Deuschel v. California Health and Human Services Agency
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Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL DEUSCHEL, No. 24-3129 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-03458-MMC v. MEMORANDUM* CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY; Doctor MARK GHALY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 23, 2025 ** Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and HINDERAKER, District Judge.***
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable John Charles Hinderaker, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. Michael Deuschel appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his First
Amended Complaint (FAC). The district court dismissed the FAC, with prejudice,
for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because the FAC
did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of the FAC pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and dismissal under Rule 8. Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th
1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2024) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); In re
Dominguez, 51 F.3d 1502, 1508 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal under Rule 8). We
review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s dismissal of a complaint
without leave to amend. United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d
1161, 1172 (9th Cir. 2016).
The district court did not err in dismissing the FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because the FAC did not comply with Rule 8. See Cafasso, U.S.
ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2011)
(collecting cases affirming dismissal without leave to amend under Rule 8(a)
where the complaint is unnecessarily long, repetitive, or confusing). The FAC fails
to specify what actions taken by each defendant caused injury in violation of which
laws.
With respect to dismissal without leave to amend, “court[s] consider[] five
2 24-3129 factors in assessing the propriety of leave to amend—bad faith, undue delay,
prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff
has previously amended the complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655
F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). As to the fourth factor, futility of
amendment, we have explained that “[l]eave to amend is warranted if the
deficiencies can be cured with additional allegations that are ‘consistent with the
challenged pleading’ and that do not contradict the allegations in the original
complaint.” Id. (quoting Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296–97
(9th Cir. 1990)).
In dismissing the FAC without leave to amend, the district court failed to
explicitly consider all the factors for dismissal without leave to amend. With
respect to futility, the district court cited the standard set forth in Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)—that leave to amend should be granted
unless a pleading “could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts”—
but failed to identify any reasons for concluding that the FAC could not be cured
with additional allegations. See DCD Programs v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186
(9th Cir. 1987) (“If a district court believes the plaintiff is not able to state a claim,
it should provide written findings explaining this. . . . [I]n the absence of written
findings or a record which clearly indicates reasons for the district court’s denial,
this court will reverse a denial of leave to amend.”). The district court’s
3 24-3129 observation that it was “unable to discern any attempt in the FAC to revise the
complaint in such a way as to cure or even address the deficiencies identified in the
Court’s prior screening order” does not suffice as consideration of futility because
it does not address whether, if granted leave to amend, Deuschel could have stated
a claim with additional allegations.
The fifth factor—that Deuschel had previously amended his complaint—is
the sole cited basis for the district court’s denial of leave to amend. However, “[a]s
a general rule, leave to amend may be denied when a plaintiff has demonstrated a
‘repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.’” United
Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d at 1183 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Deuschel had only one opportunity to amend his claims; thus, if the district
court’s sole basis for dismissal without leave to amend was that Deuschel failed to
cure the pleading deficiencies after one attempt at amendment, then dismissal
without leave to amend was an abuse of discretion. See Garmon v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016) (“A district court abuses its discretion
by denying leave to amend unless amendment would be futile or the plaintiff has
failed to cure the complaint’s deficiencies despite repeated opportunities.” (citation
omitted)). This is particularly true because the district court also did not permit
Deuschel to propose further amendments to the FAC. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Although
4 24-3129 leave to amend should be given freely, a district court may dismiss without leave
where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading
deficiencies and amendment would be futile.”).
Furthermore, the district court did not identify a basis for dismissing the case
with prejudice. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052
(9th Cir. 2003) (“A district court’s failure to . . . articulate why dismissal should be
with prejudice instead of without prejudice may constitute an abuse of
discretion.”).
We therefore reverse the district court’s order dismissing the FAC without
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