HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.
Brought by plaintiffs, each claiming to be a member of Consolidated Tile and Deck Coverings, a limited partnership under the laws of New York, the suit was for partnership accounting and for damages.
The claim1 as to each plaintiff, was that he and the others, by agreement between [78]*78them all, became members of a limited partnership, but that defendants had conspired to deprive each of the plaintiffs of his interest in the partnership and appropriate it to themselves.
The defense was a denial that the partnership alleged had been formed, a denial that defendants had conspired to defraud, or had defrauded, plaintiffs, or any of them, and an affirmative claim that while Sylvester Detrio was at one time a member of a partnership with defendants but not the one claimed by plaintiffs, he had withdrawn, and defendants had tendered, and were tendering him $10,145.99, the full value of his interest.
Tried to the court without a jury, the inquiry was directed, indeed limited, to whether plaintiffs, or any of them, were, or had been, partners as alleged by them.
The district judge, of the opinion that the evidence taken as a whole failed to establish that plaintiffs had formed a partnership as they alleged, that they were, therefore, not entitled to recover in this suit as such partners, and that the payment of $7500 by Detrio to Boylan for a 14 percent interest was contingent on the partnership being formed, so found and gave judgment accordingly. The judgment, however, was without prejudice to the right of Sylvester Detrio to proceed with the suit he then had pending in New York against the individual defendants, and to obtain in it an accounting as to the partnership he had with defendants, such partnership not, however, the partnership alleged and claimed in the Federal Court suit.
Plaintiffs are here insisting that, in so finding and adjudging, the district judge failed to find and give effect to undisputed, indeed admitted, facts establishing a partnership, as claimed by plaintiffs, and the downright and uncontingent character of Detrio’s purchase from Boylan, that his findings were, therefore clearly erroneous, and that because they were his judgment must be reversed.
In addition, it is claimed: (1) That the court erred, as to all of the plaintiffs, in refusing inspection of the books of the partnership; (2) that if he did not err as to all of them, he certainly did so as to Sylvester Detrio who admittedly was or had been a partner of the defendants; and (3) that Sylvester Detrio having elected to prosecute his suit in the Southern District of Mississippi, it was error to decline to grant him the relief sought and remit him for it to New York.
Appellants urge upon us that in finding and concluding as he did, that no partnership was formed, the district Judge fell into the error of not distinguishing between the [79]*79two sets 'of discussions the parties had entered upon. One of these was the February-March discussion which resulted in the oral agreement that Louis Detrio would reenter the partnership as a general partner with a profit sharing interest of 36%. The other was the discussion looking to the making of the January 2nd, 1945 written agreement. They insist that this is a wholly untenable view and that on the undisputed evidence there is no basis for the judge’s view that the oral agreement was still unreached and these later discussions were continuing and abortive efforts to reach it. These, they say, are the undisputed facts as to these two separate sets of discussions:
First, there were discussions resulting in an oral agreement thoroughly understood, agreed to, and acted on, that Louis Detrio should become again, as of March 1st, one of two general partners, in the limited partnership which had its inception on Feb. 28, 1943, and had been since amended from time to time, with the profit sharing percentages then agreed on, 36% to Boylan and 36% to Detrio.
Second, and this was after the oral agreement had become effective and the partnership thus formed was in active operation under it, Boylan undertook to bring Marks, his brother-in-law in, and it was in the discussion then had that for the first time difficulties and confusions arose.
Third, that these difficulties attended and only attended, the efforts to change the partnership, already orally formed and in operation, by obtaining the execution of a written agreement to change that partnership. These changes were: (1) Marks was to be brought in as a limited partner with a 16 per cent interest contributed by Boylan and Detrio; (2) the effective date of the partnership was to be changed from March 1st to January 2nd; and (3) Paragraph 13 of the agreement was to be amended to give the general partners a power to require the withdrawal of a limited partner.
While, therefore, they insist that their proof was sufficient to establish final agreement of all the parties on these changes, and that the agreement was made abortive by the conspiracy between Glasscheib and Boylan to break the partnership up, they urge with greater conviction that, if wrong in this, the evidence establishes without conflict that Sylvester and Louis Detrio were, and are, partners with Boylan and Glasscheib under the oral agreement of February, 1945.
As to Marks and Louis Detrio, they insist further that if they did not become members of a limited partnership they acquired by assignments from Boylan an interest of respectively 8% and 14%, in the profits and since, under New York law2 and generally,3 an interest in a partnership is assignable, Boylan and the partnership must account to them for those interests.
The appellees, on their part, insist that the evidence amply supports all of the district judge’s findings and that it cannot be said of any of them that they are clearly erroneous.
