Deutche Bank v. Norton, B.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 7, 2025
• Docket: 53 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A15016-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF COMPANY, TRUSTEE C/O PHH : PENNSYLVANIA MORTGAGE CORPORATION & SAXON : ASSET COMPANY, SECURITY TRUST : 2007-2, MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET : BACKED C, C/O PHH MORTGAGE : CORP. : : : No. 53 MDA 2025 v. : : : BRUCE R. NORTON : : Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered December 6, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No: 2024-SU-001816

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 7, 2025

In this mortgage foreclosure action, Appellant, Bruce R. Norton,

appeals, pro se, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County (“trial

court”) granting summary judgment in favor of the above-captioned Appellees

(referred to here collectively as “Deutsche Bank”). Appellant’s central

contention is that summary judgment was improperly awarded because he

had submitted a third party’s affidavit which raised a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether the mortgage note for the subject property was forged. We

agree with the trial court that this exact issue already has been resolved

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A15016-25

against Appellant in a prior matter, thus barring Appellant from now seeking

relief on that identical ground. Thus, the order on review is affirmed.

On January 26, 2007, Appellant executed a fixed mortgage rate Balloon

Note on a property located at 1328 Brighton Circle, Seven Valleys,

Pennsylvania 17360. The first three of the Balloon Note’s four pages contain

blank spaces for the borrower’s initials. The copy of the Balloon Note

contained in the certified record shows that the letters, “BN,” were hand-

written in those spaces.1 On the fourth and final page of the Balloon Note,

there appears the handwritten signature of Appellant (“Bruce R. Norton”),

which he admits was in fact signed by him. For many years, Appellant made

timely payments as required by the terms of the Balloon Note.

As of 2019, Deutsche Bank was the holder of the Balloon Note on the

subject property. A pre-foreclosure notice was sent by Deutsche Bank to

Appellant on January 18, 2019, advising that he had missed monthly

payments required by the terms of the Balloon Note. Deutsche Bank filed a

complaint in mortgage foreclosure on May 7, 2019, and during the

proceedings, it was asserted that, as of January 5, 2021, Appellant owed

$304,588.26 on the loan. Appellant’s primary defense in that foreclosure

action was that

1 These first three pages of the Balloon Note include the material terms of the

loan, such as the total principal amount ($261,800.00), the amount of monthly payments ($1,598.46), and the terms of the borrower’s potential default on the mortgage.

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his initials on the pages of the Note and the Balloon Note are not his and therefore are forged. [Appellant] also believes that the terms of the Mortgage Note were materially altered. [Appellant] does admit that the last page of the [Balloon] Mortgage Note appears to contain his signature.

Trial Court Memorandum Opinion Granting Summary Judgment, 4/21/2021,

at 2.

In support of his defense, Appellant executed and submitted an affidavit

in which he averred that his purported initials on the Balloon Note were forged.

See id. at 4. Deutsche Bank moved for summary judgment, contending that

there existed no genuine issues of material fact, notwithstanding Appellant’s

allegation of forgery. The trial court agreed that summary judgment was

proper on that basis in part because Appellant’s affidavit did not raise a

material question of fact:

After thorough review, the Court is unable to conclude that [Appellant’s] affidavit regarding his initials are credible. First, [Appellant] does not provide the Court with his version of the Note that he has been paying on for over a decade to show that the terms have been altered as he suggests. [Appellant] has not presented the court with an expert to support the forgery allegation. [Appellant] does not deny that he has failed to make a payment since November 2018 and that he owes money on the Note. Moreover, there is no requirement that each page of the Note be initialed.

Id. at 5.

The trial court entered an order granting Deutsche Bank’s motion for

summary judgment, and that order was upheld on appeal by this Court in

Deutsche Bank v. Norton, No. 629 MDA 2021 (Pa. Super. filed March 11,

2022) (unpublished memorandum). In that opinion, this Court stressed that

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Appellant’s allegation of forgery on the part of Deutsche Bank was insufficient

to raise an issue of material fact, preventing Appellant from surviving

Deutsche Bank’s summary judgment motion:

The gravamen of his . . . issue is that the existence of forged initials “indicates that the person who forged the initials wants people to believe a party has read, understood[,] and assents to the statement, paragraph, or page when that party has not done any of those things.” Appellant’s Brief, at 38. Consequently, “[f]orgery of signatures or initials after the fact must constitute material alterations of the instrument. If the initials are forged then the instrument is dead and not binding on any J-S30043-21 party.” However, Norton also concedes that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not require initials throughout a document for it to be a valid instrument.

The note contains Norton’s full signature at the end of the document, and he has not refuted that he was the signator in that particular instance. Further, as the trial court pointed out, Norton made payments in conjunction with this note for over a decade.

