Desiree Crystal Welch Molina v. U.S. Border Patrol

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 2, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01948
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Desiree Crystal WELCH MOLINA, Case No.: 25-cv-1948-AGS-JLB

4 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 5 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS v. (ECF 3) AND DISMISSING 6 COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO

7 AMEND U.S. BORDER PATROL, 8 Defendant. 9 Plaintiff Desiree Welch Molina, proceeding without an attorney, is suing defendant 10 U.S. Border Patrol to seek deletion of records resulting from a 2013 drug-related detention. 11 She also requests to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without paying the court’s filing 12 fees. As explained below, her IFP application is granted. But her complaint does not 13 survive mandatory screening, so it will be dismissed with leave to amend. 14 DISCUSSION 15 A. IFP Application 16 Parties instituting civil actions in United States district courts must pay $405 in filing 17 fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. 18 Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). But plaintiffs granted the right to proceed IFP need 19 not pay those fees. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 20 Welch Molina’s application states that she recently became unemployed and is 21 “pending to receive unemployment benefits.” (ECF 3, at 7.) She currently only has ten 22 dollars in her checking account, no other assets, and estimates her monthly expenses at 23 “$2,875.” (Id. at 4, 7.) Paying the filing fee would result in an undue hardship on plaintiff, 24 and as “a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP,” the motion is granted. 25 See Blount v. Saul, No. 21-CV-0679-BLM, 2021 WL 1561453, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 26 2021). 27 28 1 B. Screening and Dismissal 2 The IFP statute “not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma 3 pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 4 2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) 5 require a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 6 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 7 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 8 Welch Molina claims that in 2013, she was “stopped by U.S. Border Patrol while 9 returning from Yuma, Arizona.” (ECF 1, at 2.) After a drug-sniffing dog alerted, “agents 10 searched [her] vehicle and located a small amount of marijuana along with paraphernalia.” 11 (Id.) As a result, she was “briefly questioned” and her “fingerprints were taken” before 12 being released. (Id.) “No charges, citations, or convictions resulted from this incident.” 13 (Id.) 14 “Since that time,” Welch Molina asserts she has “remained sober, law-abiding, and 15 ha[s] had no further legal issues.” (Id. at 3.) So, she requests the Court “seal and remove 16 from public access all records related to” her brief 2013 detention. (Id.) 17 But Welch Molina does not point to any authority for this Court to order U.S. Border 18 Patrol to expunge her records. “Although ‘expungement’ may mean different things in 19 different states, in general when a defendant moves to expunge records, she asks that the 20 court destroy or seal the records of the fact . . . .” United States v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790, 21 792 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit has “recognized two sources of authority by which 22 courts may expunge records of criminal conviction: statutes and our inherent authority.” 23 Id. Welch Molina does not identify any such statute, and the Court’s own research has not 24 provided any. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Privacy Act permitting a person to challenge 25 agency records and sue after exhaustion of administrative remedies); but see 5 U.S.C. 26 § 552a(j)(2)(A) (exempting from Privacy Act challenges “reports identifiable to an 27 individual compiled at any stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws”); see 28 also 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (permitting the expungement of records under the “Controlled 1 Substances Act” only if “the person was less than twenty-one years old at the time of the 2 offense”). Welch Molina claims to be 40 years old now, which means in 2013 she was in 3 her late twenties and ineligible for youth-based expungement. (See ECF 3, at 7.) 4 The Court also has “inherent authority to expunge criminal records” but only “in 5 appropriate and extraordinary cases.” Crowell, 374 F.3d at 793. That authority is very 6 limited. Critically, “district courts do not have the power to expunge a record of a valid 7 arrest” “solely for equitable concerns.” Id. Instead, “a district court’s ancillary jurisdiction 8 is limited to expunging the record of an unlawful arrest or conviction, or to correcting a 9 clerical error.” Id. (emphasis added); accord Fazaga v. FBI, 965 F.3d 1015, 1055 (9th Cir. 10 2020), rev’d on other grounds by 595 U.S. 344 (2022) (“In short, expungement relief is 11 available under the Constitution to remedy . . . alleged constitutional violations.”). Welch 12 Molina claims that the officers found a controlled substance in her car and briefly detained 13 her to question her about it. Nothing in her complaint suggests those records were created 14 in support of unlawful or unconstitutional action. As laudable as Welch Molina’s actions 15 since 2013 have reportedly been, as it stands, she has not stated a claim for relief that this 16 Court may grant. 17 The Court will, however, give Welch Molina an opportunity to amend her complaint 18 to address these deficiencies. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) 19 (holding that a “district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend 20 unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 21 amendment” (cleaned up)). 22 CONCLUSION 23 Thus, the Court orders as follows: 24 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, and the filing 25 fee is waived. 26 2. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted 27 leave to amend. 28 3. By March 2, 2026, plaintiff must file any amended complaint. The amended 1 ||}complaint must be complete by itself without reference to any previous version of the 2 || pleading; defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint 3 || will be considered waived. If plaintiff fails to timely amend, the Court will enter a final 4 || order dismissing this civil action. 5 || Dated: February 2, 2026

7 Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge

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