Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Sidden

55 Misc. 3d 872, 53 N.Y.S.3d 465
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 24, 2017
StatusPublished

This text of 55 Misc. 3d 872 (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Sidden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Sidden, 55 Misc. 3d 872, 53 N.Y.S.3d 465 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2017).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Salvatore J. Módica, J.

The above-captioned two cases are combined solely for the purpose of this memorandum decision, raising a common issue on these two otherwise unrelated mortgage foreclosure actions. They both have a common denominator in that the movants, the mortgagors, seek the appointment of a substitute referee for various grounds. In both of the cases combined for decision, this court’s independent research shows that the Justice, now retired, who appointed both of the referees, selected an attorney as the referee who did not qualify as not being on the part 36 list of eligible fiduciaries.

The importance of the issue, since it is hard to find any reported decisions discussing New York’s institution of a “part 36” list of eligible fiduciaries in several denominated categories, has led to this memorandum decision. This decision demonstrates the pitfalls of going beyond the part 36 list in appointing a fiduciary, such as a referee, although a judge is well within her or his rights in doing so—if done properly, as discussed herein.

Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Judge (22 NYCRR part 36) governs the following judicial appointments made by justices and judges of the Unified Court System of New York State: guardians; guardians ad litem, including their counsel and assistants; privately paid law guardians where authorized; court evaluators; attorneys for alleged incapacitated persons; court examiners; supplemental needs trustees; receivers; referees, e.g., a referee to sell property—excluding referees who perform quasi-judicial functions such as those who hear and report (CPLR 4201), hear and determine (CPLR 4301), or supervise discovery (CPLR 3104); secondary appointees of guardians and receivers, e.g., attorney, accountant, appraiser, etc.; and certain public administrators and counsel to public administrations in [874]*874certain regions. (See The Rules of the Chief Judge Part 36: Questions and Answers, available at https://www.nycourts.gov/ ip/gfs/FAQsPart36.pdf.)

In December 2011, New York State’s Commission on Fiduciary Appointments issued an important report (available at https://www.nycourts.gov/ip/gfs/fidcommreport.html). The report’s introduction even candidly indicates that “[o]ver 130 years ago, Benjamin Cardozo’s father, Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Albert Cardozo, was harshly criticized and ultimately forced to leave the bench in large part because of his repeated appointment of relatives and political cronies as fiduciaries.” (Id.) The late Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, observed: “ ‘[PJublic confidence in the courts is put at risk when judicial appointments are based on considerations other than merit. Simply put, the public must have faith that the courts operate free of favoritism and partiality.’ ” (Id.)

In a beautifully written and scholarly article, Understanding Fiduciary Duty (84 Fla BJ [No. 3] 20, 22 [Mar. 2010]), Florida lawyers John F. Mariani, Christopher W. Kammerer, and Nancy Guffey-Landers, discuss the fiduciary duty:

“The most basic duty of a fiduciary is the duty of loyalty, which obligates the fiduciary to put the interests of the beneficiary first, ahead of the fiduciary’s self interest, and to refrain from exploiting the relationship for the fiduciary’s personal benefit. This gives rise to more specific duties, such as the prohibition against self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and the duty to disclose material facts. Perhaps the most famous description of the duty of loyalty is by Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928): “Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
“In addition to a duty of loyalty, a fiduciary also owes a duty of care to carry out its responsibilities in an informed and considered manner and to act as an ordinary prudent person would act in the management of his or her own affairs. If the fidu[875]*875ciary has special skills, or becomes a fiduciary on the basis of representations of special skills or expertise, the fiduciary is under a duty to use those skills” (footnote references omitted).

Aside from Cardozo’s famous statement in Meinhard, made in 1928, for the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Florida, one year earlier, in Quinn v Phipps (93 Fla 805, 811, 113 So 419, 421 [1927]), articulated, with equal polish:

“Stripped of all embellishing verbiage, it may be confidently asserted that every instance in which a confidential or fiduciary relation in fact is shown to exist will be interpreted as such. The relation and duties involved need not be legal; they may be moral, social, domestic or personal. If a relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties (that is to say, where confidence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by the other, or where confidence has been acquired and abused), that is sufficient as a predicate for relief. The origin of the confidence is immaterial.”

The New York State Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments, headed by Sheila L. Birnbaum, Esq., and whose counsel was (now Judge) Lawrence K. Marks, encouraged judges, in making their selections of fiduciaries, to adhere to those listed on the part 36 lists of fiduciaries. The report, in pertinent part, states:

“Judges Should Select Fiduciaries From the OCA List.
“The fiduciary rules should make clear that judges should select fiduciaries from the OCA list. . . .
“In certain situations, however, judges may have reason to appoint a fiduciary who is not included on the list. For example, an individual not on the list may have a particular expertise required in the case or may have some previous involvement with the case or the parties. In these and other limited situations, judges should have authority to appoint someone not on the list, but when they do so they should be required to provide a reason in writing. Appointees who are not on the list, however, should still have to demonstrate that they could qualify for inclusion on the list—that is, that they meet all the criteria for such inclusion. Furthermore, they should be required to make the same filings as are [876]*876required of those on the list.”

The court commends the Commission’s report in advising judges to stick to the part 36 list of eligible fiduciaries, where any person with the proper qualifications can apply and be placed on the list after meeting the criteria and undergoing training and education. The danger of going beyond the part 36 list is real, even where a judge has complied with the writing required of judges for going beyond the part 36 list. One experienced and highly-regarded jurist learned this lesson the hard way. After writing a justification for appointing a lawyer as a receiver for a judgment debtor, the court subsequently learned that the attorney was suspended indefinitely for reasons other than and not involving the appointment. (Compare Konvalin v Tan Hai Ying, 13 Misc 3d 287, 290 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2006] [praising the lawyer for “outstanding adherence to legal ethics”], with Moray v Koven & Krause, Esqs.,

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Related

Meinhard v. Salmon
164 N.E. 545 (New York Court of Appeals, 1928)
Moray v. Koven & Krause
938 N.E.2d 980 (New York Court of Appeals, 2010)
Konvalin v. Tan Hai Ying
13 Misc. 3d 287 (New York Supreme Court, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
55 Misc. 3d 872, 53 N.Y.S.3d 465, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deutsche-bank-national-trust-co-v-sidden-nysupct-2017.