#30117-aff in pt & rev in pt-SRJ 2023 S.D. 40
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
PEGGY A. DETMERS, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
KEVIN COSTNER, Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT LAWRENCE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
THE HONORABLE ERIC J. STRAWN Judge
ANDREW R. DAMGAARD of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, P.C. Sioux Falls, South Dakota
A. RUSSELL JANKLOW of Johnson, Janklow & Abdallah, LLP Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.
STACY R. HEGGE CATHERINE A. SEELEY of Gunderson, Palmer, Nelson & Ashmore, LLP Pierre, South Dakota
ARGUED MARCH 22, 2023 OPINION FILED 08/02/23 ****
DANIEL E. ASHMORE of Gunderson, Palmer, Nelson & Ashmore, LLP Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant and appellee. #30117
JENSEN, Chief Justice
[¶1.] In the early 1990s, Kevin Costner commissioned Peggy Detmers to
create 17 large, bronze sculptures of buffalo and Lakota warriors on horseback to
display at The Dunbar, a luxury resort Costner planned to build on property he
owned near Deadwood, South Dakota. Detmers commenced litigation against
Costner in 2008, after The Dunbar had not been built, alleging that Costner was
required to sell the sculptures and split the profits with Detmers pursuant to the
terms of a prior written agreement (Agreement) because the parties had not agreed
on an alternative location for display of the sculptures. The circuit court rejected
Detmers’ claim and found that the parties had agreed to permanently display the
sculptures at Tatanka, another project Costner developed on some of the same
property where The Dunbar was to be built. This Court affirmed. Detmers v.
Costner, 2012 S.D. 35, 814 N.W.2d 146 (Detmers I).
[¶2.] In 2021, Detmers brought the current action against Costner, alleging
that his sale-listing for Tatanka constituted an anticipatory breach of the
agreement to permanently display the sculptures at Tatanka. In the alternative,
Detmers sought a declaratory judgment that selling the Tatanka property and
relocating the sculptures would trigger Costner’s obligation to sell the sculptures
under the terms of the Agreement. The parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Costner and
denied Detmers’ motion. Detmers appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
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Factual and Procedural History
[¶3.] In 1994, Detmers began her work on the sculptures pursuant to an
oral agreement with Costner. By 2000, believing progress had not been made
toward developing The Dunbar, Detmers refused to finish the sculptures. Costner
and Detmers negotiated and entered into the Agreement on May 5, 2000. As part of
the Agreement, Costner agreed to pay Detmers additional compensation, clarified
Detmers’ royalty rights on reproductions of the sculptures, and provided her with
certain rights regarding the display of the sculptures.
[¶4.] The parties’ arguments in this appeal focus on three paragraphs of the
Agreement:
2. Although I will be the sole owner of all rights in the sculptures, including the copyright, in the sculptures, you will always be attached through your royalty participation. Because I believe that the sculptures are a valuable asset, I feel strongly that it is important that you maintain your 20% of gross retail price royalty on future sales of fine art reproductions (5% of gross retail price royalty on mass market reproductions selling for under $200). However, should you desire to sell that interest to me at some point in the future, I would be happy to discuss that with you in good faith.
3. Although I do not anticipate this will ever arise, if The Dunbar is not built within ten (10) years or the sculptures are not agreeably displayed elsewhere, I will give you 50% of the profits from the sale of the one and one-quarter life scale sculptures after I have recouped all my costs incurred in the creation of the sculptures and any such sale. The sale price will be at [or] above standard bronze market pricing. All accounting will be provided. In addition, I will assign back to you the copyright of the sculptures so sold (14 bison, 3 Lakota horse and riders).
4. We will locate a suitable site for displaying the sculptures if The Dunbar is not under construction within three (3) years after the last sculpture has been delivered to the
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mold makers. In the meantime, until the sculptures are put on display, I will permit you to market and sell reproductions and you can retain eighty percent 80% of the gross retail sales price and pay 20% to me. Once the sculptures are put on public display in public view, agreed upon by both parties (but with the final decision to be made by me if we do not agree), the percentages will reverse, 80% of the gross retail sales price to me and 20% to you. The marketing must proceed as outlined below.
[¶5.] Costner and Detmers began looking for alternative locations to display
the sculptures in 2002, after the sculptures were completed but construction on The
Dunbar had not started. Costner eventually suggested permanently displaying the
sculptures on a portion of the property originally intended to be part of The Dunbar.
