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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 DERRILL J. FUSSELL, et al., CASE NO. C25-1866-KKE 8
Petitioner(s), ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS
10 PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
11 Respondent(s).
12 Petitioners Derrill J. Fussel, Cody R. Hart, Kevin S. Ewing, Larry J. Jensen, and Rylee M. 13 Fleury, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the United 14 States Attorney General and another Department of Justice official to investigate and prosecute 15 purported violations of federal law related to elections in Skagit County, Washington. Because 16 Petitioners have no legally cognizable interest in the prosecution of federal law against another, 17 the Court will dismiss their petition for lack of Article III standing. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Petitioners are five voters in Skagit County who claim that their local election processes 20 have been affected by a wide range of various forms of fraud and irregularity. Dkt. No. 1 at 4–10. 21 For instance, Petitioners allege that, after voters elected several Skagit County Superior Court 22 judges in November 2024, the judges’ oaths of office were not filed until “months after” they 23 assumed office, purportedly in violation of the Washington constitution. Id. at 5. Petitioners also 24 1 allege that various officials engaged in “election crimes” in connection with elections in 2020 and 2 2022, including—to name just a few from the petition—“false representations of public officers”; 3 “false payments from public accounts”; “masquerading as qualified officials”; and “false election
4 certifications[.]” Id. at 6. The petition also contains references to “duplicated ballots”; 5 “undisclosed early processing” of ballots; “[d]estruction of [r]ecords”; and other alleged 6 malfeasance related to these elections. Id. at 8–10. Petitioners contend that various officials at the 7 local, state, and perhaps federal level have conspired to cover up these acts, for instance by refusing 8 to investigate the alleged wrongdoing, obstructing efforts to seek “quo warranto removal” of the 9 judges at issue, and “backdat[ing]” the allegedly unconstitutional oaths of office. Id. at 5. 10 On September 26, 2025, Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to 11 compel Attorney General Pamela Bondi and Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights 12 Division Harmeet Dhillon to “investigate the documented violations of” several federal statutes,
13 “[p]rosecute or” commit to prosecuting “responsible officials[,]” and “[r]eport compliance to this 14 Court[.]” Id. at 14. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter 15 jurisdiction, arguing, among other things, that Petitioners lack standing to compel the enforcement 16 of federal law. Dkt. No. 13. That motion is now fully briefed and ripe for the Court’s 17 consideration.1 See Dkt. Nos. 15, 16. 19 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the court’s 20 subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “An attack on 21
22 1 Petitioners also filed a notice of related case, identifying Garrison v. Skagit County, 26-cv-104-JNW (W.D. Wash.) as potentially related. Dkt. No. 19. The Court has reviewed the pleadings in both cases and concludes that the 23 actions are not related under Local Civil Rule 3(g)(4). Given the different nature of the claims and identities of the defendants in each case, it does not appear “likely that there [would] be an unduly burdensome duplication of labor and expense or the potential for conflicting results if the cases [were] conducted before different judges.” Local 24 Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 3(g)(4)(B). 1 subject matter jurisdiction” under Rule 12(b)(1) “may be facial or factual.” Edison v. United 2 States, 822 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2016). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the 3 allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction,”
4 but in a factual attack, “the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, 5 would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 6 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)). Respondents’ motion to dismiss presents a facial challenge. 7 Dkt. No. 13 at 2. 9 Petitioners lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to bring this 10 lawsuit. In “every federal case[,]” standing is a “threshold question” that “determin[es] the power 11 of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). This “irreducible 12 constitutional minimum” requires the plaintiff to show (1) “an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
13 traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a 14 favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). Standing 15 requirements “can neither be waived by the parties nor ignored by the court[.]” Yakima Valley 16 Mem’l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 654 F.3d 919, 932 n.17 (9th Cir. 2011). At the 17 pleading stage, a plaintiff “must ‘clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating’ each element.” Spokeo, 18 578 U.S. at 338 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 518) (alteration in original). 19 To plead a cognizable injury, a plaintiff must allege a harm that is “particularized,” 20 meaning it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 21 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992). It is not enough to claim a “generalized interest” held by “all citizens 22 in constitutional governance.” Id. at 575 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
23 War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974)). 24 1 Under these foundational principles and longstanding “American jurisprudence[,]” “a 2 private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of 3 another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). This is, in part, because a generic
4 interest in the proper enforcement of the law is “too generalized and speculative to meet the floor 5 set by Article III.” United States v. Wegeler, 941 F.3d 665, 674 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); 6 see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (“Vindicating the public interest … is the function of Congress 7 and the Chief Executive.” (emphasis in original)). Instead, only the individual “prosecuted []or 8 threatened with prosecution” has “standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority[.]” 9 Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619. 10 A straightforward application of Linda R.S forecloses Petitioners’ claims. Petitioners seek 11 to compel federal law enforcement officials to prosecute purported violations of federal law. Dkt. 12 No. 1 at 14. Petitioners themselves are “neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution” and
13 thus have no standing to challenge the Department of Justice’s enforcement priorities or alleged 14 prosecutorial inaction. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619. To the extent Petitioners address Linda R.S.
