Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities Limited

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJuly 29, 2009
Docket08-55081
StatusPublished

This text of Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities Limited (Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities Limited) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities Limited, (9th Cir. 2009).

Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMISH DESAI; ELIZABETH LAMB;  THERESE LONG; CHRISTOPHER LONG, Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 08-55081 v. DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES  D.C. No. CV-01-09024-SVW LIMITED; DEUTSCHE BANK OPINION SECURITIES INC.; DEUTSCHE BANK AG, Defendants-Appellees.  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 7, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed July 29, 2009

Before: John T. Noonan, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion; Concurrence by Judge O’Scannlain; Concurrence by Judge Graber

9899 9902 DESAI v. DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES

COUNSEL

Joseph J. Tabacco, Jr., Berman, DeValerio, Pease, Tabacco Burt & Pucillo, San Francisco, California, argued the cause for the appellants and was on the briefs. Nicole Lavallee, Ber- man, DeValerio, Pease, Tabacco, Burt & Pucillo, San Fran- cisco, California, filed briefs. James C. Magid, Berman, DeValerio, Pease, Tabacco, Burt & Pucillo, San Francisco, California, and Ira M. Press, Kirby, McInerney LLP, New York, New York, were also on the briefs.

James H.R. Windels, Davis, Polk & Wardwell, New York, New York, argued the cause for the appellees and filed the brief. DESAI v. DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES 9903 OPINION

PER CURIAM:

We must decide whether a putative class can be certified in this securities fraud class action.

I

This appeal stages the last act of a long drama that followed the collapse of an elaborate stock manipulation scheme.

A

GenesisIntermedia, Inc. (“GENI”) is a Delaware corpora- tion with its registered address in California. Its stock once traded on the NASDAQ, but since late 2001 has traded over the counter but off the NASDAQ.1 Turmoil in GENI’s stock price began in the fall of 2001 and continued as the details emerged of what the plaintiffs allege was a sophisticated scheme to manipulate the price of the company’s stock.

Appellants—Amish Desai, Christopher and Therese Long, and Elizabeth Lamb (“Investors”)—allege that Deutsche Bank Securities Ltd. (“DBSL”), Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., and Deutsche Bank AG (collectively, “Deutsche Bank”), through Wayne Breedon, a vice-president at DBSL, masterminded this stock price manipulation scheme.2 Breedon and Deutsche 1 The National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation System, or NASDAQ, is a tool used to report the prices of millions of stocks not traded on any domestic exchange (so-called “over-the-counter” stocks). Not every stock traded over the counter is registered to trade on the NASDAQ. 2 Breedon is the main actor in the alleged scheme. He worked for DBSL in Toronto, Canada, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsche 9904 DESAI v. DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES Bank, however, played only one part in the plot that Investors allege. Some background, therefore, is necessary.

A common way to manipulate the market in a security is to cause its price to increase by creating the illusion of more investor interest than really exists. The manipulator acquires shares of the security before the price increase, then slowly sells them off and reaps the profit. The problem with this model, however, is that as the manipulator sells off his shares he depresses the price, which lessens his profit. Investors here allege a scheme that varied the theme in a way designed to cure this problem. It involved a commercial arrangement known as a securities loan.

In the typical securities loan, a broker-dealer lends securi- ties to another broker-dealer, the loan being secured by cash collateral the borrower gives to the lender. See generally Ste- phenson v. Deutsche Bank AG, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1044- 45 (D. Minn. 2003). The borrower of the security receives so- called rebate payments, which are like interest on the cash collateral he has transferred to the security lender.3 As the value of the security increases, the amount of cash collateral and the level of interest also increase. Adjustments—marking the securities to the market—are made daily.

Bank AG. Breedon’s activities at DBSL were supervised by Deutsche Bank Securities, also a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank AG. Liability for Deutsche Bank is premised on one of two theories: that Breedon acted as the agent of Deutsche Bank or that he acted within the scope of his employment so as to invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior. The validity of these theories of recovery is not at issue in this appeal. 3 This is not a typical creditor-debtor relationship, for the borrower, instead of the lender, receives a stream of income that resembles interest payments. One might be tempted to think of the arrangement as a loan of money secured by stock, but we adhere to the characterization used in the industry, as no legal issues before us turn on the question. DESAI v. DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES 9905 2

According to Investors, a web of schemers (including sev- eral persons no longer defendants) used securities loans to profit contemporaneously with the inflation of GENI’s stock price, rather than by selling the stock after the price rose (which would have depressed the price). It worked as follows.4

Officers of GENI first issued themselves unregistered shares of the company. Such shares may not be publicly traded, but the GENI officers loaned them to a broker-dealer called Native Nations Securities, Inc., receiving cash collat- eral in return. Richard Evangelista, an employee of Native Nations and apparently a longtime associate of Breedon, falsi- fied the records of his employer to make it look like the GENI shares had come from other broker-dealers. Native Nations then lent the shares (cash collateral coming back) to Deutsche Bank. Breedon was in charge of this account, which contin- ued to absorb unregistered shares of GENI stock. Eventually, Breedon and his associates at GENI developed a chain of broker-dealers that came between Native Nations and Deut- sche Bank in order to increase the amount of capital for the scheme and to insulate Deutsche Bank from any fallout should the scheme collapse.

The GENI officers used the cash collateral to day-trade in GENI’s publicly traded shares. This created the appearance of investor demand. That appearance inflated the stock price, which in turn required the borrowers of GENI stock, from Native Nations to Deutsche Bank, to provide more cash col- lateral to feed the cycle. It also increased the rebate payments to the borrowers, from Native Nations down the line to Deut- sche Bank. It seems Deutsche Bank gained the most from the rebate payments, however, because the intermediary broker- dealers in the chain paid out a percentage of the rebates they 4 We present here a simplified version of the alleged scheme. For further details, see Stephenson, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1045-51. 9906 DESAI v. DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES received to the next party in the chain. Deutsche Bank, being the last in line, did not have to do that.

To ensure that GENI’s price kept climbing, Breedon and his associates at GENI allegedly paid off two stock analysts to recommend GENI stock in order to drum up demand. One of the analysts was Courtney Smith, a one-time defendant in this litigation; the Longs claim that they purchased GENI stock in February of 2000 on the basis of Smith’s bogus rec- ommendations. The secret deal between GENI and Smith later came to light in the news media.

As the district court put it, this scheme solved the classic problem of market manipulators everywhere: it allowed them to profit from fraudulently inflating a stock’s price without having to sell the shares.

By September 11, 2001, the scheme had driven GENI’s stock price from $12 per share to over $52 per share.

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