This project came to be known as Tatanka and included a visitor center, gift shop,
cafe, interactive museum, and nature walkways to accompany the sculptures.
[¶6.] In 2008, Detmers sued Costner, seeking an order requiring Costner to
sell the sculptures and disburse the sale proceeds consistent with paragraph three
of the Agreement. She alleged that this provision of the Agreement had been
triggered because The Dunbar had not been built and the sculptures were “not
agreeably displayed elsewhere[.]” She claimed she had not agreed to the permanent
display of the sculptures at Tatanka in the absence of The Dunbar and that
Tatanka was not “elsewhere” under the terms of the Agreement. In response,
Costner argued he had spent millions of dollars to develop Tatanka and that he and
Detmers agreed to permanently place the sculptures at Tatanka, as an alternate
location for the display of the sculptures under paragraph three.
[¶7.] The trial in Detmers I commenced more than ten years after the
parties executed the Agreement. Although The Dunbar had not been built, the
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circuit court found that Detmers and Costner had agreed to permanently display
the sculptures at Tatanka. The court concluded that the sculptures were “agreeably
displayed elsewhere” as Tatanka constituted “elsewhere” under the unambiguous
terms of the Agreement. Based upon this determination, the circuit court denied
Detmers’ claim that Costner was required to sell the sculptures pursuant to
paragraph three of the Agreement and expressed that Costner had “fully performed
under the terms of the [Agreement].” Detmers appealed the decision, arguing that
she only agreed to the location because she had been promised The Dunbar would
still be built. This Court affirmed, holding that “[t]he circuit court did not err or
make any clearly erroneous factual findings in determining that the sculptures are
‘agreeably displayed elsewhere,’ in the absence of a guarantee from Costner that
The Dunbar would be built.” Id. ¶ 24, 814 N.W.2d at 151.
[¶8.] In the decade that followed, Detmers continued to receive royalties
from replicas of the sculptures sold at Tatanka. Meanwhile, construction on The
Dunbar never began, and Costner sold all the property surrounding Tatanka that
had been intended for The Dunbar. In the fall of 2021, Costner listed the real estate
upon which Tatanka is located for sale online. The listing expressly excluded the
sculptures from the sale and indicated that they “will be relocated by seller.”
[¶9.] In November 2021, Detmers brought the current action, claiming the
real estate listing and statement concerning the relocation of the sculptures
constituted an anticipatory breach of the agreement to display the sculptures at
Tatanka. Detmers also included a count for declaratory judgment asking the court
to determine her rights under the Agreement and specifically to determine that
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closing Tatanka or relocating the sculptures from Tatanka would trigger Costner’s
obligation to sell the sculptures and assign the copyright to Detmers.
[¶10.] The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the circuit
court heard oral arguments on the motions. Detmers argued that Costner was
required by Detmers I to permanently maintain the sculptures at Tatanka and that
his decision to move them was an anticipatory breach of the agreement to
permanently display the sculptures at Tatanka as a matter of law. Costner argued
that Detmers’ claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata because Detmers I
fully resolved all the issues involving the parties’ obligations under the Agreement.
Alternatively, Costner argued that he had fully performed under the terms of the
Agreement after the parties agreed to locate the sculptures “elsewhere” and that he
was not obligated to maintain the sculptures at Tatanka. He also argued the claims
for anticipatory breach were not ripe.
[¶11.] The circuit court granted Costner’s motion for summary judgment
based upon res judicata, and alternatively, based on its determination that the
reference to the “permanent” display of the sculptures in Detmers I did not obligate
Costner to continue to display the sculptures at Tatanka in perpetuity. The court
also determined that the “agreeably displayed elsewhere” language in the
Agreement did not “constitute a continuing right or obligation” and that once the
parties agreed to display the sculptures at Tatanka, Costner fully performed his
obligations under the Agreement. Detmers appeals, raising three issues which we
state as follows:
1. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding Detmers’ claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
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2. Whether the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the Agreement and in holding Costner was discharged from any further performance under the Agreement.
3. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Detmers’ motion for summary judgment that Costner anticipatorily breached the agreement to permanently display the sculptures at Tatanka as a matter of law.
Standard of Review
[¶12.] “We review a circuit court’s entry of summary judgment under the de
novo standard of review.” Healy Ranch, Inc. v. Healy, 2022 S.D. 43, ¶ 17, 978
N.W.2d 786, 793, reh’g denied (Sept. 19, 2022) (quoting Estate of Stoebner v.
Huether, 2019 S.D. 58, ¶ 16, 935 N.W.2d 262, 266). “Our task on appeal is to
determine only whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law
was correctly applied. If there exists any basis which supports the ruling of a trial
court, affirmance of a summary judgment is proper.” Id. (quoting Du-Al Mfg. Co., a
Div. of SOS Consol., Inc. v. Sioux Falls Const. Co., 487 N.W.2d 29, 31 (S.D. 1992)).
“The evidence must be viewed most favorably to the non-moving party and
reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party.” Id. (quoting Du-Al
Mfg. Co., 487 N.W.2d at 31). However, the non-moving party has the burden to
“present specific facts which demonstrate a genuine, material issue for trial.” Id.
(quoting Du-Al Mfg. Co., 487 N.W.2d at 31).
Analysis and Decision
1. Res Judicata
[¶13.] “Res judicata consists of two preclusion concepts: issue preclusion and
claim preclusion.” Id. ¶ 40, 978 N.W.2d at 798 (quoting Am. Family Ins. Grp. v.
Robnik, 2010 S.D. 69, ¶ 15, 787 N.W.2d 768, 774). “Issue preclusion refers to the
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effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of a matter that has been litigated
and decided.” Id. (quoting Robnik, 2010 S.D. 69, ¶ 15, 787 N.W.2d at 774). “Claim
preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation of a matter that
never has been litigated, because of a determination that it should have been
advanced in an earlier suit[.]” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Robnik, 2010 S.D.
69, ¶ 15, 787 N.W.2d at 774). “What is prohibited . . . under claim preclusion is the
cause of action itself, but under issue preclusion, it ‘is the particular issue or fact
common to both actions.’” Id. ¶ 41, 978 N.W.2d at 798 (quoting Bollinger v.
Eldredge, 524 N.W.2d 118, 122 (S.D. 1994)).
[¶14.] For an action to be barred by res judicata, four elements must be
satisfied:
(1) the issue in the prior adjudication must be identical to the present issue, (2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits in the previous case, (3) the parties in the two actions must be the same or in privity, and (4) there must have been a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior adjudication.
Id. ¶ 42, 978 N.W.2d at 799 (quoting Dakota, Minn., & E.R.R. Corp. v. Acuity, 2006
S.D. 72, ¶ 17, 720 N.W.2d 655, 661). We apply these elements “under both issue
preclusion and claim preclusion theories.” Id. ¶ 43, 978 N.W.2d at 799. “However,
as it relates to claim preclusion, . . . . ‘our review is not restricted to whether the
specific question posed by the parties in both actions was the same or whether the
legal question posed by the nature of the suit was the same.’” Id. ¶ 44, 978 N.W.2d
at 799 (quoting Farmer v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue & Regul., 2010 S.D. 35, ¶ 10, 781
N.W.2d 655, 660). “For purposes of [claim preclusion], a cause of action is
comprised of the facts which give rise to, or establish, the right a party seeks to
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enforce. The test is a query into whether the wrong sought to be redressed is the
same in both actions.” Id. ¶ 45, 978 N.W.2d at 799 (alteration in original) (quoting
Glover v. Krambeck, 2007 S.D. 11, ¶ 18, 727 N.W.2d 801, 805). “If the claims arose
out of a single act or dispute and one claim has been brought to a final judgment,
then all other claims arising out of that same act or dispute are barred.” Id.
(quoting Farmer, 2010 S.D. 35, ¶ 10, 781 N.W.2d at 660).
[¶15.] Costner asserts that Detmers’ current action is precluded by res
judicata because Detmers seeks to relitigate the “not agreeably displayed
elsewhere” language of the Agreement and because Detmers I affirmed the circuit
court’s determination that Costner “has fully performed” under the terms of the
Agreement after the parties agreed to place the sculptures at Tatanka. Detmers
concedes elements two and three of res judicata are satisfied but argues that the
issues are not the same in the two cases. She asserts that the only issues
determined in Detmers I were (1) whether Detmers agreed to the placement of the
sculptures at Tatanka in the absence of the resort and (2) whether the Tatanka
location constituted “elsewhere” under the terms of the Agreement.
