Deverna v. Kinney Systems, Inc.

Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

Deverna v. Kinney Systems, Inc.

146 Misc. 2d 276, 556 N.Y.S.2d 190, 1990 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 266

CourtAppellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

DecidedMarch 19, 1990

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 146 Misc. 2d 276 (Deverna v. Kinney Systems, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Deverna v. Kinney Systems, Inc., 146 Misc. 2d 276, 556 N.Y.S.2d 190, 1990 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 266 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Judgment entered January 4, 1989 affirmed, without costs, for the reasons stated in the decision of Alice Schlesinger, J., at the Civil Court.

[277]*277As correctly noted in the decision below, defendant’s tender of a check in settlement of claimant’s property damage claim brought the transaction within the reach of section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Court of Appeals has stated: "By construing the section [UCC 1-207] to permit a reservation of rights whenever a negotiable instrument is used to make payment on an existing debt, regardless of the nature of the underlying [transaction] between the parties, the commercial law of negotiable instruments is rendered more simple, clear and uniform” (Horn Waterproofing Corp. v Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 66 NY2d 321, 331 [emphasis added]). We additionally note that at page 331 of the Horn opinion, the court cites with approval to Cohen v Ricci (120 Misc 2d 712), a case where, as here, a check was given as payment for property damage to the claimant’s automobile arising out of the defendant’s negligence. This lends further support to the conclusion that Horn is to be read as applying section 1-207 of the Code to all transactions where a claim is settled by check, notwithstanding that the underlying obligation is not one covered under the substantive law of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Ostrau, P. J., Parness and McGooe, JJ., concur.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Judgment entered January 4, 1989 affirmed, without costs, for the reasons stated in the decision of Alice Schlesinger, J., at the Civil Court.

[277]*277As correctly noted in the decision below, defendant’s tender of a check in settlement of claimant’s property damage claim brought the transaction within the reach of section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Court of Appeals has stated: "By construing the section [UCC 1-207] to permit a reservation of rights whenever a negotiable instrument is used to make payment on an existing debt, regardless of the nature of the underlying [transaction] between the parties, the commercial law of negotiable instruments is rendered more simple, clear and uniform” (Horn Waterproofing Corp. v Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 66 NY2d 321, 331 [emphasis added]). We additionally note that at page 331 of the Horn opinion, the court cites with approval to Cohen v Ricci (120 Misc 2d 712), a case where, as here, a check was given as payment for property damage to the claimant’s automobile arising out of the defendant’s negligence. This lends further support to the conclusion that Horn is to be read as applying section 1-207 of the Code to all transactions where a claim is settled by check, notwithstanding that the underlying obligation is not one covered under the substantive law of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Ostrau, P. J., Parness and McGooe, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

146 Misc. 2d 276, 556 N.Y.S.2d 190, 1990 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deverna-v-kinney-systems-inc-nyappterm-1990.

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