1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 MONIQUE DESORMEAUX, Case No. 2:25-cv-01352-EJY
5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.
7 AUTO RENTAL, LLC,
8 Defendant.
9 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 11 submitted on a form created by the Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada. ECF 12 No. 1. Despite being on the wrong form, the information provided demonstrates Plaintiff’s inability 13 to pay the filing fee associated with commencing a case in federal court and, therefore, the IFP 14 Application is granted below. Also pending is Plaintiff’s Complaint in which she lists herself as a 15 resident of Nevada. Plaintiff is suing Auto Rental LLC, which she states is incorporated in Georgia, 16 with a principal place of business in Minnesota. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. The Complaint fails to establish 17 a basis for personal jurisdiction over Auto Rental. For this reason the case is dismissed. Plaintiff is 18 granted one leave to amend in which she must establish a basis for personal jurisdiction over 19 Defendant. 20 I. Screening Standard 21 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the reviewing Court must identify any cognizable claims and 22 dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 23 granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 24 1915(e)(2). 25 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 26 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A federal court must dismiss a claim if the action “is frivolous or 27 malicious[,] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or seeks monetary relief against 1 a complaint for failure to state a claim is established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2 When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 3 the complaint with directions to cure its deficiencies unless it is clear from the face of the complaint 4 that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th 5 Cir. 1995). In making this determination, the Court treats all allegations of material fact stated in 6 the complaint as true, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 7 Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). 8 Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted 9 by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does 10 not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must plead more than mere labels and conclusions. 11 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a 12 cause of action is insufficient. Id. In addition, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying 13 pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the 14 assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can 15 provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When 16 there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 17 whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint 18 states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 19 draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 20 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the plaintiff’s claims lack 21 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 22 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 23 legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations 24 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); McKeever 25 v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 26 II. Discussion 27 While Plaintiff may plead sufficient facts to establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1 “Federal courts may exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 2 AMC Fabrication, Inc. v. KRD Trucking West, Inc., Case No. 2:12-cv-00146-LDG-CWH, 2012 WL 3 4846152, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 10, 2012) (internal citations omitted). To establish general jurisdiction, 4 a defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum state to constitute the “kind of continuous 5 and systematic general business contacts that approximate physical presence.” Id. Plaintiff’s 6 Complaint includes not facts that establish a basis for general personal jurisdiction over Auto Rental. 7 ECF No. 1-1. 8 A district court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant if the causes of action 9 “arise[] out of or relate to” the defendant’s in-state activity. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 10 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985). Determining whether specific jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state 11 defendant involves two inquiries: (1) whether a forum state’s long-arm statute permits service of 12 process, and (2) whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would violate due process. Action 13 Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004). Because 14 Nevada’s long-arm statute, NRS § 14.065, reaches the “outer limits of federal constitutional due 15 process,” the Court need only analyze whether exercising specific jurisdiction over a defendant 16 comports with due process. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 479 P.2d 781, 17 784 (Nev. 1971). 18 Specific jurisdiction requires a defendant to have taken “some act by which [it] purposefully 19 avails itself of the privilege of conduct activities within the forum State.” Ford Motor Co. v. 20 Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. ––, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (citation omitted). The 21 contacts “must be the defendant’s own choice and ... must show that the defendant deliberately 22 reached out beyond its home.” Id. at 1025 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit employs a three 23 prong test to assess whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to be 24 subject to specific personal jurisdiction:
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 MONIQUE DESORMEAUX, Case No. 2:25-cv-01352-EJY
5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.