[¶16.] Detmers argues the current dispute involves Costner’s anticipatory
breach of the agreement to permanently display the sculptures at Tatanka by
stating his intention to unilaterally relocate the sculptures from Tatanka—or,
otherwise, his intended action will trigger his obligation to sell the sculptures under
the Agreement. She maintains that the facts and issues in this dispute were never
before the court in Detmers I and were not capable of being litigated at that time.
Detmers claims that she has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
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parties’ rights in the Agreement now that Costner intends to move the sculptures
from Tatanka.
[¶17.] Unlike Detmers I, the current dispute between Detmers and Costner
centers around the parties’ rights and obligations under the Agreement after the
parties agreed to display the sculptures at Tatanka. In particular, the parties
disagree whether Costner has any remaining obligation under the Agreement to sell
the sculptures, split the sale proceeds, and return the copyright to Detmers if he
unilaterally relocates the sculptures from the agreed location at Tatanka. In
Detmers I, “[t]he sole issue at the bench trial was whether the sculptures were
‘agreeably displayed elsewhere’” when they were placed at Tatanka. 2012 S.D. 35,
¶ 7, 814 N.W.2d at 149. The rights and obligations of the parties in the location and
display of the sculptures, after they were agreeably displayed at Tatanka, were not
litigated or decided in Detmers I.
[¶18.] Claim preclusion is also inapplicable because there is no showing that
Detmers knew or should have known Costner would seek to relocate the sculptures
from Tatanka. Detmers I did not discuss or even acknowledge the possibility that
Costner might decide to relocate the sculptures in the future, nor was there any
determination whether Detmers would have any rights under the Agreement in the
event the sculptures were no longer displayed at Tatanka. Rather, Costner alleged
in Detmers I that the parties had agreed to permanently display the sculptures at
Tatanka. The facts giving rise to this action did not occur until years after the prior
action and appeal were concluded. The issue “sought to be redressed” is not the
same and did not arise, along with the prior claim, “out of a single act or dispute
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. . . .” See Healy Ranch, Inc., 2022 S.D. 43, ¶ 45, 978 N.W.2d at 799 (citations
omitted). We conclude the circuit court erred in holding that Detmers’ claims are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
2. Obligations under the Agreement
[¶19.] Detmers argues that because The Dunbar was not built within ten
years, paragraph three of the Agreement includes an ongoing obligation for the
sculptures to be “agreeably displayed elsewhere.” She also claims that Costner’s
stated intention to sell Tatanka and relocate the sculptures is an anticipatory
repudiation of the agreement found in Detmers I to permanently display the
sculptures at Tatanka and requires the sculptures to be sold and the copyright
transferred to Detmers pursuant to paragraph three of the Agreement. She also
maintains that if Costner unilaterally sells Tatanka and moves the sculptures from
Tatanka, this is an event triggering paragraph three of the Agreement, requiring
the sculptures to be sold and the profits split. She argues that this position is
supported by a plain reading of the Agreement and by the language providing her
with ongoing royalty rights on all reproductions of the sculptures.
[¶20.] The circuit court adopted Costner’s assertion that his obligations under
paragraph three of the Agreement could “be satisfied in one of two ways: (1) The
Dunbar is built within ten years . . . or (2) the sculptures are agreeably displayed
elsewhere within that time frame.” Under this reading, Costner argues the circuit
court correctly reasoned that he had satisfied all his contractual duties and had no
further obligation under the Agreement after “the sculptures had been agreeably
displayed elsewhere at Tatanka within that ten-year time frame[.]” Costner claims
this construction of the Agreement is consistent with the circuit court’s -10- #30117
determination in Detmers I that “Costner has fully performed under the terms of
the [Agreement].”
