Deveney v. City of Boston

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Deveney v. City of Boston

190 N.E.2d 876, 346 Mass. 764

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedMay 31, 1963

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 190 N.E.2d 876 (Deveney v. City of Boston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Deveney v. City of Boston, 190 N.E.2d 876, 346 Mass. 764 (Mass. 1963).

Pincite

Opinion

Decree affirmed. Florence T. Deveney was the owner of three parcels of land in which the city of Boston took tax titles in 1951. In 1954 the city filed a petition in the Land Court to bar her rights of redemption. G. L. c. 60, § 65 (as amended through St. 1938, c. 305). Florence T. Deveney, although receiving notice by registered mail, filed neither appearance nor answer. On May 24, 1957, a motion for general default was allowed. On December 8, 1960, a decree was entered barring all rights of redemption. G. L. c. 60, § 69 (as amended through St. 1945, c. 226, § 1). On October 18, 1961, the petitioner filed this petition to vacate the decree. G. L. c. 60, § 69A, inserted by St. 1945, e. 226, § 2. On October 11, 1962, a judge of the Land Court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appealed. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 185, § 15; c. 60, § 72. The judge found that the petitioner had every opportunity to file an answer “in the tax lien ease” and to raise any competent matter, and that the ends of justice would not be promoted by reopening the case. No error appears. Bucher v. Randolph, 307 Mass. 391, 393. Lynch v. Boston, 313 Mass. 478, 480. Although we do not reach the question, we feel constrained to state that the city is in error in its assertion that a “matter” was overlooked in West v. Selectmen of Yarmouth, 345 Mass. 547, 551.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Decree affirmed. Florence T. Deveney was the owner of three parcels of land in which the city of Boston took tax titles in 1951. In 1954 the city filed a petition in the Land Court to bar her rights of redemption. G. L. c. 60, § 65 (as amended through St. 1938, c. 305). Florence T. Deveney, although receiving notice by registered mail, filed neither appearance nor answer. On May 24, 1957, a motion for general default was allowed. On December 8, 1960, a decree was entered barring all rights of redemption. G. L. c. 60, § 69 (as amended through St. 1945, c. 226, § 1). On October 18, 1961, the petitioner filed this petition to vacate the decree. G. L. c. 60, § 69A, inserted by St. 1945, e. 226, § 2. On October 11, 1962, a judge of the Land Court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appealed. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 185, § 15; c. 60, § 72. The judge found that the petitioner had every opportunity to file an answer “in the tax lien ease” and to raise any competent matter, and that the ends of justice would not be promoted by reopening the case. No error appears. Bucher v. Randolph, 307 Mass. 391, 393. Lynch v. Boston, 313 Mass. 478, 480. Although we do not reach the question, we feel constrained to state that the city is in error in its assertion that a “matter” was overlooked in West v. Selectmen of Yarmouth, 345 Mass. 547, 551.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

190 N.E.2d 876, 346 Mass. 764, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deveney-v-city-of-boston-mass-1963.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack