Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-13709 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-20822-JEM
DEVON A. BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ANN COFFIN, Florida Department of Revenue, Program Director, individual and official capacity, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Title IV-D Agency,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(March 21, 2019)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Devon Brown, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order dismissing
his amended civil complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the
Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine. In his complaint, Brown requested that the district court
review and reject final state court child-support and enforcement orders entered
against him after he lost in state court. On appeal, Brown does not address in his
initial brief the district court’s ruling that his claims were barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. After thorough review, we affirm.
We typically review a district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine de novo. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (11th
Cir. 2013). The party asserting the claim bears the burden of establishing federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d
1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005).
Generally speaking, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts
from reviewing state court decisions because lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over final state-court judgments. See Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. for Fla., 679
F.3d 1257, 1262–64 (11th Cir. 2012). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 2 Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 3 of 7
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558
F.3d 1266, 1273 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Exxon Mobil Co. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine applies not only to federal claims
actually raised in the state court, but also to claims that were not raised in the state
court but are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment. Casale v.
Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). A claim is inextricably intertwined
if it would effectively nullify the state court judgment, or if it succeeds only to the
extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues. Id. However, it does not apply
when a party did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise his or her federal claims
in state proceedings. Id. We’ve applied Rooker-Feldman principles to child custody
proceedings on multiple occasions and have concluded that, under Rooker-Feldman,
we may not interfere with final judgments rendered by state courts. See Goodman
ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332–35 (11th Cir. 2001); Liedel v.
Juvenile Court of Madison Cnty., Ala., 891 F.2d 1542, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1990);
Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 1988).
In Florida, judges of the circuit court appoint “general magistrates” to hear
certain matters, including child support enforcement actions, referred to them with
consent of all parties. Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.490. The rules provide for state judicial
review of the general magistrate’s report and recommendation. Id. The parties may
file exceptions to the report within 10 days from the time it is served on them. Id.
3 Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 4 of 7
Then, the circuit judge must review the entire record and give a hearing on the
exceptions, and may amend the order, conduct further proceedings, or refer the
matter back to the general magistrate for further proceedings. In re Family Law
Rules of Procedure, 663 So. 2d 1049, 1051–52 (Fla. 1995); Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.490,
12.491. If no party files exceptions, a circuit judge reviews the report and enters an
order, at which point a party may file a motion to vacate and request a hearing on
the court’s order on the magistrate’s recommended order. Hinckley v. Dep’t of
Revenue ex rel. K.A.C.H., 927 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Fla. R. Fam.
P. 12.491(f). An appeal from that order may be appealed to the state appellate court.
Robinson v. Robinson, 928 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
An issue is abandoned when a party seeking to raise a claim or issue on appeal
fails to plainly and prominently raise the issue. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681, 683 (11th Cir. 2014). Although we read briefs filed by pro
se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed
abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover,
we will not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply
brief. Id. It is insufficient for a party to make only passing references to a claim
without supporting argument or citation to authority. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681–82.
Liberal construction of pro se pleadings “does not give a court license to serve as de
facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to
4 Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 5 of 7
sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th
Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).
Here, Brown has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s order on
appeal because he does not address the order in his initial brief. Timson, 518 F.3d
at 874.
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Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-13709 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-20822-JEM
DEVON A. BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ANN COFFIN, Florida Department of Revenue, Program Director, individual and official capacity, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Title IV-D Agency,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(March 21, 2019)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Devon Brown, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order dismissing
his amended civil complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the
Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine. In his complaint, Brown requested that the district court
review and reject final state court child-support and enforcement orders entered
against him after he lost in state court. On appeal, Brown does not address in his
initial brief the district court’s ruling that his claims were barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. After thorough review, we affirm.
We typically review a district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine de novo. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (11th
Cir. 2013). The party asserting the claim bears the burden of establishing federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d
1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005).
Generally speaking, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts
from reviewing state court decisions because lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over final state-court judgments. See Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. for Fla., 679
F.3d 1257, 1262–64 (11th Cir. 2012). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 2 Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 3 of 7
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558
F.3d 1266, 1273 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Exxon Mobil Co. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine applies not only to federal claims
actually raised in the state court, but also to claims that were not raised in the state
court but are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment. Casale v.
Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). A claim is inextricably intertwined
if it would effectively nullify the state court judgment, or if it succeeds only to the
extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues. Id. However, it does not apply
when a party did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise his or her federal claims
in state proceedings. Id. We’ve applied Rooker-Feldman principles to child custody
proceedings on multiple occasions and have concluded that, under Rooker-Feldman,
we may not interfere with final judgments rendered by state courts. See Goodman
ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332–35 (11th Cir. 2001); Liedel v.
Juvenile Court of Madison Cnty., Ala., 891 F.2d 1542, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1990);
Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 1988).
In Florida, judges of the circuit court appoint “general magistrates” to hear
certain matters, including child support enforcement actions, referred to them with
consent of all parties. Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.490. The rules provide for state judicial
review of the general magistrate’s report and recommendation. Id. The parties may
file exceptions to the report within 10 days from the time it is served on them. Id.
3 Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 4 of 7
Then, the circuit judge must review the entire record and give a hearing on the
exceptions, and may amend the order, conduct further proceedings, or refer the
matter back to the general magistrate for further proceedings. In re Family Law
Rules of Procedure, 663 So. 2d 1049, 1051–52 (Fla. 1995); Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.490,
12.491. If no party files exceptions, a circuit judge reviews the report and enters an
order, at which point a party may file a motion to vacate and request a hearing on
the court’s order on the magistrate’s recommended order. Hinckley v. Dep’t of
Revenue ex rel. K.A.C.H., 927 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Fla. R. Fam.
P. 12.491(f). An appeal from that order may be appealed to the state appellate court.
Robinson v. Robinson, 928 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
An issue is abandoned when a party seeking to raise a claim or issue on appeal
fails to plainly and prominently raise the issue. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681, 683 (11th Cir. 2014). Although we read briefs filed by pro
se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed
abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover,
we will not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply
brief. Id. It is insufficient for a party to make only passing references to a claim
without supporting argument or citation to authority. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681–82.
Liberal construction of pro se pleadings “does not give a court license to serve as de
facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to
4 Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 5 of 7
sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th
Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).
Here, Brown has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s order on
appeal because he does not address the order in his initial brief. Timson, 518 F.3d
at 874. Additionally, Brown makes no reference the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. He
argues only that the district court “did not dismiss [the case] based upon any legal
argument based upon the merits,” which does not adequately identify the issue and
is no more than a passing reference to the district court’s decision without supporting
argument or citation to authority. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681–82. Although Brown
says in his reply brief that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because he
was not seeking review of state court rulings, that child support laws are “treaties”
and “contracts,” not “law,” and that family courts are not Article III courts, we will
not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief. See
Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Thus, Brown has abandoned any challenge to the district
court’s order on appeal.
But even if we were to review the issue on appeal, we would conclude that
the district court properly sua sponte dismissed Brown’s action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Brown, who lost in state
court, requested that the district court review and reject the final state court child-
support and enforcement orders, a request he made clear in both his prayer for relief
5 Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 6 of 7
in the amended complaint and his motion to “temporarily stop the Title IV-D child
support enforcement until this court constitutionally solve[s] the case.” While he
claims he is seeking relief from the Florida Department of Revenue’s administrative
actions in enforcing a child support order, the harm he actually seeks to remedy is
the Florida state court’s judgment in favor of the Department. See Staley, 837 F.2d
at 1017–18. As a result, Brown essentially has admitted that success in this case
requires a reversal of the state court’s decision. Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1273.
As for Brown’s federal claims that the Florida Department of Revenue and its
Director violated his constitutional rights by obtaining orders to garnish his tax
return and suspend his driver’s license, pursuant to the child support order, they are
inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260.
Specifically, he challenges the authority of the state magistrate to issue the orders
enforcing his child support obligations, the process he was afforded, and the validity
of the child support enforcement statute, alleging that the state magistrate had not
taken the proper oath and violations of his rights to due process and trial by jury, and
rights under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Succeeding on these federal
claims would effectively nullify the state court judgment, as he expressly requests,
because it would require the federal court to deem the state court’s authorization to
use “additional remedies to enforce the arrearage” unconstitutional. See Casale, 558
F.3d at 1260; Liedel, 891 F.2d at 1545–46. Therefore, his allegations are
6 Case: 18-13709 Date Filed: 03/21/2019 Page: 7 of 7
inextricably intertwined with the underlying state-court dispute regarding his child
support obligations.
Finally, Brown had a reasonable opportunity to raise his constitutional
arguments before the state courts. See Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1332–33. Unlike the
plaintiff in Goodman, who challenged a search that was not discussed in her child
custody hearing and who therefore had no opportunity to raise her constitutional
challenges to the search, Brown’s challenges to the state magistrate’s authority, the
process afforded him, and the validity of the child support statute could have been
raised in the state court proceeding and on appeal, in accordance with Florida law.
See id.; Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.490; Robinson, 928 So. 2d at 362. Thus, to the extent
Brown believes the state-court orders were delivered without authority, he must seek
a remedy in state court, since his claim invites review and rejection of the state-court
judgment by asking the federal court to determine whether it was wrongfully issued.
Because we do not have the jurisdiction to overturn the Florida state court’s decision,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.