Detroit Gear & Machine Co. v. Helvering

75 F.2d 660, 64 App. D.C. 141, 15 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 272, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3023
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJanuary 14, 1935
DocketNo. 6240
StatusPublished

This text of 75 F.2d 660 (Detroit Gear & Machine Co. v. Helvering) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Detroit Gear & Machine Co. v. Helvering, 75 F.2d 660, 64 App. D.C. 141, 15 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 272, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3023 (D.C. Cir. 1935).

Opinion

GRONER, Associate Justice.

Petitioner is a Michigan corporation whose principal business is the manufacture and sale of automobile parts and transmissions.

Some time prior to January 1, 1927, its general manager procured a license agreement with the owner of a patent, and in 1926 he and his associates caused two new corporations to be organized under the laws of Michigan for the purpose of exploiting the patent. The name of one was Norge Corporation and the other Refrigeration Products Company. Norge Corporation immediately after its organization acquired all the common capital stock of petitioner and three-quarters of the capital stock of Refrigeration Products Company. The remaining quarter of stock of the latter company was issued to petitioner. These stock holdings remained the same continuously during the period from January 12, 1927, to and through September 30, 1928.

Prior to the taxable year 1927 petitioner had filed its income tax returns on the basis of the calendar year. During 1927 it obtained permission from the Commissioner to report its income on the basis of a fiscal year ending September 30th.

Norge Corporation, immediately upon its organization, adopted the fiscal year ending September 30th as its annual accounting period.

Refrigeration Products Company, in order to keep its financial affairs distinct from the other corporations, adopted the calendar year. Norge Corporation and petitioner filed consolidated income tax returns for the fiscal period ended September 30, 1927, and for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1928. Refrigeration Company filed separate tax returns for the calendar years 1927 and 1928. The Commissioner determined that during the entire taxable years 1927 and 1928 all three corporations were affiliated within the meaning of section 240 of the Revenue Act of 1926 (26 USCA § 993), and section 142 of the Revenue Act of 1928 (26 USCA § 2142), and the Commissioner further determined that, because Refrigeration Company had elected to file a separate return for the-year 1927 and had not been granted by him permission to change its basis for the year 1928, the income tax liability of all [661]*661three corporations must be determined on the basis of the separate incomes of each company.

On being notified of this decision, petitioner, Norge Corporation, and Refrigeration Company requested the Commissioner to consolidate the incomes of the three companies for the years involved. This request was denied.

The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the Commissioner’s determination, and petitioner appealed to this court. Petitioner contends that the circumstances — which we shall a little later notice in detail — under ■which a separate return was filed by Refrigeration Company were such as not to constitute an election by petitioner to have its tax liability determined upon a separate basis.

The Revenue Act of 1926 and the Revenue Act of 1928 both provide that corporations affiliated within the meaning of sections 240 (a) and 142 (a) of those acts respectively, 26 USCA §§ 993 (a), 2142 (a), may “make separate returns or * * * make a consolidated return of net income” for income tax purposes. Section 142 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1928 (26 USCA § 2142 (a) provides that, if the return for the taxable year 1927 was made upon either of such bases, the return for 1928 shall be upon the same basis unless permission to change the basis is granted by the Commissioner. Therefore the return for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1928, must be on the same basis as that filed for the fiscal period, January 1, 1927, to September 30, 1927, since admittedly no permission to change the basis was granted by the Commissioner. For that reason we confine our discussion to the latter period, since the decision as to that period is determinative of the whole controversy.

It is conceded that the right of election to file one or another sort of return, which the statute gives, is exercised by filing the return. Radiant Glass Co. v. Burnet, Commissioner, 60 App. D. C. 351, 54 F.(2d) 718. Petitioner, however, contends that the facts in this case are such as to remove it and its affiliates from the operation of the rule. Briefly stated, the ground on which it seeks to escape is that at the expiration of its 1927 fiscal period, Refrigeration Company was not affiliated with it and Norge Corporation so as to entitle the former to join it and Norge in a consolidated return. The basis of this contention is article 633 of Regulations 69 of the Treasury Department, then in effect and which construed the words of section 240 (c), Revenue Act 1926, 26 US CA § 993 (c), “the same interests,” to apply only when the percentage of stock held by each stockholder in two or more corporations is substantially the same in each of the corporations. As it happens here, Norge Corporation owned 100 per centum of petitioner’s capital stock and 75 per centum of Refrigeration Company’s stock, and petitioner owned 25 per centum of Refrigeration Company’s' stock. Hence, as petitioner points out, the three corporations were not owned by the same interests in substantially the same proportion.

The Commissioner concedes that as of September 30, 1927, this was true, but says that on November 12, 1927, more than two months before petitioner’s return was filed, Treasury Decision 4100 was promulgated, amending article 633 so as to permit the filing of a consolidated return in a case of affiliation such as the one under consideration.1

We have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that, at the time petitioner filed its return, namely, the middle of January 1928, and for more than two months prior to that time, there was nothing to hinder or prevent the filing of a consolidated return on behalf of all three corporations. And this is true, because at the time mentioned the affiliated status of the three corporations was precisely in the language of the statute. This accordingly brings us to a discussion of the question, whether, by reason of the modification of the Commissioner’s regulation, petitioner and/or its parent, Norge Corporation, were misled so that the filing by Refrigeration Company of a separate return at the instance of the parent, cannot be said to be such an election to be taxed separately as to make that election binding on the affiliated group. If the circumstances of the filing of the return by the parent corporation, which included petitioner, or the filing of the return by Refrigeration Company, showed clearly that these returns were filed under the mistaken belief that the regulation was unchanged and hence that a consolidated return, including all three corpo[662]*662rations, was not' permissible under the statute and regulations, we should be loath to say that the course pursued was binding or exhausted the option which the statute' gives; and we'say this, as we have said it before, on the ground that, where there is a complete reversal of policy on the part of the Treasury Department and scant opportunity of notice 'to those affected, it would be both arbitrary and unreasonable to deprive the'taxpayer of rights given him by the Revenue Acts or to hold him, as in this case, to an election made without knowledge of his rights. In saying this, we do not mean to -intimate that the taxpayer is not bound by his misinterpretation or misconstruction of the law, or that he should he relieved because of his failure to know the law, but we are speaking entirely to the matter of an election between two inconsistent rights, either of which may be availed of by the taxpayer under-the tax laws.

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Related

Duke Power Co. v. Commissioner
44 F.2d 543 (Fourth Circuit, 1930)
Radiant Glass Co. v. Burnet
54 F.2d 718 (D.C. Circuit, 1931)

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75 F.2d 660, 64 App. D.C. 141, 15 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 272, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3023, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/detroit-gear-machine-co-v-helvering-cadc-1935.