It has been impossible for us to reconcile the conflicting claims of the parties as to what the record reveals by merely checking their citations to it. We have, therefore, laboriously read the whole 2000 pages of it, finding the story 4 it unfolds presented with [80]*80a tediousness, a prolixity and a repetitiousness almost beyond 'belief, but, except in a few particulars to be later noticed, without substantial conflict.
This story, until the blow-up came in the summer of 1945, is one of friendly and cordial relations between Louis Detrio and Felix Boylan, the general partners, of their great liberality and generosity toward the limited partners, and of an equal friendliness and co-operation with them and with each other on the part of Detrio’s brothers and Glasseheib. It is also a story of formal informality, informal formality, of [81]*81things agreed to in substance orally and thereafter acted on as agreed, and later, only as matter of form, reduced to writing.
In the face, then, of Boylan’s testimony: “His brothers and Mr. Glasscheib agreed to an amended agreement where he would come back into the company as of March 1st” (Rec. 699), and of that at Record p. 710: (Q) “About March 1st, it was agreed among you that Mr. Louis Detrio was to come back into the partnership as a full partner with a 36% interest ?” 5
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HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.
Brought by plaintiffs, each claiming to be a member of Consolidated Tile and Deck Coverings, a limited partnership under the laws of New York, the suit was for partnership accounting and for damages.
The claim1 as to each plaintiff, was that he and the others, by agreement between [78]*78them all, became members of a limited partnership, but that defendants had conspired to deprive each of the plaintiffs of his interest in the partnership and appropriate it to themselves.
The defense was a denial that the partnership alleged had been formed, a denial that defendants had conspired to defraud, or had defrauded, plaintiffs, or any of them, and an affirmative claim that while Sylvester Detrio was at one time a member of a partnership with defendants but not the one claimed by plaintiffs, he had withdrawn, and defendants had tendered, and were tendering him $10,145.99, the full value of his interest.
Tried to the court without a jury, the inquiry was directed, indeed limited, to whether plaintiffs, or any of them, were, or had been, partners as alleged by them.
The district judge, of the opinion that the evidence taken as a whole failed to establish that plaintiffs had formed a partnership as they alleged, that they were, therefore, not entitled to recover in this suit as such partners, and that the payment of $7500 by Detrio to Boylan for a 14 percent interest was contingent on the partnership being formed, so found and gave judgment accordingly. The judgment, however, was without prejudice to the right of Sylvester Detrio to proceed with the suit he then had pending in New York against the individual defendants, and to obtain in it an accounting as to the partnership he had with defendants, such partnership not, however, the partnership alleged and claimed in the Federal Court suit.
Plaintiffs are here insisting that, in so finding and adjudging, the district judge failed to find and give effect to undisputed, indeed admitted, facts establishing a partnership, as claimed by plaintiffs, and the downright and uncontingent character of Detrio’s purchase from Boylan, that his findings were, therefore clearly erroneous, and that because they were his judgment must be reversed.
In addition, it is claimed: (1) That the court erred, as to all of the plaintiffs, in refusing inspection of the books of the partnership; (2) that if he did not err as to all of them, he certainly did so as to Sylvester Detrio who admittedly was or had been a partner of the defendants; and (3) that Sylvester Detrio having elected to prosecute his suit in the Southern District of Mississippi, it was error to decline to grant him the relief sought and remit him for it to New York.
Appellants urge upon us that in finding and concluding as he did, that no partnership was formed, the district Judge fell into the error of not distinguishing between the [79]*79two sets 'of discussions the parties had entered upon. One of these was the February-March discussion which resulted in the oral agreement that Louis Detrio would reenter the partnership as a general partner with a profit sharing interest of 36%. The other was the discussion looking to the making of the January 2nd, 1945 written agreement. They insist that this is a wholly untenable view and that on the undisputed evidence there is no basis for the judge’s view that the oral agreement was still unreached and these later discussions were continuing and abortive efforts to reach it. These, they say, are the undisputed facts as to these two separate sets of discussions:
First, there were discussions resulting in an oral agreement thoroughly understood, agreed to, and acted on, that Louis Detrio should become again, as of March 1st, one of two general partners, in the limited partnership which had its inception on Feb. 28, 1943, and had been since amended from time to time, with the profit sharing percentages then agreed on, 36% to Boylan and 36% to Detrio.
Second, and this was after the oral agreement had become effective and the partnership thus formed was in active operation under it, Boylan undertook to bring Marks, his brother-in-law in, and it was in the discussion then had that for the first time difficulties and confusions arose.
Third, that these difficulties attended and only attended, the efforts to change the partnership, already orally formed and in operation, by obtaining the execution of a written agreement to change that partnership. These changes were: (1) Marks was to be brought in as a limited partner with a 16 per cent interest contributed by Boylan and Detrio; (2) the effective date of the partnership was to be changed from March 1st to January 2nd; and (3) Paragraph 13 of the agreement was to be amended to give the general partners a power to require the withdrawal of a limited partner.
