Desmond DeShawn Shaw v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: District Court, W.D. Kentucky
• Decided: May 22, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-00042
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

DESMOND DESHAWN SHAW PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-42-JHM

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Desmond DeShawn Shaw filed the instant pro se civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 20, 2026. [DN 1]. The complaint is before the Court on an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Upon review, the Court will dismiss this action. I. At the time Plaintiff filed this complaint, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee housed at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (“LMDC”). Plaintiff sues the Commonwealth of Kentucky for false imprisonment because he “is about to win [his] case” and for defamation because the Commonwealth had his “face all over the news.” [DN 1 at 4]. Plaintiff seeks damages. [Id. at 6]. II. Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’”

Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). III. “Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Id.

(citations omitted). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991). A state is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution acts as a bar to all claims for relief against the Commonwealth of Kentucky. “[A] state and its agencies may not be sued in federal court, regardless of the relief sought, unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated [the] states’ immunity.” LeBlanc v. Hagan, No. 1:16-CV-00178-GNS, 2017 WL 2779490, at *6 (W.D. Ky. June 27, 2017); see also P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 124 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978). The Commonwealth of Kentucky has not waived its immunity. Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 857 (6th Cir. 2004). Thus, Plaintiffs claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., McKee v. Fayette Cir. Ct., No. 95-5011, 1995 WL 559331, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). IV. The Court will enter a separate Order dismissing this action. Date: May 22, 2026 MMSinf Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge ce: Plaintiff, pro se United States District Court 4414.014