RENDERED: APRIL 11, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-1419-MR
DESHA BELL APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE TIFFANY YAHR, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-02583
AARON JAMES FERRAL APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, CETRULO, AND A. JONES, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: Desha Bell (“Bell”), pro se, appeals from the Fayette
Family Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law arising out of the
dissolution of her marriage to Aaron Ferral (“Ferral”).1 After careful review, we
affirm.
1 Although not raised by the parties, the Court notes that the judgment directs counsel for Ferral to prepare a decree consistent with the family court’s rulings. The record before us does not include a decree, despite references to one in subsequent pleadings and a qualified domestic relations order. Because the judgment includes finality language and resolves all issues of marital property and debts, we are addressing the merits of the appeal. Kentucky Rules of Civil BACKGROUND
In May 2017, Bell and Ferral rented a house together on Penmoken
Park in Lexington, Kentucky (“Penmoken”). Ferral purchased the house that
November. In June 2018, Ferral and Bell married in Fayette County, Kentucky.
After the couple developed concerns about mold in the home, they
renovated Penmoken and sold it in November 2021. Subsequently, the couple
used a portion of the proceeds from the sale to purchase a new home on Pinkney
Drive in Lexington, Kentucky (“Pinkney”).
Eventually, the marriage broke down, and the couple separated in
August 2022. On September 9, 2022, Ferral filed for dissolution of the marriage.
On December 7, 2022, Ferral filed a motion to compel Bell’s
preliminary verified disclosure statement (“disclosure statement”)2 and for
exclusive occupancy of Pinkney. On December 16, the family court held a hearing
on the matter, and it denied Ferral’s motion for exclusive occupancy of Pinkney,
but ordered Bell to tender her disclosure statement and supporting documentation
Procedure (“CR”) 54.01 and 54.02. The parties are certainly advised to have a decree properly entered. 2 Kentucky Family Rule of Practice and Procedure 2(3) requires parties in a dissolution action to draft/compile and exchange “[a] preliminary disclosure statement, which is verified and contains the information required in the official AOC form 238 (Preliminary Verified Disclosure Statement) . . . within 45 days of service of the petition on the respondent[.]”
-2- within 30 days. Additionally, the family court required the parties to participate in
mediation once Bell tendered her disclosure statement.
On February 1, 2023, Ferral filed another motion to compel Bell’s
disclosure statement and for exclusive occupancy of Pinkney. The parties were
scheduled for mediation on February 21, but Bell had still not provided her
disclosure statement. On March 3, 2023, the family court held a hearing on
Ferral’s February 1st motion. At that hearing, Bell asserted that a settlement had
been reached, but Ferral disagreed and argued the mediation was unsuccessful.
Consequently, the family court continued the hearing until March 10 and extended
Bell’s document presentation deadline to March 6. Bell served Ferral with a copy
of her disclosure statement on March 6, but she did not provide supporting
documentation. On that same day, Bell filed a motion to compel Ferral to specific
performance of the alleged settlement agreement.
On March 10, 2023, the family court heard arguments pertaining to
both Ferral’s and Bell’s motions. The family court denied Bell’s motion to
compel. The family court granted Ferral’s motion for exclusive use of Pinkney,
ordered Ferral to advance Bell $5,000 of the marital estate, and ordered Bell to
vacate the premises by April 7, 2023. Furthermore, the family court again ordered
Bell to tender a complete copy of her disclosure statement and the required
-3- supporting documentation by March 13. Bell produced the required
documentation to Ferral by that time.
On August 2, 2023, after more failed settlement attempts and a case
management conference, the family court entered a hearing order and set the
matter for a final dissolution hearing on October 4, 2023. The order required the
parties, whether represented by counsel or pro se, to “file with the Court and serve
on the Fayette Family Court Sixth Division Office and opposing party or counsel a
list and a copy of each exhibit expected to be introduced at the hearing . . . [and] a
Final Verified Disclosure Statement along with the required supporting
documentation.” The exhibits and disclosures were to be filed/served within 14
business days of the final hearing.
