Detroit Motor Appliance Co. v. Taylor

66 F.2d 319, 18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 226, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 2635
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedAugust 1, 1933
DocketNo. 4862
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 66 F.2d 319 (Detroit Motor Appliance Co. v. Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Detroit Motor Appliance Co. v. Taylor, 66 F.2d 319, 18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 226, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 2635 (7th Cir. 1933).

Opinion

ALSCHULER, Circuit Judge.

Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment dismissing, for want of equity, its bill charging appellees with infringement of United States patent to Crawford (assigned to appellant), No. 1,352,184, September 7, 1920, for improvement in radiator shields.

The invention has to do with means for regulating the ilow of the air through automobile radiators for the purpose of cooling the water which circulates therein in order to keep the engine cool. As is well stated in appellees’ brief: “The inventive concept of Crawford, therefore, was to take the old radiator consisting of core covered by a separate covering shell of sheet metal, admittedly old, extend the shell in front forward farther than it had been done previously, and mount in this forward extension of the shell in front of the radiator core, the shutter,, which in closed position closed the front open panel of the shell and in open position exposed the air and water tubes of the radiator core to the air which might pass baekwardly through the panel and the open shutters.”

Claims 1, 4, and 8 are involved. Claim 4, appearing in the margin,1 is sufficiently typical. All are combination claims whereof each of the elements is old in the art.

It is claimed that this invention brought together for the first time the extension beyond the face of the radiator proper of the shell or shield which surrounds it, and the shutters, mounted upon and within such extension, adapted to be opened or closed for regulating the extent of the opening for the air intake..

The court found that Crawford’s claim 1 is without patentable novelty in view of prior United States patent to Wright, No. 1,152,585; and that his claims 4 and 8 are void- of invention and without patentable novelty in view of said patent to Wright, patent to Furber, No. 1,114,246, and patent to Brock, No. 774,556.

Appellees’ main reliance is upon the Wright patent, application for which was filed December 14, 1912. This device shows an extension of the radiator shield or shell beyond the radiator face, and at the front of the extension a series of fixed flat metal bars in the form of a grid, with open spaces between the bars, and with a corresponding sliding member for covering and uncovering the spaces. The contention is that before Crawford there were in this art shutters for regulating the air intake, and that it did not involve invention to substitute shutters for grids.

The Furber patent shows a structure not contained within the shield or shell itself, but adapted to be bolted to and carried on the core of the radiator. It showed shutters for regulating the intake, contained within this added structure.

The Brock patent, November 8, 1904, shows devices for cooling or heating the water in the radiators. It mentions pivoted slats as one means of opening and closing the walls of the casing; but it appears that the arrangement is not part of .the shield or shell itself, if, indeed, such a shield is there shown; but it is bolted onto the radiator and not to an extension of the shield or shell, as in Furber.

Appellant contends that if in Wright shutters were substituted for grids, it would still fall short of showing the Crawford combination. If it be assumed that with such substitution Wright and Crawford would be substantially identical, it would be at least doubtful whether invention over Wright would be involved in the Crawford device; and were it not for the evidentiary influence of transactions between the parties, to which reference will hereinafter be made, we might be inclined to resolve the doubt in accordance with fact finding No. 10.

Fact finding No. 12 is to the effect that [321]*321the Crawford patent is void of patentable novelty in view of the patents to Carter, Keizer, Tibbetts, and Fekete. As to this aj>pellees’ brief admits that if the twelfth finding of fact is on the basis that the four patents last named anticipate Crawford, and show invention earlier than the invention date to which Crawford is entitled, the finding is in conflict with the seventh finding, which fixes Crawford’s invention date not later than December 16, 1915, which is prior to the filing date of each of these four patents.

Appellees admit they are bound by this seventh finding as to Crawford’s invention date, and this obviates the need of discussing these patents as prior art or anticipation of Crawford.

Appellees contend that the pendency of so many applications at about this time tends to indicate that the Crawford improvement was the result of the normal growth 'of this art, and did not involve invention. This court’s opinion in Wall Pump & Compressor Co. v. Gardner Governor Co., 28 F.(2d) 334, 339, is cited for appellees on this subject. In support of the principle as there stated we quoted from Walker on Patents (5th Ed.) to the effect that: “The absence of invention may be established in some cases, by evidence that a considerable number of persons who were not inventors, acting independently of each other, and without receiving any information from the patentee or his patent, did in fact contrive the improvement claimed therein, not long after he produced it.” To the same general effect there was cited Concrete Appliances Co. et al. v. Gomery et al., 269 U. S. 177, 46 S. Ct. 42, 70 L. Ed. 222.

There is evidence in this reeord tending to indicate there was not that independence or separateness as tetween Crawford and the others as to invoke hero the application of that rule. The evidence indicates that Crawford was lacking in funds, and that for some time before filing his application he sought to interest various concerns in his invention; and it is quite possible, under the evidence, that the somewhat sudden development of more or less similar devices for year round regulation of air flow for cooling water in automobile radiators was stimulated by Crawford’s showing of his plans, and his undertaking to interest manufacturers therein, long before Ms patent was granted, and before oven his application was filed.

It does not appear that Wright ever came into use. Indeed, there is evidence to indicate that about the time the license contract expired attempt was made to employ the Wright grids on some of General Motors’ radiators, but without success.

We are satisfied that Crawford brought together a new combination of old elements wMch resulted in some advance over the pri- or art, find the determining question is whether this involved invention.

-Had the controversy followed shortly after the granting of the patent, and without the experiences of the years intervening since Crawford’s invention date, it is quite possible that our conclusion would coincide with that of the District Court, which found that invention was not involved. But it happens that since Crawford’s filing date (September 18, 1916) things have transpired which must he considered in determining the doubtful question of invention.

It appears that prior to March 27, 1917, Crawford had assigned to appellant this application for patent, and a number of other applications for United States patents in the same field. Appellant had acquired also the above referred to United States patent No. 3,114,246, to Eurber, October 20, 3914, for improvements in “temperature-controlling apparatus for internal-combustion engines,” and also a number of other applications for patents for more or less similar devices.

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66 F.2d 319, 18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 226, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 2635, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/detroit-motor-appliance-co-v-taylor-ca7-1933.