SPER1i tF UAM 1 21118 HAY —4n 10: 23 2 V. tRK C CIJ 3
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 5 MONICA ANN NINETE DEVERA, ) CIVIL CASE NO. CVOO28-18 6 As Special Administratrix of the Estate of ) Charles Vincent Ninete Blas, ) ) 8 PLAINTIFF, ) v. ) DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING 9 ) DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS GUAM HEALTHCARE DEVELOPMENT, ) 10 INC., dba GUAM REGIONAL MEDICAL ) 11 C1TY,JOHN DOES 1-10; JOHN DOES ) ENTITIES 1-10; AND JOHN DOE ) 12 INSURANCE BUSINESSES 1-10, ) DEFENDANT. ) 13
14 Introduction 15 This matter came before the Honorable Maria T. Cenzon on April 11, 2018 for a 16 Scheduling Conference. Defendant Guam Healthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional 17 Medical City (“Defendant”) appeared through counsel, Attorney G. Patrick Civille. Plaintiff 18 Monica Ann Ninete Devera, as Co-administratrix of the Estate of James Patrick Sablan 19 (“Plaintiff’) was present and represented by Attorney Gloria Rudolph. During the scheduling 20 conference, the Court informed the parties that it is prepared to make a ruling on Defendant’s 21 Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay Proceedings filed by Defendant on February 1, 22 2018.1 Having reviewed the record, the relevant law, and the parties’ arguments, the Court ruled 23 from the bench GRANTING Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. This Decision and Order further 24 memorializes the Court’s ruling. 25
26 The Court previously ruled on an identical motion in another case; that the Court does not have subject matter 27 jurisdiction over a medical malpractice claim without the claimant first arbitrating its claims. See Manibusan v. GRMC (Superior Court of Guam Civil Case No. CVI 165-17). 28 Monica Ann Ninete Devera, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Vincent Ninete Bias v. Guam Healthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional Medical City; CV0028- 18 D&O Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Page 1 of 5 . 1 Background
2 This matter arises out of the “medical treatment that was rendered on Charles [Vincent
3 Ninete Bias] on or around January 16 - 23, 2017, and thereafter,” performed by Defendant.
4 Verified Complaint for Damages, p. 3 (Jan. 12, 2018). Plaintiff seeks damages based on fraud,
5 negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death. Id.
6 On February 1, 2018, Defendant filed the instant motion requesting the Court to Dismiss
7 Plaintiffs claims for failure to arbitrate or Stay the Proceedings until after arbitration. On March
8 1, 2018, Plaintiff opposed Defendant’s Motion through the Opposition to [Defendant’s] Motion
9 to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay Proceedings. On March 15, 2018, Defendant filed a Reply
10 to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay Proceedings.
11 Discussion
12 Defendant cites to two Superior Court cases which involve identical issues, Soumwei v.
13 GRMC (Superior Court of Guam Civil Case No. CV0584-17) and Manibusan v. GRMC
14 (Superior Court of Guam Civil Case No. CV 1165-17). Tn both cases, the Courts granted
15 Defendant’s motion; the latter was decided by this Court. In Manibusan, this Court found
16 Plaintiffs failure to arbitrate its medical malpractice claim warrants dismissal pursuant to Rule
17 12(b) (1) of the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court finds the circumstances in this case
18 and the law as described in 10 Guam Code Ann. § 10102 remain the same.2
19 a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
20 Rule 12(b) (1) provides the basis for dismissing a civil action for the lack of jurisdiction
21 over the subject matter. Guam R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). Jurisdiction is a threshold issue and any
22 motion challenging a trial court’s jurisdiction over a matter may be dispositive of the entire case.
23 See Petition of Quitugua v. flores, 2004 Guam 19 ¶ 31. Under 10 Guam Code Ann. § 10102,
25 2 Notably, the Plaintiffs in Soumwei, Man ibusan, and this case are represented by the same firm, Lujan & Wolff, LLP and the Defendant in all three cases is Guam Healthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional Medical City 26 represented by Attorney G. Patrick Civille of the Civille and Tang, PLLC.
27 The statute in its entirety provides:
28 Monica Ann Ninete Devera, as SpecialAdministratrix of the Estate of Charles Vincent Ninete Bias v. Guam Healthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional Medical CuT; CV0028-l $ D&O Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Page 2 of 5 1 malpractice claimants are required to submit their claims to arbitration prior to bringing a court
2 action. Villagomez-Palisson v. Superior Court, 2004 Guam 13, ¶(J[ 8-9, 34 (emphasis added).
3 Hence, if a claimant fails to first arbitrate its medical malpractice claims, the Court does not have
4 subject matter jurisdiction.
5 Plaintiffs counsel once again argues substantial compliance with Section 10102
6 mandating arbitration satisfies the requirements under the statute, specifically arguing that since
7 the statute only requires a claim “be submitted to mandatory arbitration,” mere submission is all
8 that is required. P1. Opp. to Defs. Mot. to Dismiss, at p. 6 (quoting 10 GCA § 10102) (emphasis
9 in Plaintiffs motion). Plaintiffs counsel misconstrues the clear language of the statute.
10 The Court continues to rely on JP Morgan Chase Bank v. SFR Investments Pool, wherein
ii the Nevada Supreme Court opined that “in determining whether strict or substantial compliance
12 is required, courts examine the statute’s provisions, as well as policy and equity considerations.”
13 200 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1170 (2016) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, courts examine
14 “whether the purpose of the statute or rule can be adequately served in a manner other than by
15 technical compliance with the statutory or rule language.” Id. Thus, Courts generally strictly
16 construe time and manner requirements, while substantial compliance with a statute may be
17 sufficient for form and content requirements. Id.
18 Plaintiffs argument conflicts with the opinion of the Guam Supreme Court in
19 Vittagomez-Patisson v. Superior Court, 2004 Guam 13 ¶ 30, wherein the Guam Supreme Court
20 found the legislative purpose to be as follows:
21 [Title 10, Chapter 10] was passed as a result of the perceived problem associated with the increase in the cost of malpractice insurance, and even its unavailability. 22 The committee found that the island was faced with a dilemma due to the passing 23 Mandatory arbitration. Any claim that accrues or is being pursued in the territory of Guam, 24 whether in tort, contract, or otherwise, shalt be submitted to inandatoiy arbitration pursuant to the terms of this Chapter if it is a controversy between the patient, his relatives, his heirs-at-law or 25 personal representative or any third party or other party, and the health professional or health care institution, or their employees or agents, and is based on malpractice, tort, contract, strict liability, 26 or any other alleged violation of a legal duty incident to the acts of the health professional or health care institution, or incident to services rendered or to be rendered by the health professional 27 or health care institution.
28 Monica Ann Ninete Devera, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Vincent Ninete Bias v. Guam Heatthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional Medical City; CV0028-l8 D&O Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Page 3 of 5 . 1 on of high medical fees and costs to the consumer, as well as the increase in costs of medical care due in part to the tendency of physicians to practice “defensive 2 medicine” to avoid malpractice suits.
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SPER1i tF UAM 1 21118 HAY —4n 10: 23 2 V. tRK C CIJ 3
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 5 MONICA ANN NINETE DEVERA, ) CIVIL CASE NO. CVOO28-18 6 As Special Administratrix of the Estate of ) Charles Vincent Ninete Blas, ) ) 8 PLAINTIFF, ) v. ) DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING 9 ) DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS GUAM HEALTHCARE DEVELOPMENT, ) 10 INC., dba GUAM REGIONAL MEDICAL ) 11 C1TY,JOHN DOES 1-10; JOHN DOES ) ENTITIES 1-10; AND JOHN DOE ) 12 INSURANCE BUSINESSES 1-10, ) DEFENDANT. ) 13
14 Introduction 15 This matter came before the Honorable Maria T. Cenzon on April 11, 2018 for a 16 Scheduling Conference. Defendant Guam Healthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional 17 Medical City (“Defendant”) appeared through counsel, Attorney G. Patrick Civille. Plaintiff 18 Monica Ann Ninete Devera, as Co-administratrix of the Estate of James Patrick Sablan 19 (“Plaintiff’) was present and represented by Attorney Gloria Rudolph. During the scheduling 20 conference, the Court informed the parties that it is prepared to make a ruling on Defendant’s 21 Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay Proceedings filed by Defendant on February 1, 22 2018.1 Having reviewed the record, the relevant law, and the parties’ arguments, the Court ruled 23 from the bench GRANTING Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. This Decision and Order further 24 memorializes the Court’s ruling. 25
26 The Court previously ruled on an identical motion in another case; that the Court does not have subject matter 27 jurisdiction over a medical malpractice claim without the claimant first arbitrating its claims. See Manibusan v. GRMC (Superior Court of Guam Civil Case No. CVI 165-17). 28 Monica Ann Ninete Devera, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Vincent Ninete Bias v. Guam Healthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional Medical City; CV0028- 18 D&O Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Page 1 of 5 . 1 Background
