Devin Andrich v. David Shinn

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 4, 2024
• Docket: 22-16559
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 4 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DEVIN ANDRICH, No. 22-16559

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:17-cv-00047-RM v.

JULIA ERWIN, Legal Access Monitor at MEMORANDUM* Arizona Department of Corrections, ULIBARRI, First name unknown; named as Jane Doe Ulibarri, Paralegal at Arizona Department of Corrections, BEVERLY ULIBARRI, Paralegal at Arizona Department of Corrections, CHRISTINA PHILLIS, Director at Office of Public Defense Services, JANELLE A. MCEACHERN, Attorney licensed to practice law in Arizona, DAVID SHINN, ADC Director, Director,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Rosemary Marquez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 4, 2024** San Francisco, California

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: WALLACE, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Devin Andrich, a former attorney and Arizona state

prisoner, appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor

of, and entering final judgment for, Defendants-Appellees on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

court-access claim. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

the district court’s summary judgment de novo. See Perez v. City of Fresno, 98

F.4th 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2024). We affirm.

Summary judgment was proper on the access-to-courts claim. Andrich was

not entitled to affirmative assistance from Ulibarri in responding to his state bar

action because the action was not a direct or collateral challenge to his criminal

conviction or his conditions of confinement. See First Amend. Coal. of Az. v. Ryan,

938 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Simmons v. Sacramento County Sup.

Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In other words, a prisoner has no

constitutional right of access to the courts to litigate an unrelated civil claim.”).

Similarly, Andrich has not shown injury to support an active-inference claim

because he submitted a response to the state bar with the legal supplies Ulibarri

provided and has not shown how copies of his client billing records would have

aided in his response. Cf. Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013),

quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (“[A]ccess-to-courts rights do not

exist in an ‘abstract, freestanding’ form. . . . Instead, they are tethered to principles

2 of Article III standing.”); Simmons, 318 F.3d at 1160, quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at

355 (emphasis removed) (“Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one

of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and

incarceration.”). Andrich’s reliance on Allen v. Sakai is misplaced because that case

involved officials’ interference with an inmate’s ability to submit filings “in

connection with his second attempt to obtain post-conviction relief,” in other words,

a claim directly related to his incarceration, not an unrelated civil claim. 48 F.3d

1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Finally, it is well-settled that “[a]

denial of free photocopying does not amount to a denial of access to the courts.”

Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1991).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.