On September 18, 2023, just over two weeks before the final hearing,
Bell, pro se, filed a motion to replace her counsel and for a continuance of the final
hearing. Three days later, Bell’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw. That same
day, Bell filed another motion for a continuance and to replace her counsel, in
which she claimed that her counsel’s withdrawal from the case was an “unforeseen
development” that prejudiced her.
On September 29, 2023, the family court held a hearing on the
withdrawal/continuance motions. At the outset, the family court allowed Bell’s
counsel to withdraw from the case. Next, the family court and the parties turned
-4- their attention to Bell’s continuance motion. The family court noted it had
received a list of Bell’s witnesses and exhibits; however, Ferral’s counsel stated
she had not received any such list from Bell. The family court told Bell that, after
the continuance hearing, Bell needed to send the list to Ferral’s counsel.
Ferral objected to the disclosure extension and continuance. He noted
that the final hearing had been set for nearly two months; the dissolution had been
pending for over a year; the dissolution had incurred “an absurd amount of
attorney’s fees”; and a continuance would further delay the matter. Bell then
stated that she was unfamiliar with the law and had attempted to find another
lawyer to take her case, but she was unable to find a lawyer that would do so on
such short notice.
The family court noted that whether to continue the hearing was a
matter of its discretion. The court further stated that there had not necessarily been
other continuances but there had been “several other hearings about other issues in
this case”;3 agreed with Ferral that the case needed “to move forward” because the
case “had been pending for quite some time”; and the court did not “think there
[were] that many issues that [] need[ed] to [be] address[ed].” Finally, the court
stated that if it were to continue the final dissolution hearing, the new hearing
3 The family court referred to a domestic violence petition involving Ferral and Bell, but that action is not part of the record on appeal.
-5- would not be scheduled until 2024. Rather than keep the parties financially
connected during that time, the court found the parties needed resolution and
denied Bell’s motion for a continuance.
After denying the continuance, the family court informed Bell that she
needed to send her witness and exhibit lists to Ferral’s counsel, as well as
corresponding copies of the exhibits. The court informed Bell that it would make
its decision(s) on whether to enter specific exhibits into evidence during the final
dissolution hearing.
The dissolution hearing took the full day of October 4, 2023, with
Ferral represented by counsel and Bell appearing pro se. Both Ferral and Bell
testified. The family court informed Bell that she could move to submit evidence,
but it reminded her that it would not take “wholesale” voluminous financial
records, and she needed to introduce specific items with a corresponding specific
purpose for introduction. Further, the court reminded Bell that Ferral had a
standing objection to the introduction of documents that had not been shared with
his counsel or had been shared later than required. While the court gave Bell “a
little bit of latitude[,]” given that she did not have her own counsel, it informed her
that they would address the introduction of evidence one document at a time.
Ferral objected for relevancy to many of the documents Bell
unsuccessfully sought to have entered into evidence, because she introduced them
-6- to prove undisputed facts. Other documents were not entered because of Ferral’s
successful hearsay objection. Ultimately, the court entered three of Bell’s exhibits
into evidence: notes relating to a conversation between Ferral and the realtor
connected to Penmoken; Bell’s student loan balance sheet; and checks signed by
Bell showing she contributed to the Penmoken inspection and renovations.
The family court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law on
November 3, 2023. After categorizing property as marital and non-marital, the
family court essentially equally divided the marital assets. Ferral retained Pinkney,
but the marital interest in the residence was equally split. As for marital debts,
each party assumed the responsibility of one marital vehicle and the respective
expenses; each party assumed responsibility for their respective student loans; and
Ferral assumed responsibility for the lion’s share of the parties’ known credit debt.4
Finally, the judgment ordered that Bell was “entitled to an offset of $14,855.” Bell
timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
At the outset, we note that Bell’s brief falls woefully short of
complying with the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”). RAP
32(A)(4) requires an appellant’s brief to contain:
4 Ferral was responsible for a $20,413 credit card balance with UK Federal Credit Union. Bell assumed responsibility for an American Express credit card balance of $1,433 and a Lowe’s card that the parties did not know the balance of but believed to be low.
-7- An argument conforming to the statement of points and authorities, with ample references to the specific location in the record and citations of authority pertinent to each issue of law and which shall contain at the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.
Bell’s brief fails to offer any preservation statement(s), fails to cite to
specific locations in the written record a single time, and fails to offer a single pin
cite to the points of authority she claims support her arguments. See Koester v.