2 This matter arises out of the “medical treatment that was rendered on Charles [Vincent
3 Ninete Bias] on or around January 16 - 23, 2017, and thereafter,” performed by Defendant.
4 Verified Complaint for Damages, p. 3 (Jan. 12, 2018). Plaintiff seeks damages based on fraud,
5 negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death. Id.
6 On February 1, 2018, Defendant filed the instant motion requesting the Court to Dismiss
7 Plaintiffs claims for failure to arbitrate or Stay the Proceedings until after arbitration. On March
8 1, 2018, Plaintiff opposed Defendant’s Motion through the Opposition to [Defendant’s] Motion
9 to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay Proceedings. On March 15, 2018, Defendant filed a Reply
10 to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay Proceedings.
11 Discussion
12 Defendant cites to two Superior Court cases which involve identical issues, Soumwei v.
13 GRMC (Superior Court of Guam Civil Case No. CV0584-17) and Manibusan v. GRMC
14 (Superior Court of Guam Civil Case No. CV 1165-17). Tn both cases, the Courts granted
15 Defendant’s motion; the latter was decided by this Court. In Manibusan, this Court found
16 Plaintiffs failure to arbitrate its medical malpractice claim warrants dismissal pursuant to Rule
17 12(b) (1) of the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court finds the circumstances in this case
18 and the law as described in 10 Guam Code Ann. § 10102 remain the same.2
19 a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
20 Rule 12(b) (1) provides the basis for dismissing a civil action for the lack of jurisdiction
21 over the subject matter. Guam R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). Jurisdiction is a threshold issue and any
22 motion challenging a trial court’s jurisdiction over a matter may be dispositive of the entire case.
23 See Petition of Quitugua v. flores, 2004 Guam 19 ¶ 31. Under 10 Guam Code Ann. § 10102,
25 2 Notably, the Plaintiffs in Soumwei, Man ibusan, and this case are represented by the same firm, Lujan & Wolff, LLP and the Defendant in all three cases is Guam Healthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional Medical City 26 represented by Attorney G. Patrick Civille of the Civille and Tang, PLLC.
27 The statute in its entirety provides:
28 Monica Ann Ninete Devera, as SpecialAdministratrix of the Estate of Charles Vincent Ninete Bias v. Guam Healthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional Medical CuT; CV0028-l $ D&O Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Page 2 of 5 1 malpractice claimants are required to submit their claims to arbitration prior to bringing a court
2 action. Villagomez-Palisson v. Superior Court, 2004 Guam 13, ¶(J[ 8-9, 34 (emphasis added).
3 Hence, if a claimant fails to first arbitrate its medical malpractice claims, the Court does not have
4 subject matter jurisdiction.
5 Plaintiffs counsel once again argues substantial compliance with Section 10102
6 mandating arbitration satisfies the requirements under the statute, specifically arguing that since
7 the statute only requires a claim “be submitted to mandatory arbitration,” mere submission is all
8 that is required. P1. Opp. to Defs. Mot. to Dismiss, at p. 6 (quoting 10 GCA § 10102) (emphasis
9 in Plaintiffs motion). Plaintiffs counsel misconstrues the clear language of the statute.
10 The Court continues to rely on JP Morgan Chase Bank v. SFR Investments Pool, wherein
ii the Nevada Supreme Court opined that “in determining whether strict or substantial compliance
12 is required, courts examine the statute’s provisions, as well as policy and equity considerations.”