[¶21.] The circuit court concluded that any discussion in Detmers I that the
sculptures would be permanently located at Tatanka did not prevent Costner from
relocating them. In the briefs, the parties devote considerable attention to the
definition of “permanent” in the context of the implied agreement referenced by the
circuit court in Detmers I. Detmers’ anticipatory repudiation claim is primarily
premised on her argument that the circuit court in Detmers I found an implied
agreement existed and that this implied agreement requires Costner to
permanently display the sculptures at Tatanka. However, the current dispute is
controlled by the express terms of paragraph three of the Agreement and whether
Costner can relocate the sculptures from Tatanka without triggering the sale
provision of the Agreement, not by any implied agreement found by the court in
Detmers I. “[W]here there is a valid express contract existing between parties in
relation to a transaction fully fixing the rights of each, there is no room for an
implied promise.” J. Clancy, Inc. v. Khan Comfort, LLC, 2021 S.D. 9, ¶ 27, 955
N.W.2d 382, 391 (quoting Koopman v. City of Edgemont by Dribble, 2020 S.D. 37,
¶ 20, 945 N.W.2d 923, 928). “[A]n express contract precludes the existence of a
contract implied by law or a quasi-contract.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Jurrens v. Lorenz Mfg. Co. of Benson, Minn., 1998 S.D. 49, ¶ 6, 578 N.W.2d 151,
153).
[¶22.] “‘Contract interpretation is a question of law’ reviewed de novo.”
Detmers I, 2012 S.D. 35, ¶ 20, 814 N.W.2d at 151 (citation omitted). “When
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interpreting a contract, ‘[a court] looks to the language that the parties used in the
contract to determine their intention.’” Id. (citation omitted). “When the words of a
contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, the search for
the parties’ common intent is at an end.” Id. (quoting Nelson v. Schellpfeffer, 2003
S.D. 7, ¶ 8, 656 N.W.2d 740, 743). Courts “may neither rewrite the parties’ contract
nor add to its language[.]” Id. ¶ 21, 814 N.W.2d at 151 (quoting Culhane v. W. Nat’l
Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 S.D. 97, ¶ 27, 704 N.W.2d 287, 297). “Because we can review
the contract as easily as the trial court, there is no presumption in favor of the trial
court’s determination.” Ziegler Furniture & Funeral Home, Inc. v. Cicmanec, 2006
S.D. 6, ¶ 14, 709 N.W.2d 350, 354 (quoting Cowan v. Mervin Mewes, Inc., 1996 S.D.
40, ¶ 6, 546 N.W.2d 104, 107).
[¶23.] Consistent with Detmers I, we determine that the controlling language
of the Agreement is unambiguous. See id. (quoting Pesicka v. Pesicka, 2000 S.D.
137, ¶ 6, 618 N.W.2d 725, 726) (“When the meaning of contractual language is plain
and unambiguous, construction is not necessary.”). Under the plain language of the
Agreement, the circuit court erroneously read “not agreeably displayed elsewhere”
to expire after ten years. This reading of the language in paragraph three and the
conclusion that Costner had fully satisfied his obligation thereunder conflict with
the rules of grammar in extending the ten-year time period for building The Dunbar
to “not agreeably displayed elsewhere[.]” In the first sentence of paragraph three,
the phrase “within ten (10) years” immediately follows the word “built” and is
separated from the word “displayed” by the conjunction “or[.]” As a result, “within
ten (10) years” modifies only “built[.]” Conversely, “displayed” is not affected by
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“within ten (10) years[.]” Thus, the plain language of paragraph three establishes
that “not agreeably displayed elsewhere” is not limited by time or duration.
[¶24.] The portion of paragraph three addressing what would happen if The
Dunbar was not built within ten years, or the sculptures were not agreeably
displayed elsewhere, specifies conditions that would trigger Costner’s contractual
obligation to sell the sculptures, split the profits, and assign the copyright for the
sculptures to Detmers. We determine whether a condition precedent exists from
“[t]he document as a whole” and whether the parties intended to agree “that the
happening or nonoccurrence of the stated event after the contract becomes binding
would cause the contract to terminate without further duties or obligations on
either party.” Weitzel v. Sioux Valley Heart Partners, 2006 S.D. 45, ¶ 38, 714
N.W.2d 884, 896. “A condition precedent is a contract term distinguishable from a
normal contractual promise in that it does not create a right or duty, but instead is
a limitation on the contractual obligations of the parties. A condition precedent is a
fact or event which the parties intend must exist or take place before there is a right
to performance. A condition is distinguished from a promise in that it creates no
right or duty in and of itself but is merely a limiting or modifying factor. If the
condition is not fulfilled, the right to enforce the contract does not come into
existence.” Id. ¶ 38, 714 N.W.2d at 895 (quoting Johnson v. Coss, 2003 S.D. 86,
¶ 13, 667 N.W.2d 701, 705–06). Paragraph three imposes a contingent obligation
upon Costner to sell the sculptures, divide the profits with Detmers, and return the
copyright to Detmers upon the occurrence of two conditions precedent: “Although I
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do not anticipate this will ever arise, if [these conditions occur], I will give you . . . .”