Koester, 569 S.W.3d 412, 414-15 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation omitted) (“It is not the
function or responsibility of this court to scour the record on appeal to ensure that
an issue has been preserved.”).
Furthermore, several cases cited in Bell’s brief are either improperly
cited or do not exist, which makes it difficult to ascertain what cases the brief
attempts to cite to at all. Additionally, the authorities that Bell’s brief cites to with
correct information (i.e., the correct reporters, court names, years, etc.) often do not
support the arguments she claims they do.5
“When counsel fail to narrow focus to specific parts of a record, or
when they point to little or no persuasive legal authority, they unnecessarily tax
5 For example, Bell cites to Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 2004), and states that, there, “[t]he court emphasized the need for fair procedures and support to ensure that self-represented parties can adequately protect their rights.” However, Sexton contains no such verbiage and has nothing to do with pro se parties or their rights. See id.
-8- already limited judicial resources.” J.P.T. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Serv., 689
S.W.3d 149, 152 (Ky. App. 2024). Such failures enable this Court to strike a
deficient brief and dismiss the appeal. Id. at 153 (citing RAP 10(B)). Given Bell’s
insistence, below and in her brief to this Court, that the family court had a duty to
clarify and research the law for her, it appears she does not think the rules apply to
her, a pro se litigant. This is not true. This Court has held that the rules of
appellate procedure apply to all litigants, including pro se litigants. Koester, 569
S.W.3d at 415. Compliance with the RAP is “mandatory[,]” and Bell “is bound by
the same rules of appellate procedure as [her] opposing counsel and any other party
before this court.” See id. at 413-15.
That said, out of an abundance of leniency, we address two arguments
Bell has presented: (1) whether the family court erred when it denied Bell’s
motion for a continuance; and (2) whether the family court erred when dividing the
marital estate. These two issues encompass many of the nine arguments raised in
Bell’s brief. We will not address other issues as they are either unsupported and/or
unpreserved. See RAP 32.
1. The Family Court Did Not Err When It Denied Bell’s Motion For A
Continuance.
We review the family court’s denial of a continuance for an abuse of
discretion. Deleo v. Deleo, 533 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Ky. App. 2017) (citing Guffey v.
-9- Guffey, 323 S.W.3d 369, 371 (Ky. App. 2010)). “The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d
941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).
Bell argues the family court abused its discretion when it denied her
continuance because the case was complex; she was prejudiced by her lack of
counsel; and she should have been given time to obtain new counsel. Conversely,
Ferral argues the family court properly considered the factors required by law and
properly denied Bell’s continuance. We agree with Ferral.
“[W]hether a continuance is appropriate in a particular case depends
upon the unique facts and circumstances of that case.” Guffey, 323 S.W.3d at 371
(quoting Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 814 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. 1991), overruled
on other grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. 2001)). The
trial court considers the following factors: “1) length of delay; 2) previous
continuances; 3) inconveniences to litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; 4)
whether the delay is purposeful or is caused by the accused; 5) availability of other
competent counsel; 6) complexity of the case; and 7) whether denying the
continuance will lead to identifiable prejudice[.]” Id. Family courts are “not
required to make written findings” when considering these factors, and they may
-10- orally state their reasons for granting or denying a continuance. Deleo, 533
S.W.3d at 217.
Here, the family court orally stated its reasons for denying Bell’s
motion for a continuance. The family court expressed concern about continuing to
delay the dissolution hearing and keeping the parties financially connected. It
stated that, while there were no previous continuances, there had been several other
hearings that delayed finalization of the dissolution. It noted that there were not
many issues left to resolve. Now, we review each of the factors to determine if an
abuse of discretion occurred. See Deleo, 533 S.W.3d at 217 (where this Court
reached its conclusion after it considered each continuance factor and the totality
the circumstances).
Length of delay: If the family court had granted the continuance, we
do not know exactly how long the hearing would have been delayed. The court
stated that the earliest time that it could reschedule the hearing would be three to
four months. We can find no hard and fast rule pertaining to what time period
constitutes a significant delay in a marriage dissolution case. As such, we
conclude that this factor did not weigh in favor of granting or denying a
Previous continuances: No other continuances had been granted;
however, prior to the continuance hearing, the family court conducted a domestic
-11- violence hearing and three hearings on the parties’ motions to compel. We
conclude that this factor weighed slightly in favor of Bell.
Inconvenience: Bell filed for the continuance approximately two
weeks before the dissolution hearing. The family court did not rule on the motion
until two and one-half business days before the scheduled hearing. Granting a
continuance this close to the hearing date would undoubtedly inconvenience the
parties, Ferral’s attorney, and the family court. As Ferral argued below, a
continuance would have inconvenienced him because Bell had control of his long-
term cell phone number, and she would not cooperate in releasing the number to
him until she was ordered to by the family court at the dissolution hearing.
Further, both Ferral and Bell worked as teachers, and the family court scheduled
the dissolution hearing during their mutual fall break. A continuance would have
deprived both parties of the benefit of finalizing their dissolution during their
mutual pause from work. Taken together, these circumstances amount to a
“significant or substantial inconvenience[.]” See id. (quoting Eldred v.
Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Ky. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by
Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554 (Ky. 2003)). Thus, this factor
weighed in favor of denying Bell’s continuance.
Delay purposeful or caused by the movant: After her attorney filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel, Bell claimed that his withdrawal constituted an
-12- “unforeseen development” that necessitated a continuance for her to find new
counsel. However, Bell first filed a separate motion to replace her counsel three
days before he filed his motion to withdraw. While we can appreciate Bell’s desire
to obtain new counsel before the dissolution hearing, she initiated the sequence of
events that caused her attorney to withdraw. Accordingly, we conclude that this
factor weighed in favor of denying the continuance.
Availability of competent counsel: As stated, Bell had counsel up
until two and one-half business days before the final dissolution hearing. We agree
that it would have been difficult to obtain competent counsel in that short time
frame.6 Thus, this factor weighs in favor of granting the continuance.
Complexity of the case: Ferral and Bell were not married long; they
did not have children together; and they kept their finances mostly separate. With
past negotiations in mind and after considering Ferral’s pretrial memorandum, the
family court did not believe addressing the remaining issues would be complex.
We agree. Bell argues that, like Deleo, this family law case is complex. However,
that case involved a 20-year marriage and “included issues of child custody,
parenting time, division of marital assets, division of marital debt and
maintenance[.]” 533 S.W.3d at 218. Conversely, this case involves a couple that
6 Although, we do note that she could have been looking for substitute counsel before or at the time she filed her first motion to replace counsel.
-13- were married for just over four years, and the only issues were the division of
marital assets and debt. Like the family court, we do not believe this was a
complex case. Thus, this factor weighed in favor of denying the continuance.
Identifiable prejudice caused by denying the continuance: In Guffey,
this Court said that, when a party asserts its lack of counsel as an identifiable
prejudice, it must explain “how a later hearing in which she might have had
representation would have rendered results different from the hearing at which she
acted pro se.” Guffey, 323 S.W.3d at 373. Bell has not shown how a continuance
would have changed the outcome of the dissolution hearing. She simply argues
that she deserved a more equitable outcome, but she does not describe what her
desired outcome would entail. Thus, we do not believe Bell sufficiently identified
how denying the continuance would have or did prejudice her. Accordingly, this
After weighing each factor and considering the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that the family court did not err when it denied the
continuance. See Deleo, 533 S.W.3d at 217. We do think that whether to grant the
continuance was a close call, however “[w]hile litigants may perceive the need to
act pro se as a handicap, in reality a court makes an extra effort to compensate for
the lack of representation by affording special courtesy and attention to the pro se
litigant.” See Guffey, 323 S.W.3d at 373. Here, the family court did not make a
-14- decision that was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles, and the record reflects courtesy and patience by the family court to Bell.
Thus, it did not abuse its discretion.
2. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Divided The
Marital Estate.
This analysis requires us to determine whether the family court
complied with Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 403.190 when it divided the
marital estate, and whether the family court’s evidentiary rulings were in error.
We review property division decisions and evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. Muir v. Muir, 406 S.W.3d 31, 34 (Ky. App. 2013) (citations omitted);
Leach v. Commonwealth, 571 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Ky. 2019) (citing Clark v.
Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007)).
Bell argues the family court did not equitably divide the marital
property because (1) it did not allow her to enter Venmo and bank statements into
evidence that showed her financial contributions; (2) it did not consider the income
Ferral made playing in musical groups; (3) it did not take into account her role as a
homemaker; and (4) it did not take into account her role as a project manager for
the renovations done at Penmoken. Conversely, Ferral argues the family court
properly divided the marital estate because it correctly excluded Bell’s financial
documents from evidence; his musical income was negligible; Bell never argued
-15- that she was a homemaker below; and because many issues Bell argues were not in
dispute. We agree that the family court did not err.
Marriage dissolution actions involve “a three-step process: (1) the
trial court first characterizes each item of property as marital or nonmarital; (2) the
trial court then assigns each party’s nonmarital property to that party; and (3)
finally, the trial court equitably divides the marital property between the parties.”
Travis v. Travis, 59 S.W.3d 90, 908-09 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted). This case
only requires us to analyze the third prong.
KRS 403.190 “mandates that the trial court divide marital property in
‘just proportions.’” Muir v. Muir, 406 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Ky. App. 2013) (quoting
Garrett v. Garrett, 766 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Ky. App. 1989)). The statute requires
the family court to consider: “each spouse’s contribution to the acquisition of
marital property; the value of the property set apart to each spouse; the duration of
the marriage; and the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time of the
division.” Id.
Kentucky Rule of Evidence (“KRE”) 401 defines relevant evidence as
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” Here, Bell introduced Venmo and bank
statements to prove that she contributed to the daily household expenses, bills, and
-16- renovations of Penmoken. Ferral objected because Bell did not disclose these
financial documents properly and for relevancy. The family court sustained the
relevancy objection because both parties testified that they evenly split expenses
and bills. Because Bell introduced the Venmo and bank statements to prove
matters that Ferral did not dispute, those documents did not tend to make the
existence of those undisputed facts more probable. See KRE 401. Thus, Bell’s
financial documents were irrelevant, and the family court did not err by excluding
them from evidence. See id. Likewise, the exclusion of the irrelevant evidence did
not constitute an error when the family court divided the marital property.
Bell’s arguments that the marital property was not justly divided
because the court did not take into account her contribution as the Penmoken
renovation project manager or Ferral’s musical income fail for similar reasons.
First, at the dissolution hearing, Ferral did not dispute that Bell acted as project
manager for the Penmoken renovations, and the family court did allow her to enter
financial documents into evidence that she claimed showed her contributions to the
renovations. Next, while the family court’s findings do not mention Ferral’s
musical income, the court did take notice of that income, which had been described
as “petty cash,” at the dissolution hearing. Bell’s argument to this Court does not
appear to be that the family court did not consider these factors, but rather that the
family court should have given more weight to these factors.
-17- It is not our role to reweigh the evidence in Bell’s favor. See Muir,
406 S.W.3d at 34 (citations omitted) (“[A] reviewing court is not permitted to
substitute its judgment for that of the family court unless its findings are clearly
erroneous”). Review of the written record and the final dissolution hearing reveals
that the family court considered Bell’s project manager contributions and Ferral’s
musical income. This is all that was required for the court to divide the marital
property in the “[j]ust proportions” required by KRS 403.190. See id. at 35-36.
Finally, Ferral is correct that Bell did not argue she acted as a
homemaker below. After scouring the written and video records, we have not
found anything that meaningfully supports Bell’s contention that she performed
“significant labor as [a] homemaker[.]” Further, Bell does not point us to anything
in the record that supports this argument or its preservation. See RAP 32. Thus,
the argument is without merit.
Bell argues that the family court’s marital property division was not
equitable. Yet, she received a $5,000 advance of the marital estate; the judgment
awarded her a $14,855 offset; and she does not indicate what she should have
additionally received. Furthermore, the family court performed its duty and
properly divided the marital property in accordance with the requirements of KRS
403.190. Thus, the family court did not abuse its discretion when it divided the
-18- CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the findings of fact and conclusions of law
of the Fayette Family Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Desha Bell, pro se Catherine Monzingo Lexington, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky
-19-