Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines

199 F. 204, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1167
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Iowa
DecidedAugust 21, 1912
DocketNo. 71—M
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 199 F. 204 (Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 199 F. 204, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1912).

Opinion

SMITH McPHERSON, District Judge.

A gas plant for lighting purposes was established in Des Moines a number of years ago, and now and for several years' has been owned by complainant. At one time the rates were $1.30 per thousand, then $1.25, then $1.20, $1.15, [205]*205$1.10, and finally $1. The city council, by ordinance of December 27, 1910, fixed the rate at 90 cents. Then this action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance, for the reason, as is alleged, that a 90-cent rate will not be remunerative.

The case was referred to Robert E. Sloan as special master, to take the evidence, reduce it to writing, and report the same to the court, together with his findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is most gratifying to the court to learn that counsel on both sides agree that learning, patience, fairness, and all those qualifications a master in chancery should possess are evidenced by nearly one year of work by Judge Sloan in this case. And the report of the master now pending on exceptions fully warrants the correctness of the compliments of counsel as respects the work and report of the master. The court deems it appropriate to make of record the statement that the administration of justice has been furthered by the untiring industry of the master, whose record in this case is in keeping with his longtime service as an Iowa judge.

While counsel on both sides and the court unite on the foregoing, no one means to say that the report of the master is not subject to criticism and exceptions. Neither party is satisfied with all of his findings. But the real test of judicial action is not in the fact that a litigant is not satisfied, nor in the fact that a tribunal in proceedings to review may otherwise conclude.

I deem it appropriate to call attention to another phase of this litigation. The ordinance was adopted within a few minutes from its intro luction. Quite likely it had been considered by the members in their individual capacities. But in open session it received but little consideration, and without the presence of any one for the gas company. And every member voting to reduce the earnings had a direct personal and moneyed interest in thus reducing the rates. If a judge were to so act, his acts would be absolutely void, because of the longtime maxim, “No man can be judge in his own cause.” And this ought to apply to those who act in an administrative or legislative capacity. This litigation has cost both the gas company and city extravagantly large sums, most of which cannot be taxed as costs, nor recovered back by the party successful in the end. Much of this kind of litigation, and practically all of the expense, would be avoided if Iowa, like so many of the other, including some neighboring, states, had an impartial and city nonresident commission or tribunal, with power to fix these rates at a public hearing, all interested parties present, with the tribunal selecting its own engineers, auditors, and accountants. Too often we have selfish, partisan, prejudiced, and unreliable experts engaged for weeks at a time, at $100 or more and expenses per day, exaggerating their importance, and making the successful party in fact a loser. With all of our boasted advancement, Iowa is a laggard in this matter, and will continue as such until these rate makings are taken from the power of city councils. Appeals to the courts will seldom be taken from the findings of such a tribunal.

But at present the city councils have the duty and power to fix rates; and when rates are thus fixed by them, there is a presumption, [206]*206greater or less, according to the character and methods of their work, that such rates are remunerative. And in any event the corporation whose rates are reduced has the burden to show that the rates thus fixed are not remunerative, failing in which the rates must be observed and enforced. And this was the matter referred to the master. He reports that a 90-cent rate is sufficiently high for a sufficient return to the gas company. The order appointing Judge Sloan required him to take all the testimony, including exhibits, return the same to the court, and make findings of fact with his conclusions of law. All these he has done. Both the city and the gas company have filed exceptions to the report.

In many cases courts themselves have heard the rate cases under rule 67 of the General Equity Rules as amended (29 Sup. Ct. xxxiii). But in districts like, this, with but a single judge, the time would all be devoted to such cases, with other litigation at a standstill. And the Supreme. Court has said that it is a seemly and orderly and commendable course to refer such cases to a master. Railroad v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 20 Sup. Ct. 336, 44 L. Ed. 417; Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln, 223 U. S. 349, 32 Sup. Ct. 271, 56 L. Ed. 466.

[ 1 ] And in case of such a reference the report of the master stands for something substantial, and something besides recommendations. His conclusions have every reasonable presumption in their favor, and are not to be set aside or modified, unless there clearly appears to have been error or mistake on his part. Camden v. Stuart, 144 U. S. 104, 119, 12 Sup. Ct. 585, 36 L. Ed. 363, and cases therein cited. So that it is incumbent on such party to make it clearly appear that the report of the master is erroneous as respects the matters covered by exceptions.- The city has filed several exceptions to the report, largely on questions of fact. But they were not argued orally, nor by brief, and the alleged errors are not made clearly to appear. Every of said exceptions of the city is denied.

There are some propositions now so firmly established by the courts as not to be longer within the limits of debate. The net earnings, according to the duration of the franchise, the earning power of money in that vicinity, and the hazards, moral and physical and otherwise, should vary from 4 to 8 per cent., besides that set aside for depreciation and maintenance. But there is and can be no rigid or inflexible rule as to the per cent, to be thus earned. Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin Company, 192 U. S. 201, 216, 24 Sup. Ct. 241, 48 L. Ed. 406; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Company, 212 U. S. 1, 29 Sup. Ct. 148, 53 L. Ed. 371; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 53 L. Ed. 382, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034; Railway Commission v. Cumberland Telephone Company, 212 U. S. 414, 29 Sup. Ct. 357, 53 L. Ed. 577; San Diego Sand Company v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 19 Sup. Ct. 804, 43 L. Ed. 1154; Lincoln Gas Co. v. City of Lincoln, 223 U. S. 349, 32 Sup. Ct. 271, 56 L. Ed. 466; Cedar Rapids Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 32 Sup.

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199 F. 204, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/des-moines-gas-co-v-city-of-des-moines-iasd-1912.