7 AUTO RENTAL, LLC,
8 Defendant.
9 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 11 submitted on a form created by the Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada. ECF 12 No. 1. Despite being on the wrong form, the information provided demonstrates Plaintiff’s inability 13 to pay the filing fee associated with commencing a case in federal court and, therefore, the IFP 14 Application is granted below. Also pending is Plaintiff’s Complaint in which she lists herself as a 15 resident of Nevada. Plaintiff is suing Auto Rental LLC, which she states is incorporated in Georgia, 16 with a principal place of business in Minnesota. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. The Complaint fails to establish 17 a basis for personal jurisdiction over Auto Rental. For this reason the case is dismissed. Plaintiff is 18 granted one leave to amend in which she must establish a basis for personal jurisdiction over 19 Defendant. 20 I. Screening Standard 21 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the reviewing Court must identify any cognizable claims and 22 dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 23 granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 24 1915(e)(2). 25 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 26 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A federal court must dismiss a claim if the action “is frivolous or 27 malicious[,] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or seeks monetary relief against 1 a complaint for failure to state a claim is established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2 When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 3 the complaint with directions to cure its deficiencies unless it is clear from the face of the complaint 4 that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th 5 Cir. 1995). In making this determination, the Court treats all allegations of material fact stated in 6 the complaint as true, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 7 Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). 8 Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted 9 by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does 10 not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must plead more than mere labels and conclusions. 11 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a 12 cause of action is insufficient. Id. In addition, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying 13 pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the 14 assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can 15 provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When 16 there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 17 whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint 18 states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 19 draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 20 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the plaintiff’s claims lack 21 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 22 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 23 legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations 24 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); McKeever 25 v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 26 II. Discussion 27 While Plaintiff may plead sufficient facts to establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1 “Federal courts may exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 2 AMC Fabrication, Inc. v. KRD Trucking West, Inc., Case No. 2:12-cv-00146-LDG-CWH, 2012 WL 3 4846152, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 10, 2012) (internal citations omitted). To establish general jurisdiction, 4 a defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum state to constitute the “kind of continuous 5 and systematic general business contacts that approximate physical presence.” Id. Plaintiff’s 6 Complaint includes not facts that establish a basis for general personal jurisdiction over Auto Rental. 7 ECF No. 1-1. 8 A district court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant if the causes of action 9 “arise[] out of or relate to” the defendant’s in-state activity. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 10 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985). Determining whether specific jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state 11 defendant involves two inquiries: (1) whether a forum state’s long-arm statute permits service of 12 process, and (2) whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would violate due process. Action 13 Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004). Because 14 Nevada’s long-arm statute, NRS § 14.065, reaches the “outer limits of federal constitutional due 15 process,” the Court need only analyze whether exercising specific jurisdiction over a defendant 16 comports with due process. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 479 P.2d 781, 17 784 (Nev. 1971). 18 Specific jurisdiction requires a defendant to have taken “some act by which [it] purposefully 19 avails itself of the privilege of conduct activities within the forum State.” Ford Motor Co. v. 20 Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. ––, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (citation omitted). The 21 contacts “must be the defendant’s own choice and ... must show that the defendant deliberately 22 reached out beyond its home.” Id. at 1025 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit employs a three 23 prong test to assess whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to be 24 subject to specific personal jurisdiction:
25 (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some 26 act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 27 1 (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable. 2 3 Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor 4 Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). The burden initially falls on the plaintiff to show the first 5 two prongs but subsequently shifts to the defendant to show the third. CollegeSource, Inc. v. 6 AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011). 7 Here, Plaintiff alleges events that took place in College Park, Georgia, and Tulsa, Oklahoma. 8 ECF No. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff states no facts establishing Auto Rental engaged in any activity or 9 consummated any transactions in the State of Nevada. There are no forum activities and, therefore, 10 there is no basis upon which the Court can properly exercise specific personal jurisdiction over 11 Defendant. 12 III. Order 13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 14 No. 1) is GRANTED. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must file Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 16 No. 1-1) on the docket. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is DISMISSED 18 without prejudice and with one opportunity to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended 19 complaint she must do so no later than August 18, 2025. The amended complaint must plead all 20 facts upon which Plaintiff bases her claim for relief. Plaintiff must also plead facts establishing a 21 basis for personal jurisdiction over Auto Rental, LLC in the U.S. District Court for the District of 22 Nevada. Plaintiff may want to consider suing Auto Rental in state or federal court in Oklahoma or 23 Georgia where jurisdiction over Defendant is more likely to lie. 24 Dated this 28th day of July, 2025. 25
26 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH 27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE