Detroit v. Dean

106 U.S. 537, 1 S. Ct. 560, 27 L. Ed. 300, 16 Otto 537, 1882 U.S. LEXIS 1575
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 22, 1883
Docket73
StatusPublished
Cited by54 cases

This text of 106 U.S. 537 (Detroit v. Dean) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Detroit v. Dean, 106 U.S. 537, 1 S. Ct. 560, 27 L. Ed. 300, 16 Otto 537, 1882 U.S. LEXIS 1575 (1883).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Field

delivered the opinion of the court.

In December, 1871, the Mutual Gas-Light Company of Detroit was created a corporation under a general law of Michigan, for the purpose of manufacturing,' selling, and furnishing gas for consumption in Detroit. The proposed corporators had previously made application to the common, council to authorize the corporation, when formed,- to lay gas-pipes, mains, conductors, and service-pipes in the avenues, 4 streets, lanes, highways, alleys, public parks, and squares throughout the city; and obtained the passage of an ordinance granting permission to the company to lay the pipes, subject, however, to certain conditions. Power was conferred by law upon the city authorities to grant the permission “ upon such reasonable regulations as they might prescribe; ” and they provided that the permission should cease if the company should, at any time, combine with any other company concerning rates to be charged for gas either to the city or to private consumers ; and that the company should not sell its property, franchises, or privileges to any other gas-light company, under the penalty of a forfeiture of its works to the city. The company accepted the terms of the-ordinance; erected its manufacturing works in the township of Hamtranck, just beyond the boundary of the city; laid mains and service-pipes in the streets, and in November, 1872, commenced distributing and supplying gas to private consumers and to the city, and continued to do so up to the time this suit was commenced.

During this period, and previously, another corporation, known as The Detroit-Gas-Light Company, was in existence, and was also supplying gas to private consumers and the city. In June, 1877, the two companies entered into an agreement to divide the city between them, one to take the part lying easterly of the middle of Woodward Avenue, and the other the part lying westerly of it, each to transfer to the other its' property situated in the portion of the other, and each stipulating not to lay mains or to supply gas in the portion of the other, *539 reserving, however, the right to fulfil all obligations resting upon it with respect to any portion of the city. The difference' in the value of the property exchanged was $140,000 in favor of the old company, and this sum the new company agreed to PaY-

The common council, deeming this division of the city, and other things done or omitted by the company, to constitute a breach of the conditions upon which permission to lay its pipes in the streets had been granted, passed, on the 14th of December, 1877, an ordinance repealing the previous one, reciting as reasons for it that the company had not built its gas-works in the city of Detroit, but in the township of Hamtranck; that it had entered into an agreement with the Detroit Gas-Light Company to divide the territory of Detroit between them for the supply of gas; and that it had refused to lay mains in streets on petition of owners or occupants of buildings for a supply of gas.

The repealing ordinance declared that the company had thus forfeited its gas-pipes, mains, conductors, and service-pipes lying within the avenues, streets, lanes, highways, alleys, public parks, and squares of the city, and all other property situated within its limits; and that the title to the whole had vested in the city of Detroit. It therefore directed the comptroller to assume possession and control of the same and to serve a copy of the ordinance upon the company. To restrain 'the enforcement of this ordinance and protect the rights and property of the company the present suit was commenced by the complainant, a citizen of New York.. The company had expended large sums of money in the construction of its works, and created for that purpose a debt, represented by bonds secured by mortgage upon its property, which, with interest, amounted to $650,000. There was, therefore, an urgent necessity for legal proceedings to stop the seizure of the property. There were only three directors of the company, ’ two of them residents of Detroit and one of New York; and as the company could not maintain .a suit in the Federal court against the city, they devised such a case of refusal on their part to take the necessary legal proceedings to protect the property and rights of the company as to *540 give jurisdiction to the Federal court of a suit brought for that purpose by the non-resident director and stockholder.. The three directors discussed the matter among themselves. The president represents himself to have been very belligerent in his disposition. According to his statement, he professed not to want any legal proceedings taken. He proposed to settle the matter by force, and if any man attempted to take the property, to shoot him on the spot. His feelings on the subject must have been very intense, for more than two months afterwards he testified under oath that he would “ most assuredly ” have shot any man who meddled with him “ as quick as wink; ” as quick as he would have shot a burglar in his house at midnight. Dean, the complainant, another director, favored more pacific methods ; he desired legal proceedings to be instituted. The third director, Meddaugh, was similarly disposed. He was a member of the bar of Michigan, and acting as one of the attorneys of the company. He favored legal proceedings, but expressed a want of confidence in the local tribunals of the State by reason of the then excited condition of ihe public mind; he desired to get into the Federal court, and so he resolved to object to a suit in - the State courts. ' A meeting of the directors was thereupon improvised in his office to carry out the course resolved upon. Dean then asked that the officers of the company be instructed to protect its property and rights from the execution of the threat contained in the repealing ordinance of the city, and for that purpose to bring suit in the proper court. The matter being discussed, it was resolved, “ That the company, convinced of the improbability of obtaining redress or justice in the local courts, which would be its only recourse, in the present excited condition of the public mind — the press of th¿ city having, for some timé past, continually aggravated public feeling by exaggeration and falsehood — cannot prudently enter into a litigation with the city, and that no such attempt on its part would now be made.” Dean voted against the resolution, the other two directors' in favor of it. The resolution having passed, Dean, on the following day, commenced the present suit, alleging the refusal of the directors to institute proceedings in the name of the company. The bill was read in the presence of the three *541 directors, and one of them, Meddaugh, acted as a solicitor in the case.

It is impossible to read the testimony of the president contained in the record, with his hesitating and evasive answers to the interrogatories of counsel, and not be convinced that the refusal, which constituted the basis of the present suit, was made for the express purpose of enabling a suit to be brought in the Federal court, and that no such refusal would have been given if that result had not been desired. It was an attempt to get into the Federal court upon a pretence, that 'justice was impossible in the State courts, owing to the excited condition of the public mind. .The only party who could seek redress in a Federal court, by.

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Bluebook (online)
106 U.S. 537, 1 S. Ct. 560, 27 L. Ed. 300, 16 Otto 537, 1882 U.S. LEXIS 1575, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/detroit-v-dean-scotus-1883.