Detrius Roberson v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: June 28, 2022
• Docket: 2020-CA-01208-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-CA-01208-COA

DETRIUS ROBERSON APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/20/2020 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. GEORGE M. MITCHELL JR. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ATTALA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM SCOTT MULLENNIX CODY WILLIAM GIBSON ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/28/2022 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Detrius Roberson filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) seeking a new trial

based on a trial witness’s recanted testimony. After an evidentiary hearing on Roberson’s

PCR motion, the Attala County Circuit Court entered an order denying the motion.

¶2. Roberson now appeals. After our review, we find that the circuit judge’s denial of

Roberson’s PCR motion was supported by substantial evidence and was not clearly

erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

¶3. Roberson, along with Justin James, Buddy Love, and Robert Landfair, allegedly robbed a retail shop in Kosciusko, Mississippi. One person was shot and killed during the

robbery.

¶4. After the incident, two eyewitnesses identified Love as one of the robbers. Love was

subsequently arrested, and he identified James, Roberson, and Landfair as the other people

involved in the crime.

¶5. Roberson and James were tried as co-defendants, and Love was tried separately. After

their trial, Roberson and James were convicted of armed robbery, manslaughter, conspiracy

to commit armed robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial judge sentenced

Roberson and James to serve a total of sixty years in the custody of the Mississippi

Department of Corrections.

¶6. Roberson, collaterally with James, appealed his convictions. This Court affirmed the

circuit court’s judgment. James v. State, 146 So. 3d 985, 987 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).

James’s PCR motion

¶7. Approximately one year later, James filed a PCR motion seeking a new trial on the

ground that a trial witness and co-conspirator, Love, had recanted his testimony from

Roberson’s and James’s trial.

¶8. The circuit judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on James’s PCR motion. Love

testified at the evidentiary hearing and recanted his trial testimony implicating James and

Roberson in the shooting and robbery. Love claimed that he testified falsely during the trial

because he and James were in rival gangs, and the gang leaders told him to implicate

2 Roberson and James in the crime to get them off of the streets. Love also claimed that

Landfair had Roberson’s phone during the robbery.

¶9. After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit judge entered an order denying James’s PCR

motion. The circuit court stated that in making its determination, he had reviewed Love’s

testimony during the trial and evidentiary hearing, as well as the transcript from Landfair’s

guilty-plea hearing. Prior to Roberson’s and James’s trial, Landfair pled guilty to conspiracy

to commit armed robbery and accessory after the fact to armed robbery. During the plea

hearing, Landfair testified that Love, James, and Roberson were involved in the robbery and

shooting. The circuit judge found that although Landfair refused to testify at Roberson’s and

James’s trial, Landfair never recanted his testimony from his plea hearing.

¶10. Regarding Love’s trial testimony, the circuit judge found that although Love made

some inconsistent statements, “he was always consistent in the persons involved . . . [and]

their actions at the scene.” The circuit judge also found Love’s trial testimony “to be

sufficiently corroborated by other witnesses and the cell phone records produced at trial,”

while “his recanted testimony is uncorroborated.” The circuit judge ultimately determined

that Love’s recantation was “totally fabricated and not true.”

¶11. James appealed, and this Court affirmed the circuit judge’s denial of James’s PCR

motion after finding that “James failed to prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that

the recantation entitled him to a new trial.” James v. State, 220 So. 3d 989, 991 (¶7) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2016).

3 Roberson’s PCR motion

¶12. Turning to the PCR motion currently before us, on October 27, 2016, the Mississippi

Supreme Court granted Roberson’s petition seeking leave to file a PCR motion in the circuit

court. On February 1, 2017,1 Roberson filed his PCR motion seeking an evidentiary hearing

and a new trial based on Love’s recanted trial testimony.2 Roberson asserted in his PCR

motion that “[t]here is a reasonable possibility that, had Love’s false testimony not been

admitted, a different result would have been reached at trial.” In support of his PCR motion,

Roberson attached affidavits from Love, Landfair, Jonshay Bell, Jermaine Griffin, and

Jimmy Young.

¶13. In Love’s affidavit, he stated that his testimony from Roberson’s trial was untrue.

Love explained that he testified falsely against Roberson and James because they were in

rival gangs, and Love was given orders to “get rid of” Roberson and James. Roberson

maintained that the affidavits of Bell, Griffin, Young, and Landfair corroborate the assertions

made in Love’s affidavit.

¶14. On September 23, 2019, the circuit judge held an evidentiary hearing on Roberson’s

PCR motion. At the hearing, the circuit judge heard testimony from four witnesses: Love,

1 This Court affirmed Roberson’s convictions on direct appeal on February 11, 2014, and Roberson filed his PCR motion within three years of that ruling, as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020). 2 At some point after filing his first PCR motion, Roberson retained new counsel. On June 12, 2018, Roberson’s new counsel filed a second PCR motion asserting the same claims and seeking the same relief that Roberson sought in the first motion.

