Desz v. Lincoln Savings Bank

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Desz v. Lincoln Savings Bank

260 A.D. 949, 23 N.Y.S.2d 699, 1940 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5579

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 25, 1940

StatusPublished

This text of 260 A.D. 949 (Desz v. Lincoln Savings Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Desz v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 260 A.D. 949, 23 N.Y.S.2d 699, 1940 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5579 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1940).

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Opinion

Appeal by permission of this court from an order of the Appellate Term, reversing an order of the City Court of the City of New York, County of Queens, which denied plaintiffs’ motion to strike an affirmative defense from defendant’s answer, and granting the motion upon the ground that the defense is insufficient in law. Order of the Appellate Term reversed on the law, and order of the City Court affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Term. In our opinion, under the facts here pleaded, the question of whether or not the plaintiffs waived the anticipatory breach or are estopped may be a question of fact to be determined upon the trial. Lazansky, P. J., Hagarty, Carswell, Adel and Close, JJ., concur. [174 Misc. 263. See post, p. 1022.]

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Appeal by permission of this court from an order of the Appellate Term, reversing an order of the City Court of the City of New York, County of Queens, which denied plaintiffs’ motion to strike an affirmative defense from defendant’s answer, and granting the motion upon the ground that the defense is insufficient in law. Order of the Appellate Term reversed on the law, and order of the City Court affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Term. In our opinion, under the facts here pleaded, the question of whether or not the plaintiffs waived the anticipatory breach or are estopped may be a question of fact to be determined upon the trial. Lazansky, P. J., Hagarty, Carswell, Adel and Close, JJ., concur. [174 Misc. 263. See post, p. 1022.]

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Bluebook (online)

260 A.D. 949, 23 N.Y.S.2d 699, 1940 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5579, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/desz-v-lincoln-savings-bank-nyappdiv-1940.

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