13 200 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1170 (2016) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, courts examine
14 “whether the purpose of the statute or rule can be adequately served in a manner other than by
15 technical compliance with the statutory or rule language.” Id. Thus, Courts generally strictly
16 construe time and manner requirements, while substantial compliance with a statute may be
17 sufficient for form and content requirements. Id.
18 Plaintiffs argument conflicts with the opinion of the Guam Supreme Court in
19 Vittagomez-Patisson v. Superior Court, 2004 Guam 13 ¶ 30, wherein the Guam Supreme Court
20 found the legislative purpose to be as follows:
21 [Title 10, Chapter 10] was passed as a result of the perceived problem associated with the increase in the cost of malpractice insurance, and even its unavailability. 22 The committee found that the island was faced with a dilemma due to the passing 23 Mandatory arbitration. Any claim that accrues or is being pursued in the territory of Guam, 24 whether in tort, contract, or otherwise, shalt be submitted to inandatoiy arbitration pursuant to the terms of this Chapter if it is a controversy between the patient, his relatives, his heirs-at-law or 25 personal representative or any third party or other party, and the health professional or health care institution, or their employees or agents, and is based on malpractice, tort, contract, strict liability, 26 or any other alleged violation of a legal duty incident to the acts of the health professional or health care institution, or incident to services rendered or to be rendered by the health professional 27 or health care institution.
28 Monica Ann Ninete Devera, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Vincent Ninete Bias v. Guam Heatthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional Medical City; CV0028-l8 D&O Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Page 3 of 5 . 1 on of high medical fees and costs to the consumer, as well as the increase in costs of medical care due in part to the tendency of physicians to practice “defensive 2 medicine” to avoid malpractice suits. The Guam Legislature apparently believed that the provisions of the Arbitration Act would remedy what it perceived as a crisis situation in the area of medical malpractice. 4 Id. ¶ 29. Based on these legislative committee findings, the Court finds the clear and unequivocal
intent of the legislature was to require strict compliance with the arbitration requirement to the 6 conclusion of such arbitration. The Court concurs with the Defendant that submitting the claim
first to mandatory arbitration is a time and manner requirement, and therefore should be strictly 8 construed.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff in this case has not actually arbitrated her claims through 10 the AAA, PAMS, or any other arbitration firms. As in Manibusan, supra, the Court’s analysis
stops here. The Court similarly finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction until Plaintiff completes 12 arbitration through the AAA or any other entity organized to arbitrate disputes pursuant to Title 13 10, Chapter 10 of the Guam Code Annotated. 14 b. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim 15 Plaintiff argues that Section 10102 is now invalid since there is no longer an AAA office 16 in Guam. Moreover, Plaintiff would be denied meaningful access to the court if forced to suffer 17 excessive hardship by paying for and having the claim handled by AAA. 18 The Court recognizes, its role in determining whether the “availability of arbitrating 19 before AAA” may violate one’s due process rights. Vitlagomez-Palisson v. Superior Cottrt, 2004 20 Guam 13 ¶ 33. Further, the Court recognizes that 10 GCA § 10101(a) does not specifically limit 21 a claimant to file a claim through AAA and actually provides, “Association means the [AAA] or 22 other entity organized to arbitrate disputes pursuant to this Chapter.” (emphasis added). Again, 23 the Court is not requiring Plaintiff to arbitrate through the AAA, but the Court determined that 24 Plaintiff is required to actually arbitrate the claims through AAA, PAMS, or any other entity 25 organized to arbitrate. 26
28 Monica Ann Ninete Devera, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Vincent Ninete Bias v. Guam Healthcare Development, inc., dba Guam Regional Medical Cit; CV0028- 18 D&O Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Page 4 of 5 1 Conclusion and Order Dismissing Case
2 Based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court finds dismissal of this action is
3 warranted. The Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
4 It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT
6 No further hearings are scheduled in this matter.
$ 50 ORDERED this NAY 0 4 2018 , nunc pro tunc April 11, 2018.
12 HONOILjBt1MARIAT. CENIZON JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT Of GUAM 13
22 VA cOURTP. 23 thata A wasp 24 ‘L 25
26 CoiL 27
28 Monica Ann Ninete Devera, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Vincent Ninete Bias v. Guam Healthcare Development, Inc., dba Guam Regional Medical City; CVOO2$- 1$ D&O Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Page 5 of 5