(Emphasis added.)
[¶25.] The Dunbar was not built within ten years, meeting the first of two
conditions necessary to trigger the sale clause. The second condition is that “the
sculptures are not agreeably displayed elsewhere[.]” In Detmers I, this condition
was not met, and thus Costner’s obligation to sell the sculptures in paragraph three
was not triggered. As discussed above, however, the Agreement places no time limit
on when the second condition may be satisfied or the obligation triggered thereby.
[¶26.] This reading of paragraph three of the Agreement is consistent with
our reading of the language in Detmers I. In Detmers I, we stated, “[u]nder
paragraph three, Detmers would only be entitled to specific performance if The
Dunbar was not built or the sculptures were not ‘agreeably displayed elsewhere.’”
2012 S.D. 35, ¶ 10, 814 N.W.2d at 149. See also id. ¶ 21, 814 N.W.2d at 151 (“The
plain words of the contract unequivocally provide that if The Dunbar was not built
or the sculptures were not agreeably displayed elsewhere, then Detmers would be
entitled to the relief described in paragraph three.”).
[¶27.] “It is a fundamental rule of contract interpretation that the entire
contract and all its provisions must be given meaning if that can be accomplished
consistently and reasonably.” Prunty Constr., Inc. v. City of Canistota, 2004 S.D.
78, ¶ 16, 682 N.W.2d 749, 756 (citation omitted). Paragraph two provides that
Costner will be the sole owner of the sculptures but also provides Detmers with
ongoing royalties for the sale of reproductions. It states that “it is important that
you maintain your 20% of gross retail price royalty on future sales of fine art
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reproductions[.]” These terms provide Detmers with a continuing interest in the
location and display of the sculptures because the value of the royalty payments is
integrally related to whether the sculptures are displayed at a location likely to
attract visitors and result in more sales of reproductions. If “the sculptures are not
agreeably displayed elsewhere,” the contingency provision for the sale of the
sculptures ensures that Costner recovers the costs he incurred in the sculptures’
creation, both parties share in any profits from the sale of the sculptures, and
Detmers retains the copyright for the sculptures.
[¶28.] Conversely, paragraph four applied during the time between three
years after the last sculpture was delivered to the mold makers without
construction having begun on The Dunbar and ten years from the date of the
Agreement without The Dunbar having been built. This provision gave Costner the
power to make a final decision about an interim location for display of the
sculptures. Thereafter, paragraph three, which has applied since ten years passed
without The Dunbar being built, requires the sale of the sculptures unless the
parties are in agreement about the display location.
[¶29.] Contrary to the circuit court’s reasoning in this action, the circuit
court’s conclusion in Detmers I that Costner “has fully performed” was not a judicial
determination that Costner had no further obligation under the Agreement.
Rather, it was a determination that Costner was not obligated to sell the sculptures
because the sculptures’ placement at Tatanka was “elsewhere” and “the sculptures
are ‘agreeably displayed elsewhere[.]’” 2012 S.D. 35, ¶ 24, 814 N.W.2d at 151
(emphasis added). Nothing in the prior litigation released Costner from the
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provisions and obligations under paragraph three of the Agreement. Since the
condition that “the sculptures are not agreeably displayed elsewhere” is ongoing,
Costner’s decision to unilaterally sell Tatanka and relocate the sculptures would
trigger the sale clause in paragraph three of the Agreement unless the parties agree
to another display location.
[¶30.] The circuit court erred in its conclusion that Costner had no remaining
obligation under paragraph three of the Agreement after the parties agreed to
display the sculptures at Tatanka.
3. Anticipatory Breach
[¶31.] Detmers alleges that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for
summary judgment on her claim for anticipatory repudiation by Costner. She
argues that Costner’s online real estate listing for the Tatanka property was an
unequivocal statement that Costner intended to breach his obligation to display the
sculptures at Tatanka and that the circuit court should have found, as a matter of
law, Costner’s breach of the Agreement. Costner responds that Detmers has failed
to establish an anticipatory repudiation, as a matter of law, based upon the sale
listing. 1
[¶32.] “An anticipatory breach of a contract or anticipatory repudiation is
‘committed before the time when there is a present duty of performance and results
1. Costner also argues that Detmers’ action should be dismissed because her claims are not ripe. Detmers’ claims are ripe because a real controversy exists as to the rights and obligations of the parties under the Agreement in the event Costner unilaterally moves the sculptures from Tatanka and as to whether Costner’s actions to date rise to anticipatory breach. See Boever v. S.D. Bd. of Acct., 526 N.W.2d 747, 750 (S.D. 1995) (holding that a declaratory judgment action “is sufficiently ripe if the facts indicate imminent conflict”).