While, therefore, they insist that their proof was sufficient to establish final agreement of all the parties on these changes, and that the agreement was made abortive by the conspiracy between Glasscheib and Boylan to break the partnership up, they urge with greater conviction that, if wrong in this, the evidence establishes without conflict that Sylvester and Louis Detrio were, and are, partners with Boylan and Glasscheib under the oral agreement of February, 1945.
As to Marks and Louis Detrio, they insist further that if they did not become members of a limited partnership they acquired by assignments from Boylan an interest of respectively 8% and 14%, in the profits and since, under New York law2 and generally,3 an interest in a partnership is assignable, Boylan and the partnership must account to them for those interests.
The appellees, on their part, insist that the evidence amply supports all of the district judge’s findings and that it cannot be said of any of them that they are clearly erroneous.
It has been impossible for us to reconcile the conflicting claims of the parties as to what the record reveals by merely checking their citations to it. We have, therefore, laboriously read the whole 2000 pages of it, finding the story 4 it unfolds presented with [80]*80a tediousness, a prolixity and a repetitiousness almost beyond 'belief, but, except in a few particulars to be later noticed, without substantial conflict.
This story, until the blow-up came in the summer of 1945, is one of friendly and cordial relations between Louis Detrio and Felix Boylan, the general partners, of their great liberality and generosity toward the limited partners, and of an equal friendliness and co-operation with them and with each other on the part of Detrio’s brothers and Glasseheib. It is also a story of formal informality, informal formality, of [81]*81things agreed to in substance orally and thereafter acted on as agreed, and later, only as matter of form, reduced to writing.
In the face, then, of Boylan’s testimony: “His brothers and Mr. Glasscheib agreed to an amended agreement where he would come back into the company as of March 1st” (Rec. 699), and of that at Record p. 710: (Q) “About March 1st, it was agreed among you that Mr. Louis Detrio was to come back into the partnership as a full partner with a 36% interest ?” 5 (A) “That’s right,” and of the undisputed facts of record that Detrio returned to his partnership drawing status of $2500 per month and his active management as a general partner, it will not do to claim, as appellees do, and the court finds, that for want of a writing this agreement of partnership was incomplete and ineffective.
Nor will it do to claim, as appellees do, and the court finds, that the fact, that the agreement of the general partners with Glasscheib to give him a salary was not communicated and agreed to by the limited partners, prevented the partnership agreement from becoming effective. In the first place, there is no proof whatever that the Detrio brothers did not know of and fully approve this agreement, none that they objected to it in any way. But in the second place, and more important, this matter of Glasscheib’s salary was not a matter with which they had any concern since, under the partnership articles, the entire management, including the fixing of salaries, was vested in the general partners.
Neither, in the face of Boylan’s undisputed testimony: “Each of them (the boys) agreed to give varying percentages and amounting to 22%. So I said, T have 50%, and if I give you 14 of this, for which you will pay me, we’ll both have 36%’., and that was agreed.” (Tr. 710), will it do to find, as the court did, that the purchase of that 14% was a conditional purchase and that it could be disregarded entirely by Boylan and Glasscheib without accounting to Detrio for the profits accruing to that share.
We, therefore, agree with appellant that the findings of the district judge, that the February-March oral agreement was never completed and that no partnership resulted from it, were clearly erroneous, indeed were without any support in the evidence, and that this is so also as to his finding that Detrio’s purchase of 14% from Boylan was contingent and revocable.
When it comes, however, to the finding, that the written agreement, purporting to have been made Jan. 2, 1945, by which the parties sought to change the February-March oral agreement, to introduce Marks as a partner, to make the profit sharing relate back to January 1st, and to empower the general partners to require the withdrawal of a limited partner, was never assented to by all the partners, the matter stands differently. Whatever we, ourselves, as triers of the fact might have found, we are in no doubt that in view of the sharp conflicts the record presents on the issue of Glasscheib’s agreement to these changes, particularly those arising upon the questions of good faith and of the authorship of the letter of July 19th,6 plaintiffs claiming it to be genuine, defendants that it was [82]*82a forgery, we cannot characterize these findings as wholly erroneous. Neither can we say that the court erred in finding with defendants that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover on the written agreement. We, therefore, agree with appellees, that, as to Marks, the judgment must be affirmed.
As to Louis and Sylvester Detrio, however, we agree with appellants that the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions : (1) To find that by oral agreement Louis Detrio re-entered the partnership of March 2, 1945, on a basis of 36% of the profits, and, as of the same date, Sylvester’s percentage of the profits was reduced from 8 to 5 percent; (2) to take and state an account between plaintiffs and defendants on this basis, and (3) to enter judgment accordingly.
Reversed and remanded with directions.