Desert Valley Patients Assn. v. City of Rancho Mirage CA4/2
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Opinion
Filed 1/21/14 Desert Valley Patients Assn. v. City of Rancho Mirage CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
DESERT VALLEY PATIENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., E056260 Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Super.Ct.No. INC1S10959) v. OPINION CITY OF RANCHO MIRAGE et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Randall Donald White,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
Steven B. Quintanilla, City Attorney, and Nicholas Hermsen, Deputy City
Attorney, for Defendants and Appellants.
Jeffrey A. Lake and Nathan A. Shaman for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Defendants City of Rancho Mirage and Randal K. Bynder (City) appealed by
notice filed May 1, 2012, the judgment entered April 20, 2012, granting declaratory relief
and letting a peremptory writ issue in favor of plaintiffs Desert Valley Patients
1 Association, Inc. et al. (Patients). Patients prevailed based on the trial court’s
determination that the City of Rancho Mirage’s ordinances generally banning medical
marijuana dispensaries, and the Patients’ facilities in particular, were preempted by state
law. Those ordinances are No. 999 (45-day moratorium on establishing medical
marijuana dispensaries), No. 1000 (additional 45-day moratorium), No. 1004 (additional
one-year moratorium), and No. 1009 (permanent ban of medical marijuana dispensaries).
After the case was fully briefed on March 22, 2013, the California Supreme Court
filed its opinion in City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Center,
Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729 (Inland) on May 6, 2013, in which the court held that state law
did not preempt a local ordinance banning facilities that distribute medical marijuana.
(Id. at p. 762.) In response on June 20, 2013, the parties filed a “REQUEST AND
STIPULATION TO REVERSE JUDGMENT AND REMAND TO LITIGATE ALL
OTHER ISSUES” (the stipulation). The stipulation asks in effect that the judgment be
reversed and the superior court directed to decide whether plaintiffs prevail on the first
cause of action for declaratory relief on other specified grounds.
By order filed June 28, 2013, this court directed the filing of a letter memorandum
of points and authorities responding to questions necessary to make the findings required
for a reversal by stipulation of a superior court judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd.
(a)(8) (§ 128 (a)(8)).) A letter memorandum was filed July 15, 2013, showing good
cause for the stipulated reversal. This opinion decides this appeal pursuant to the parties’
stipulation.
2 APPROVAL OF STIPULATED REVERSAL
To the stipulation we apply section 128 (a)(8), which provides in relevant part:
“An appellate court shall not reverse or vacate a duly entered judgment upon an
agreement or stipulation of the parties unless the court finds both of the following: [¶]
(A) There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be
adversely affected by the reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of the parties for requesting
reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a
judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive
for pretrial settlement.”
1. Effect on Nonparties and Public
Regarding the first finding, we must consider how the interests of nonparties or the
public might be affected by the settlement. (§ 128 (a)(8)(A).) Specifically, we must
inquire whether there is a “reasonable possibility that the interests” of a nonparty would
be “adversely affected by . . . reversal.” (Ibid.)
In this case the California Supreme Court has decided in Inland how the interests
of nonparties and the public should be affected, and the stipulated reversal merely
implements that decision. Furthermore, the final effect on the interests of parties,
nonparties, and the public has yet to be determined, because further litigation in the
superior court will be required to adjudicate the issues raised by Patients’ first cause of
action against City. Thus, the stipulation itself has little effect because it is not yet final,
and whatever effect the stipulation ultimately has, that effect was ordained by the
California Supreme Court.
3 We conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties
or the public will be adversely affected by the stipulated reversal.
2. Reasons for Stipulated Reversal
Regarding the second, two-pronged finding weighing the reasons for reversal
against the effect on public trust and pretrial settlement (§ 128 (a)(8)(B)), we must first
identify the parties’ reasons for preferring stipulated reversal over dismissal.
Here the reason for the stipulation is that dismissal would allow a judgment
contrary to the law to remain in effect—reversal is the only way to follow the law as laid
down in Inland. Additionally, the stipulation avoids the delay and expense of continuing
on to a result that has already been determined by the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Inland.
3. Erosion of Public Trust
Taking first the issue of the erosion of public trust and postponing consideration of
the effect on pretrial settlement incentives, public trust is eroded by a stipulated reversal
when it appears that through settlement one party has paid off the other to obtain the
particular result from the appellate court that the payor desired—the condemnation of the
trial court’s judgment implied by the reversal. This reflects poorly on both courts
implying that the trial court erred and that the appellate court’s reversal was groundless.
(See Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 287, 293-294,
dis. opn. of Kennard, J.)
But that is not the situation here, where the condemnation of the judgment implied
by the reversal is mandated by a California Supreme Court decision. Thus, the reversal is
4 not groundless, and there is no erosion of public trust in this case. Therefore, we find the
significant reasons for the stipulated reversal outweigh the negligible possibility of the
erosion of the public’s trust in the judiciary.
4. Disincentive for Pretrial Settlement
As the final task required by section 128 (a)(8), and subdivision (B) in particular,
we must weigh the reasons for stipulating to reverse against “the risk that the availability
of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.” The concern is
that parties will avoid settling a case before the trial court decides it because the parties
know they can appeal and then settle for a stipulated reversal of the disliked ruling.
Pretrial settlement is, of course, more economical than settlement on appeal. (See Neary
v. Regents of University of California, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 288-291, dis. opn. of
Kennard, J.)
This stipulated reversal does not implement a settlement by the parties; rather, the
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