A “vague and inadequate proffer,” is insufficient to demonstrate that summary judgment was improperly granted. Norton continues to suggest that alleged forged initials on the document, in the context of his actual signature appearing at the document’s end, has legal import and renders the note invalid. Norton has not provided any authority, either on point or via analogy, to demonstrate this specific proposition.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Norton, he has failed to demonstrate that the lower court either abused its discretion or committed an error of law. While he contends that there is at least one triable issue of material fact, he has provided no clear basis to demonstrate that one exists. Therefore, we are compelled to affirm the lower court’s order granting summary judgment.

Order affirmed.

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Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added, some internal citations omitted).

Norton later cured the default soon after a sheriff’s sale of the property

was scheduled. He then made timely mortgage payments until, according to

Deutsche Bank, he again defaulted, prompting the instant foreclosure action,

which Deutsche Bank filed on June 18, 2024. Appellant filed his pro se Answer

with New Matter on July 16, 2024, and Deutsche Bank filed its Reply to New

Matter on July 23, 2024, closing the pleadings.

On October 15, 2024, Deutsche Bank filed its Motion for Summary

Judgment. Appellant filed a brief in opposition to that motion on October 25,

2024. He relied upon the affidavit of a third party, Michelle Donaldson, to

argue that there existed a question of material fact as to the validity of the

Balloon Note. See Defendant’s Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment, 10/25/2024 (Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Michelle Donaldson).

According to Donaldson, she is a notary public, and a “Maryland Title

Insurance Producer.” Id. She averred that, in the state of Maryland, she had

served as the closing agent and notary public in 47 real estate transactions

with Appellant. See id. Of those, Donaldson only specifically referred to two

transactions on June 21, 2005. See id. Donaldson stated that, after

reviewing the Balloon Note for the subject property, executed on January 26,

2007, she determined that the handwritten initials at the bottom of its pages

did not match the initials written by Appellant in any of the Maryland

documents. See id.

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The trial court granted Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment.

Judgment in rem was awarded to Deutsche Bank, and against Appellant, “in

the amount of $397,841.05, as of August 14, 2024, plus interest at the

contract.” Trial Court Order, 12/4/2024. Appellant then moved for

reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment, and the motion was

denied. After Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal, the trial court

submitted a 1925(a) opinion giving the reasons why the order should be

upheld. Of relevance in this appeal, the trial court stressed that “one of the

faults with [Appellant’s] argument, besides the lack of evidence, is that these

very issues were previously litigated by [the Superior Court] and resolved

against him.” Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 1/21/2025, at 3.

In his brief, Appellant ostensibly raises two issues for our consideration:

1. Are there material issues of fact that are in question?

2. Did the lower court fail to consider the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5-6 (Statement of Questions Involved) (suggested

answers omitted).

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in ruling that his fraud

defense was procedurally barred due to being previously litigated in the earlier

foreclosure action filed by Deutsche Bank. See id. at 16. The sole basis he

advances as to why his fraud defense was not barred is that the affidavit of

Michelle Donaldson is “new evidence that was not available prior to the

decision on the previous record, and when the decision on the previous record

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was based on fraudulent acts by one or more of the parties.” Appellant’s Brief,

at 16.

On review of an order granting summary judgment, the following

standards apply:

Pennsylvania law provides that summary judgment may be granted only in those cases in which the record clearly shows that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the burden of proving that no genuine issues of material fact exist. In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the trial court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Thus, summary judgment is proper only when the uncontraverted allegations in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of record, and submitted affidavits demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In sum, only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, may a trial court properly enter summary judgment.

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we must examine the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. With regard to questions of law, an appellate court's scope of review is plenary. The Superior Court will reverse a grant of summary judgment only if the trial court has committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law based on the facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration.

Weible v. Allied Signal, Inc., 963 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

and brackets omitted).

“In an action for mortgage foreclosure, the entry of summary judgment

is proper if the mortgagors admit that the mortgage is in default, that they

have failed to pay interest on the obligation, and that the recorded mortgage

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is in the specified amount.” Cunningham v. McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054,

1057 (Pa. Super. 1998) (citation omitted).

The doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bars a party from

relitigating an issue, such as alleged fraud, when that identical issue was

decided in a prior action. See generally In re Coatesville Area Sch. Dist.,

244 A.3d 373, 379-80 (Pa. 2021). This preclusion doctrine applies where:

the issue is the same as in the prior litigation; the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior action; and the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.

Id., at 379; see also Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 464

A.2d 1313, 1318-19 (Pa. Super. 1983) (citations omitted) (same).

