Detric Sheffield v. State
Opinion
Detric Sheffield, appellant, has filed with this Court a motion to dismiss his appeal. The motion is signed by counsel. Attached to the motion is an affidavit signed by Sheffield which states he has read the motion and that it is true and correct. As authorized by Rule 42.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, we grant the motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: September 25, 2007
Date Decided: September 26, 2007
Do Not Publish
*William J. Cornelius, Chief Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment
In a prior appeal, we reversed the trial court's judgment revoking Freddy Hatten's community supervision and remanded the cause, because we found that the trial court failed to adequately inform Hatten on the record of his right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed our judgment because there is no requirement that the trial court admonish a defendant on the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation when the defendant does not contest his guilt in a misdemeanor case. Hatten pleaded true to the motion to revoke in this proceeding. See Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (op. on reh'g). In its opinion reversing our judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeals said, "What remains to be decided, . . . is whether the waiver of right to counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. That is a separate issue apart from the entitlement to admonishments under Faretta." Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332, 334-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Before Hatten pleaded true to the motion to revoke, he signed a written form waiving certain
rights, including his right to an attorney. (1)
In addition to receiving and approving Hatten's waiver form, the trial court inquired into
Hatten's knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights as well as his mental condition and his
understanding of the proceedings. (2)
In the past, there have been some differences of opinion among the courts of appeals as to
when and under what circumstances it is necessary for the trial court to advise a defendant as to his
right to counsel and admonish him on the record as to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. At least part of this uncertainty has now been removed. Since the decision in
Johnson v. State, it is clear that, in misdemeanor cases where the defendant's guilt is not contested,
the trial court is not required to admonish the defendant as to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, but must only see that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to
counsel. Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 116; Garcia v. State, 909 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1995, pet. ref'd); Barras v. State, 902 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, pet. ref'd);
Blocker v. State, 889 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.); State v. Finstad,
866 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App-Waco 1993, pet. ref'd); Cooper v. State, 854 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1993, no pet.). Moreover, the teaching of Johnson and the above-cited courts of appeals cases, all of which
are cited with approval by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332,
is that, if the defendant in a misdemeanor case where guilt is not contested signs a written waiver of
counsel in court and there is no contradicting evidence or any evidence that the defendant was
coerced or intimidated, the record is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant's waiver of
counsel was valid. That is what occurred in this case. Hatten signed an extensive and thorough
written waiver approved by the trial court. There was some testimony about his knowing waiver of
his rights, and in none of the evidence is there any hint that tends to contradict his written waiver.
The trial court found that Hatten freely and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and to a jury trial
and other rights. Paraphrasing the words of the Houston Court of Appeals in Blocker v. State, 889
S.W.2d at 508, we note that, if Hatten had second thoughts about proceeding without a lawyer, he
was free to bring those concerns to the trial court's attention before the entry of his plea of true. Because the record here supports the trial court's finding that Hatten voluntarily and
intelligently waived his right to counsel, we affirm the trial court's judgment. William J. Cornelius Justice* *Chief Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment Date Submitted: August 6, 2002 Date Decided: September 20, 2002 Publish
1. The form reads as follows: Now comes the Defendant herein, in person and WITHOUT an attorney, and
states that he understands the following: 1. The Defendant has the right to remain silent and not make any
statement at all and that any statement the Defendant makes may be
used against him at his trial; 2. Any statement the Defendant makes may be used as evidence against
him in Court; 3. The Defendant has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him
prior to and during any questioning; 4. If the Defendant is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have
a lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning;
and
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