Dewayne Murray, Bankruptcy Trustee on Behalf of Sherman Robinson v. Desmond Pollard

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-26-00047-CV

DEWAYNE MURRAY, BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE ON BEHALF OF SHERMAN ROBINSON, Appellant

V.

DESMOND POLLARD, Appellee

On Appeal from the 136th District Court Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Court No. 26DCCV0326

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dewayne Murray, the Bankruptcy Trustee on behalf of Sherman Robinson, appeals1 the trial court’s order denying his petition for bill of review and alternative motion to vacate a 2017 nonsuit of Schneider National Carriers, Inc.

On appeal, Murray argues the nonsuit was void because Robinson’s trial counsel lacked standing as the bankruptcy debtor to dispose of the bankruptcy estate’s personal injury claim because Robinson’s trial counsel who filed the nonsuit was not appointed or approved at the time of the filing to represent Murray or the estate. Murray further argues that, because the trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the nonsuit could be challenged at any time and was not subject to the four-year limitations period applicable to a bill of review. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Background On October 4, 2017, Sherman Robinson, proceeding pro se, sued Desmond Pollard, Schneider National Carriers, Inc., Old Republic Insurance Company, and INS Insurance, Inc. for personal injury arising from a motor vehicle accident.2 Before Robinson filed the personal injury claim, Robinson filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. After filing for bankruptcy, Robinson hired Louisiana-licensed attorney, George Tucker, to represent him in his personal injury suit. Murray, the bankruptcy trustee, asked the

1 This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Ninth Court of Appeals pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court docket equalization order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). Accordingly, we apply the precedent of the Ninth Court of Appeals in deciding this case to the extent that it conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 See Murray as Tr. of Est. of Robinson v. Pollard, No. 09-24-00004-CV, 2025 WL 1710527, at 5 (Tex. App.— Beaumont June 19, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) for a more comprehensive review of the facts underlying the suit.

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bankruptcy court to approve Tucker as Robinson’s counsel, and the bankruptcy court did so. Robinson, proceeding pro se, filed his personal injury lawsuit. Robinson eventually retained Wendle Van Smith, a licensed Texas lawyer, as counsel in his personal injury suit.

Van Smith filed a nonsuit without prejudice for Schneider, Old Republic, and INS, and the trial court granted it. Robinson later filed an amended petition to reflect that Robinson and Murray, on behalf of Robinson’s estate, were both named plaintiffs. Although Robinson had already nonsuited Schneider, Old Republic, and INS, the amended petition included them again as defendants.

Pollard filed a motion to dismiss, stating that he was the only defendant in the case.

Pollard also objected to the amended petition, arguing that, since the bankruptcy suit was filed before the personal injury lawsuit, only Murray had standing to bring suit, but the statute of limitations to add parties expired on October 5, 2017. Pollard also objected to Robinson’s amended petition’s attempt to add in previously nonsuited defendants.

Murray filed an opposition to Pollard’s motion to dismiss. Murray argued that Robinson did not have standing to file the suit, but that the trial court had concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction.

On August 15, 2019, the parties filed a notice of automatic stay. In 2020, the bankruptcy court entered an agreed order stating

[Murray] is authorized to substitute for [Robinson] as the proper party plaintiff in the Texas Civil Action, with [Murray’s] substitution as plaintiff being subject to any defenses that any of the parties in the Texas Civil Action may have including, but not limited to, statute of limitations, prescription and standing, and that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. [Section] 326(a) is annulled to allow the Texas Civil Action to be litigated in state court to a final, non-appealable judgment.

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The trial court held a hearing on Pollard’s dismissal requests in which Murray argued that Section 108(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code extended the applicable statute of limitations. See 11 U.S.C. § 108(a). Section 108(a) provides, in pertinent part:

If applicable non bankruptcy law . . . fixes a period within which the debtor may commence an action, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee may commence such action only before the later of –

(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or

(2) two years after the order for relief.

11 U.S.C. § 108(a). The trial court entered a letter order explaining the following:

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. [Section] 108(a)(2), a bankruptcy trustee may bring suit on behalf of the bankruptcy estate within two years of the filing for bankruptcy relief.

The Plaintiff is correct that the bankruptcy code effectively extended the applicable statute of limitations from October 5, 2017[,] to February 18, 2018.

However, the amended pleading which sought to re-join Schneider National Carriers, Inc., Old Republic Insurance Co, and INS Insurance, Inc., into the case was not filed until August 28, 2018, which was roughly six months after the extended limitations period had already expired. Thus, the claims which were reasserted against those defendants were untimely. Accordingly, as to Schneider National Carriers, Inc., Old Republic Insurance Co, and INS Insurance, Inc., the Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss is meritorious and is hereby GRANTED.

. . . . [Robinson’s] argument of lack of capacity versus lack of standing [is]

persuasive and properly supported by the legal authority. See Austin Nursing Ctr.

v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849–53 (Tex. 2005) . . . . Accordingly, although Sherman Robinson may have lacked capacity to bring the personal injury action October 4, 2017, any defect in his capacity was later cured by the substitution of Dwayne Murray, the bankruptcy trustee. Accordingly, as to the Defendant’s lack of standing claim against Robinson and Murray, the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED.

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The trial court granted Pollard’s motion to sever the dismissed case against Schneider, Old Republic, and INS into another cause number.

On August 16, 2023, Murray filed a bill of review and, in the alternative, a motion to vacate nonsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction against Schneider on the ground that Robinson did not have standing to file the nonsuit and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act because only the bankruptcy court had the authority to dismiss Schneider.

Pollard’s response to the bill of review stated that Murray failed to meet his burden to plead and prove each of the essential elements of a bill of review. Pollard also argued that Murray’s challenge was one of capacity, not standing, and even so, a standing challenge does not implicate the type of jurisdictional challenge for which compliance with the bill of review requirements was excused. Lastly, Pollard asserted that an equitable bill of review must be filed within four years and that Murray’s bill seeking to overturn a November 2017 nonsuit in 2023 was well outside of that period.

The trial court denied the bill of review. In a letter ruling, the trial court explained that its ruling was due to the statute of limitations.

Murray appeals the denial of the bill of review.

II. Lack of Capacity Does Not Deprive the Trial Court of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction We must first address whether the trial court retained subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on the petition for bill of review.

Murray argues Robinson lacked standing to nonsuit Schneider because only the bankruptcy trustee could prosecute the personal injury claim. Texas law treats those concepts as

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distinct. “A plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy.” Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 775 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2001)).

Murray relies on cases that use “exclusive standing,” but “exclusive standing,” in the bankruptcy context, describes the trustee’s status as the real party in interest so that a debtor’s cause of action becomes property of the bankruptcy estate, and the trustee acquires the authority to prosecute the claim. See Wieburg v. GTE S.W. Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2001); Harris v. St. Louis Univ., 114 B.R. 647, 649 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990). However, that does not mean Robinson lacked standing even though he lacked capacity. Federal and Texas intermediate courts have stated that a trustee’s authority to prosecute estate claims is distinct from standing. See Norris v. Causey, 869 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 2017); Moser, Tr. of Est. of Mason v. Dillon Invs., LLC, 649 S.W.3d 259, 266–70 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.); Ramirez v. Bank of Am., N.A., 627 S.W.3d 486, 492–94 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2021, no pet.).

Since Robinson had standing, the trial court was not deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Ramirez, 627 S.W.3d at 491 (citing Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P., 46 S.W.3d at 884) (“A plaintiff’s lack of capacity does not implicate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”); McLane Champions, LLC v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907, 912 (Tex. 2023) (citing Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 773) (“Lack of constitutional standing deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.”).

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Therefore, we must address whether the trial court erred in denying the bill of review.

III. Murray Failed to Prove Elements of Bill of Review Pollard argues that Murray did not prove the elements of a bill of review.

A. Applicable Law “A bill of review is a direct attack on a judgment.” WWLC Inv., L.P. v. Miraki, 624 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam). “Because it is a direct attack, a bill of review must be filed in the court that rendered the original judgment, and only that court may exercise jurisdiction over the bill.” Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2015).

Bill of review plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part.

Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam). “Courts narrowly construe the grounds on which a plaintiff may obtain a bill of review due to Texas’s fundamental public policy favoring the finality of judgments.” Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enters., Inc., 369 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam); see Valdez, 465 S.W.3d at 230 (“Bills of review are intrinsically incongruous with finality, and thus, are not lightly granted.”).

We review a trial court’s ruling on a bill of review under an abuse of discretion standard which recognizes that the trial court is the fact-finder. Gard v. Douglas Ray Stracener Est., 631 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.).

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B. Analysis Murray did not attempt to explain why he was prevented from appealing the final order (April 22, 2021, order to sever) within the regular procedural requirements.3 Since he has not done so, he has not satisfied the second and third elements required for a bill of review. See Gold v. Gold, 145 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam), abrogated by Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2020). Nor has he attempted to prove fraud, accident, or wrongful conduct or official mistake of the opposing party.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the bill of review.

IV. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s denial of the bill of review.

Jeff Rambin

Justice

Date Submitted: August 28, 2026 Date Decided: August 31, 2026

3 This is the second appeal regarding the trial court’s December 6, 2023, decision on the bill of review. Murray as Tr. of Est. of Robinson, 2025 WL 1710527, at *5. The bill of review was initially filed in the original cause number. Id. As a result, the trial court’s decision on the bill of review was not final. Id. Murray attempted to bring an interlocutory appeal of that non-final order. Id. That appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. Thereafter, on February 24, 2026, the trial court severed the decision on the bill of review into a new cause number. This is an appeal from the severed bill-of-review decision. Because this appeal is from a severed, and final order, we deny Pollard’s motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.