Collateral estoppel is similar to the doctrine of res judicata, which is

commonly referred to as “claim preclusion.” See id. at 378. While both

doctrines bar relitigation of a previously decided issue, res judicata requires

the claim to be the same in both the present and the prior action. See id.2

Both doctrines, however, bar a party from relitigating issues “that either were

2 Courts have commented that “[t]he doctrine of res judicata subsumes the

doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.” Khalil v. Cole, 240 A.3d 996, 1001–02 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Chada v. Chada, 756 A.2d 39, 42 (Pa. Super. 2000)). That is, in a number of decisions, “res judicata” is described as encompassing both (a) issue preclusion/collateral estoppel, and (b) claim preclusion, or “technical” res judicata. See e.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 794 A.2d 936, 939 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (“Technical res judicata provides that where a final judgment on the merits exists, a future lawsuit on the same cause of action is precluded.”).

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raised or could have been raised in the prior proceeding.” Khalil v. Cole,

240 A.3d 996, 1001–02 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting McArdle v. Tronetti, 426

Pa. Super. 607, 627 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1993)) (citations omitted; emphasis in

original).

“A judgment is deemed final for purposes of res judicata or collateral

estoppel unless or until it is reversed on appeal.” Shaffer v. Smith, 543 Pa.

526, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 1996) (citation omitted). The preclusion of a

previously litigated claim or issue is “premised on practical considerations”

such as “avoiding the ‘cost and vexation’ of repetitive litigation, conserving

judicial resources, ‘and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encouraging

reliance on adjudication.’” In re Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., 244 A.3d at

379 (citing Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d 47,

50-51 (Pa. 2005)).

In the case at hand, the dispositive question is whether Appellant’s

current allegation of fraud against Deutsche Bank is procedurally barred. The

record conclusively shows that the issue of purported fraud raised by Appellant

is the same issue he raised in the prior foreclosure action against Deutsche

Bank. The prior foreclosure action resulted in a final judgment on the merits,

and Appellant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the

asserted fraud in that prior action. Accordingly, Appellant is now barred, or

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collaterally estopped, from raising any issue that was, or could have been,

raised in the prior foreclosure action.3

Nevertheless, Appellant argues vaguely, and without any reference to

legal authority, that his fraud claim is not barred because the affidavit of

Michelle Donaldson (supporting his allegation of fraud) is “new evidence”

which was not available in the prior action. The lack of any authority in

support of his argument, taken alone, would be fatal to Appellant’s position. 4

But even assuming that that Pennsylvania law would recognize a “new

evidence” exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, it would not be

availing to Appellant in this case.

In her affidavit, Donaldson stated that the initials of Appellant on the

Balloon Note to the subject property are inconsistent with the initials of

Appellant written on dozens of other mortgage documents executed in

3 We note that claim preclusion (technical res judicata) would not apply because the causes of action here and in the prior foreclosure case are not the same. In both cases, Deutsche Bank alleged that Appellant defaulted on the mortgage, but the respective default periods fell on different date ranges.

4 Appellate briefs must include a separate argument section for each question

that is argued, with each argument supported “by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). An appeal may be quashed or dismissed where a brief does not “conform in all material respects with the requirements” of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. “Appellate arguments which fail to adhere to these rules may be considered waived, and arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived. Arguments not appropriately developed include those where the party has failed to cite any authority in support of a contention.” Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29–30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

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Maryland. However, the only Maryland transactions that Donaldson

mentioned in her affidavit were completed on June 21, 2005. The Balloon

Note on the subject property was completed about a year and a half later, on

January 26, 2007. Deutsche Bank did not file the prior foreclosure action until

12 years after that, in 2019.

At the time of that prior foreclosure action, Appellant would have had a

full and fair opportunity to bolster his fraud claim with evidence that his

purported initials on the Balloon Note did not match his initials in other

mortgage documents. Appellant cannot credibly contend that he is excepted

from the doctrine of collateral estoppel due to the discovery of so-called “new

evidence” when that evidence was in fact not new at all. See Khalil, 240

A.3d at 1005 (rejecting plaintiff's fraud claim because she “had [the]

opportunity to press her fraud claim in the [prior] suit”); see also Fannie

Mae v. Ferreri, No. 2563 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. filed April 24, 2025)

(unpublished memorandum) (“Ferreri's claims regarding lack of standing and

fraud were previously argued and rejected in the underlying Foreclosure Case

by both the trial court and this Court. Therefore, Ferreri is precluded from

relitigating the issues under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue

preclusion.”).

Appellant’s fraud defense here is simply an attempt to relitigate the prior

foreclosure action in which Deutsche Bank prevailed. As discussed above, and

recounted by this Court, summary judgment was previously granted in favor

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of Deutsche Bank and against Appellant, who had asserted in the earlier action

that his initials on the Balloon Note to the subject property had been forged.

See Norton, No. 629 MDA 2021.

Appellant makes an identical claim in the instant foreclosure action, and

his supposedly new evidence of fraud he now relies upon is of no moment.

Accordingly, Norton’s defense is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel,

and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for Deutsche

Bank.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/07/2025

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