure to State a Claim Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the vast majority of the

amend order, he did, at least, provide the name of the Director of the Nursing Staff: Ms. Peterson. (See Doc. # 5 at 1, 2.) However, as will be discussed further below, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Ms. Peterson for deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs. B. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Serious Medical Needs

As outlined in the amend order, to state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, Plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly show that “(1) the injured party suffered a deprivation that was objectively[,] ‘sufficiently serious,’ and (2) the defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.’” Wingo v. WellStar Health Sys., Inc., 160

F.4th 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc)); see also O’Connor v. Reddish, 2026 WL 74569, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (per curiam) (“[T]o succeed on his [deliberate-indifference]

claim against [the defendant], [the plaintiff] must allege facts that plausibly show that [the defendant] knew that it would seriously jeopardize [the plaintiff’s] health to give him a sick-call form instead of referring him for immediate care. But the facts he

asserts don’t support that conclusion.”). “To meet the second step, the plaintiff must show that the ‘defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.’” Wingo, 160 F.4th at 1190– 91 (quoting Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262).

Plaintiff’s liberally construed deliberate-indifference claim fails at both elements. First, Plaintiff has not alleged an objectively, sufficiently serious deprivation. He conclusorily asserts that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights are being violated because his medication, ordered by a doctor, is being “illegally” administered, which “could cause harm to [him].” (Doc. # 5 at 2.) As noted in the amend order, Plaintiff’s claim initially failed at this element because “[h]e provide[d] no information about the type of medications, their purpose, how

the medications were improperly administered (e.g., too early or too late), and how imperative it is that he take these medications exactly 12 hours apart.” (Doc. # 4 at 8.) In his amended complaint, Plaintiff does not address these shortcomings and thus

has not alleged an objectively, sufficiently serious deprivation. Second, other than conclusory assertions that his medication is being administered “illegal[l]y[] by all the nursing staff at Staton Corr. Facility” and that “DON Nurse Peterson is very

aware of it” (Doc. # 5 at 3), Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendants were actually, subjectively aware that their actions pertaining to the administration of his medications posed a substantial risk of serious harm to him.

Consequently, Plaintiff still has not plausibly stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against Defendants, and this action will be dismissed without prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

C. Futility of Further Amendment Construed favorably to Plaintiff, the claims in the amended complaint must be dismissed for the reasons explained. Generally, the district court will afford a pro se

prisoner an opportunity to amend his complaint at least once, which this court already has granted. See Johnson v. Boyd, 568 F. App’x 719, 723 (11th Cir. 2014). However, a district court is not required to allow a further amendment that would be futile. Jenkins v. Walker, 620 F. App’x 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing

Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)). An amendment is considered futile, if the complaint, as amended, “would still be properly dismissed.” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th

Cir. 2019) (citing Cockrell, 510 F.3d at 1310). Plaintiff already has been afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint and was even provided with instructions on how to do so. (See Doc. # 4.) Nevertheless,

Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not comply with those instructions. His allegations remain vague and conclusory; he continues to engage in impermissible fictitious-party pleading (i.e., naming “Nursing Staff” as a Defendant); and he has

failed to plausibly allege any violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, any further amendment to the complaint would be futile, and leave to amend will not be granted again. V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are DISMISSED without prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

Final judgment will be entered separately. DONE this 14th day of May, 2026. /s/ W. Keith Watkins UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE