Devin Harmon v. Martin Marshal

Ninth Circuit

Devin Harmon v. Martin Marshal

391 F. App'x 632

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 5, 2010

Docket08-56057

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 391 F. App'x 632 (Devin Harmon v. Martin Marshal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Devin Harmon v. Martin Marshal, 391 F. App'x 632 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Devin Harmon appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging malicious prosecution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir.2009). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Harmon failed to raise a triable issue as to whether defendants lacked probable cause. See Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 767 (9th Cir.2006) (to prove malicious prosecution under California law, plaintiff must show an absence of probable cause); see also Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir.2008) (applying absence of probable cause requirement in Fourth Amendment context, following Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006)).

The district court properly relied on defendant Marshall’s declaration regarding fingerprint evidence to establish probable cause, and contrary to Harmon’s contention, the declaration was not subject to the standards for admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir.2006) (evidence relied upon to show probable cause need not meet standards for admissibility of testimony in court).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Devin Harmon appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging malicious prosecution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir.2009). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Harmon failed to raise a triable issue as to whether defendants lacked probable cause. See Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 767 (9th Cir.2006) (to prove malicious prosecution under California law, plaintiff must show an absence of probable cause); see also Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir.2008) (applying absence of probable cause requirement in Fourth Amendment context, following Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006)).

The district court properly relied on defendant Marshall’s declaration regarding fingerprint evidence to establish probable cause, and contrary to Harmon’s contention, the declaration was not subject to the standards for admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir.2006) (evidence relied upon to show probable cause need not meet standards for admissibility of testimony in court).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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391 F. App'x 632, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/devin-harmon-v-martin-marshal-ca9-2010.

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