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from words or conduct indicating an intention to refuse performance in the future.’”
Union Pac. R.R. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 2009 S.D. 70, ¶ 39, 771
N.W.2d 611, 621 (quoting 23 Williston on Contracts § 63:29 (4th ed. 2000)). “A
breach of contract caused by a party’s anticipatory repudiation, i.e., unequivocally
indicating that the party will not perform when performance is due[,] allows the
nonbreaching party to treat the repudiation as an immediate breach of contract and
sue for damages.” Id. ¶ 39, 711 N.W.2d at 621–22 (alteration in original) (quoting
Weitzel, 2006 S.D. 45, ¶ 31, 714 N.W.2d at 894).
[¶33.] The condition that “the sculptures are not agreeably displayed
elsewhere” does not impose any obligation on the parties beyond the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing. See Garrett v. BankWest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 841
(S.D. 1990) (“Every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing which prohibits either contracting party from preventing or injuring the
other party’s right to receive the agreed benefits of the contract.”). Thus, Costner’s
real estate listing for the sale of Tatanka does not—and the sale of the Tatanka real
estate in itself would not—breach any contractual obligation under the Agreement.
The potential sale of Tatanka merely foreshadows the possibility that the obligation
on Costner to sell the sculptures, split the profits, and assign the copyright will be
triggered unless the parties otherwise agree to the location for the display of the
sculptures. 2 When ten years passed without The Dunbar being built, the first
2. In responding to Detmers’ claim for anticipatory repudiation, Costner cites Detmers’ statement in Detmers I that she “has not agreed and will not agree to an alternative permanent location for the [sculptures]” and argues this constituted an anticipatory breach of the Agreement by Detmers. The circuit (continued . . .) -17- #30117
condition was met. In determining that the parties agreed to display the sculptures
at Tatanka, Detmers I recognized that the second condition had not been met. The
second condition may still be satisfied, however, if and when the sculptures are no
longer agreeably displayed—that is, if Costner sells the Tatanka property or moves
them from Tatanka to another location without Detmers’ agreement.
[¶34.] While Costner has admitted he still intends to sell Tatanka, this at
most signals that his contingent obligation to sell the sculptures may vest. See
Weitzel, 2006 S.D. 45, ¶ 38, 714 N.W.2d at 895 (explaining that there is no right to
performance until condition precedent occurs). Even if Costner sells Tatanka or
unilaterally relocates the sculptures from Tatanka to a place not agreeable to
Detmers, such an action would not breach his obligation under the Agreement.
Instead, this event would satisfy the second condition in paragraph three of the
Agreement, triggering the obligation to sell the sculptures, split the profits, and
transfer the copyright to Detmers. At present, Costner owes Detmers no obligation
with respect to the display or sale of the sculptures that she can enforce against
him. See Union Pac. R.R., 2009 S.D. 70, ¶ 39, 771 N.W.2d at 621–22 (explaining
that nonbreaching party may seek immediate relief only when repudiating party
unequivocally indicates its intent to refuse to perform a duty when it becomes due
in the future). For these reasons, Detmers has failed to establish Costner
________________________ (. . . continued) court adopted this reasoning as an alternative ruling in this action. However, this is inconsistent with the circuit court’s finding in Detmers I that Detmers had in fact agreed to the display at Tatanka.
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anticipatorily breached the terms of the Agreement as a matter of law, and the
circuit court properly denied Detmers’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.
Conclusion
[¶35.] We affirm the circuit court’s denial of Detmers’ motion for summary
judgment on the question of anticipatory breach by Costner. We reverse the circuit
court’s entry of summary judgment for Costner. We remand Detmers’ claims for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶36.] KERN, DEVANEY, and MYREN, Justices, and BARNETT, Circuit
Court Judge, concur.
[¶37.] BARNETT, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for SALTER, Justice, who
deemed himself disqualified and did not participate.
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