4 Landfair, Griffin, and Young. Upon being sworn in, Love invoked his Fifth Amendment

rights and refused to testify. However, Roberson’s counsel submitted a copy of Love’s

testimony from Roberson’s trial into evidence, as well the transcript from James’s 2015 PCR

evidentiary hearing where Love recanted his trial testimony. As stated, at James’s

evidentiary hearing, Love testified that Roberson and James were not present or involved in

the robbery or shooting. Love stated that Landfair was present during the robbery and

shooting, and Love claimed that Landfair had Roberson’s phone with him during that time.

¶15. Landfair testified next. In his affidavit, which Roberson attached to his PCR motion,

Landfair stated that on the night of the robbery and shooting, Roberson was not with him.

Landfair’s affidavit further stated that Landfair had Roberson’s cell phone with him that

night. However, during the evidentiary hearing, Landfair testified that the contents of the

affidavit were not true. Landfair admitted that he signed the affidavit, but explained that he

did not realize he was under oath when he signed it. Landfair testified that he signed the

false affidavit because he “got tired of the harassment” from his and Roberson’s friends

asking him to sign it, and also because he wanted to help Roberson. Landfair stated that he

“didn’t think [he] could convince a judge that [he] had everybody[’s] phone.”

¶16. Landfair informed the circuit judge that his original testimony from his plea hearing

was the truth of what actually happened during the robbery and shooting—that Roberson

approached him about participating in a robbery; that he, Roberson, James, and Love went

to the retail shop together with guns for the purposes of committing robbery; and that

5 Landfair did not have Roberson’s cell phone with him that night. The transcript from

Landfair’s plea hearing was admitted into evidence.

¶17. The circuit judge then heard testimony from Griffin and Young. Griffin and Young

both testified that they attended a Gangster Disciples meeting where the head of the gang

ordered Love to take Roberson and James off the streets by implicating them in the robbery

that Love committed. Neither Griffin nor Young were present during the robbery and

shooting.

¶18. Although Bell did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, the circuit judge reviewed

Bell’s affidavit. In his affidavit, Bell stated that he was in prison with Love. According to

Bell, Love told him that Love was coerced into implicating Roberson and James in the

robbery, and that Landfair had Roberson’s phone during the robbery.

¶19. After the hearing, the circuit judge entered an order denying Roberson’s PCR motion.

The circuit judge enumerated all of the documents that he read and examined in making his

decision, including Roberson’s PCR motion and attached affidavits; the transcripts from

Roberson’s trial, James’s evidentiary hearing, and Landfair’s plea hearing; as well as

applicable case law. The circuit judge found that Roberson “has not presented any evidence

to this [c]ourt that the result of his original trial would be any different if the recanted

testimony was accepted and believed by this [c]ourt.”

¶20. Roberson subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the order denying his PCR

motion or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which the circuit judge denied. This appeal

6 followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶21. When reviewing a circuit judge’s denial of a PCR motion after an evidentiary hearing,

we apply “the clearly erroneous standard.” Whitehead v. State, 299 So. 3d 899, 904 (¶15)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2020). “The supreme court has explained that a finding of fact is clearly

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire

evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johns v. State, 926 So. 2d 188, 196 (¶36) (Miss.

2006)). We review issues of law de novo. Id. (citation omitted). “As the PCR movant,

[Roberson] has the burden of showing [he] is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Id.

DISCUSSION

¶22. Roberson argues that the circuit judge erred by denying his PCR motion after finding

that Roberson failed to meet his burden of proof regarding Love’s recanted testimony.

¶23. Because he sought a new trial based on Love’s recanted testimony, Roberson had to

prove “to the satisfaction of the [circuit] judge at the evidentiary hearing . . . the perjury

existed by showing that the recantation was material, and . . . [that] the result of a new trial

would be different than the one reached.” Howell v. State, 163 So. 3d 240, 248 (¶10) (Miss.

2014). At an evidentiary hearing on a PCR motion, the petitioner bears the burden of

proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the relief.” Miss. Code

7 Ann. § 99-39-23(7) (Rev. 2020). Roberson maintains that he met this burden based on

Love’s recanted testimony, Landfair’s affidavit stating that he committed perjury at his plea

hearing, and the affidavits of Bell, Griffin, and Young, which Roberson claims corroborated

Love’s statements.

¶24. “[R]ecanted testimony, if believed by the [circuit] judge, may in some situations

require a new trial. But the mere fact a trial witness later recants does not itself necessitate

a new trial.” Graves v. State, 187 So. 3d 173, 176 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). The

determination of whether a new trial is warranted based on recanted testimony is “left to the

sound discretion of the [circuit judge] and should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”

Peeples v. State, 218 So. 2d 436, 439 (Miss. 1969). “Typically, the [circuit] judge is tasked

with deciding if the witness was lying at trial or later at the PCR hearing.” Graves, 187 So.

3d at 176 (¶13). Our supreme court has cautioned that “[r]ecanting testimony has been

shown to be extremely unreliable and should be approached with suspicion.” Peeples, 218

So. 2d at 439. “A court will usually deny a new trial based on recanting testimony where it

is not fully satisfied regarding the truthfulness of the testimony.” Id. We recognize that

“[c]redibility decisions [on recanted testimony] are for the [circuit] judge, not this [C]ourt.”

Graves, 187 So. 3d at 176 (¶12).

¶25. The circuit judge held an evidentiary hearing regarding Love’s recanted testimony.

When Love refused to testify, Roberson’s counsel submitted a copy of Love’s testimony

from Roberson’s trial into evidence, as well the transcript from James’s PCR evidentiary

8 hearing where Love recanted his prior trial testimony implicating Roberson in the crime. The

circuit judge also heard testimony from Landfair, Griffin, and Young, and he examined

Roberson’s PCR motion and the attached affidavits, as well as the transcripts from

Roberson’s trial and Landfair’s plea hearing. Additionally, the circuit judge examined

James’s PCR motion seeking a new trial based on Love’s recanted testimony, the transcript

from James’s evidentiary hearing, the circuit judge’s order denying James’s PCR motion, and

this Court’s opinion affirming the denial of James’s PCR motion.

¶26. After reviewing the testimony and evidence, the circuit judge denied Roberson’s PCR

motion. The circuit judge explained that Roberson “has not presented any evidence . . . that

the result of his original trial would be any different if the recanted testimony was accepted

and believed by this [c]ourt.” The circuit judge referenced the order denying James’s PCR

motion, observing that the circuit judge in that case “found [Love’s] recanted testimony to

be totally fabricated and not true.” The circuit judge also cited this Court’s decision

affirming Roberson’s conviction on direct appeal. There, we held that Roberson’s (and

James’s) convictions “are supported by more evidence than just the testimony of Love, the

co-conspirator.” James, 146 So. 3d at 995 (¶34). This Court explained that the convictions

were supported by Roberson’s and James’s phone records, eyewitness testimony, and “the

discovery of an unspent 9-millimeter round in James’s car after the shooting.” Id.

¶27. After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the circuit judge’s credibility

assessments and denial of Roberson’s PCR motion were clearly erroneous. Because the

9 circuit judge’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

¶28. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY BARNES, C.J., AND McDONALD, J.; McCARTY, J., JOINS IN PART.

WESTBROOKS, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING:

¶29. Because I am bound to follow the applicable law, I concur with the majority’s

disposition in this case. I write separately because more objective guidance is needed to

evaluate recanted testimony. Our Supreme Court has held, as a general rule, that recanted

testimony is unreliable and should be met with suspicion and skepticism. Howell v. State,

989 So. 2d 372, 384 (¶33) (Miss. 2008). In addition, a new trial is granted when the court

is “fully satisfied regarding the truthfulness of the [recanted] testimony.” Peeples v. State,

218 So. 2d 436, 439 (Miss. 1969) (emphasis added). The criminal justice system relies

heavily on testimony and the long-standing tradition of bringing a case to the point of

finality. See Smith v. State, 492 So. 2d 260, 264 (Miss. 1986), superseded by statute on other

grounds as recognized in McClendon v. State, 539 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Miss. 1989).

¶30. As mentioned by the majority, the determination of whether a new trial is warranted

based on recanted testimony “is left to the sound discretion of the [circuit judge] and should

not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Peeples, 218 So. 2d at 439. Notwithstanding my

agreement with today’s outcome, the rules for recanted testimony as currently applied subject

defendants like Roberson to the unknown standards of each court. I would suggest that our

10 Supreme Court look to the approach adopted in New York, where the New York Court of

Appeals established factors to evaluate the credibility of recanted testimony. New York

considers recantation using the following factors:

(1) the inherent believability of the substance of the recanting testimony; (2) the witness’s demeanor both at trial and at the evidentiary hearing; (3) the existence of evidence corroborating the trial testimony; (4) the reasons offered for both the trial testimony and the recantation; (5) the importance of facts established at trial as reaffirmed in the recantation; and (6) the relationship between the witness and defendant as related to a motive to lie[.]

People v. Wong, 784 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).

¶31. It would not be difficult for our Supreme Court to adopt or adapt New York’s

approach because the factors support our existing rules and provide consistent guidance for

evaluating recanted testimony. In fact, this framework fully analyzes the circumstances of

the disavowed testimony and provides clarity to the defendant filing claims based on

recantation. Again, I write separately not only to shine a light on the minimal guidance

provided regarding recanted testimony, but to offer a potential solution that would provide

greater guidance, leave our general rules intact, and prevent injustice.

BARNES, C.J., AND McDONALD, J., JOIN THIS OPINION. McCARTY, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.