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1 2 3
4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 DERRILL J. FUSSELL, et al., CASE NO. C25-1866-KKE 8
Petitioner(s), ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS
10 PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
11 Respondent(s).
12 Petitioners Derrill J. Fussel, Cody R. Hart, Kevin S. Ewing, Larry J. Jensen, and Rylee M. 13 Fleury, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the United 14 States Attorney General and another Department of Justice official to investigate and prosecute 15 purported violations of federal law related to elections in Skagit County, Washington. Because 16 Petitioners have no legally cognizable interest in the prosecution of federal law against another, 17 the Court will dismiss their petition for lack of Article III standing. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Petitioners are five voters in Skagit County who claim that their local election processes 20 have been affected by a wide range of various forms of fraud and irregularity. Dkt. No. 1 at 4–10. 21 For instance, Petitioners allege that, after voters elected several Skagit County Superior Court 22 judges in November 2024, the judges’ oaths of office were not filed until “months after” they 23 assumed office, purportedly in violation of the Washington constitution. Id. at 5. Petitioners also 24 1 allege that various officials engaged in “election crimes” in connection with elections in 2020 and 2 2022, including—to name just a few from the petition—“false representations of public officers”; 3 “false payments from public accounts”; “masquerading as qualified officials”; and “false election
4 certifications[.]” Id. at 6. The petition also contains references to “duplicated ballots”; 5 “undisclosed early processing” of ballots; “[d]estruction of [r]ecords”; and other alleged 6 malfeasance related to these elections. Id. at 8–10. Petitioners contend that various officials at the 7 local, state, and perhaps federal level have conspired to cover up these acts, for instance by refusing 8 to investigate the alleged wrongdoing, obstructing efforts to seek “quo warranto removal” of the 9 judges at issue, and “backdat[ing]” the allegedly unconstitutional oaths of office. Id. at 5. 10 On September 26, 2025, Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to 11 compel Attorney General Pamela Bondi and Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights 12 Division Harmeet Dhillon to “investigate the documented violations of” several federal statutes,
13 “[p]rosecute or” commit to prosecuting “responsible officials[,]” and “[r]eport compliance to this 14 Court[.]” Id. at 14. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter 15 jurisdiction, arguing, among other things, that Petitioners lack standing to compel the enforcement 16 of federal law. Dkt. No. 13. That motion is now fully briefed and ripe for the Court’s 17 consideration.1 See Dkt. Nos. 15, 16. 19 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the court’s 20 subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “An attack on 21
22 1 Petitioners also filed a notice of related case, identifying Garrison v. Skagit County, 26-cv-104-JNW (W.D. Wash.) as potentially related. Dkt. No. 19. The Court has reviewed the pleadings in both cases and concludes that the 23 actions are not related under Local Civil Rule 3(g)(4). Given the different nature of the claims and identities of the defendants in each case, it does not appear “likely that there [would] be an unduly burdensome duplication of labor and expense or the potential for conflicting results if the cases [were] conducted before different judges.” Local 24 Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 3(g)(4)(B). 1 subject matter jurisdiction” under Rule 12(b)(1) “may be facial or factual.” Edison v. United 2 States, 822 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2016). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the 3 allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction,”
4 but in a factual attack, “the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, 5 would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 6 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)). Respondents’ motion to dismiss presents a facial challenge. 7 Dkt. No. 13 at 2. 9 Petitioners lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to bring this 10 lawsuit. In “every federal case[,]” standing is a “threshold question” that “determin[es] the power 11 of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). This “irreducible 12 constitutional minimum” requires the plaintiff to show (1) “an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
13 traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a 14 favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). Standing 15 requirements “can neither be waived by the parties nor ignored by the court[.]” Yakima Valley 16 Mem’l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 654 F.3d 919, 932 n.17 (9th Cir. 2011). At the 17 pleading stage, a plaintiff “must ‘clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating’ each element.” Spokeo, 18 578 U.S. at 338 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 518) (alteration in original). 19 To plead a cognizable injury, a plaintiff must allege a harm that is “particularized,” 20 meaning it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 21 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992). It is not enough to claim a “generalized interest” held by “all citizens 22 in constitutional governance.” Id. at 575 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
23 War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974)). 24 1 Under these foundational principles and longstanding “American jurisprudence[,]” “a 2 private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of 3 another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). This is, in part, because a generic
4 interest in the proper enforcement of the law is “too generalized and speculative to meet the floor 5 set by Article III.” United States v. Wegeler, 941 F.3d 665, 674 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); 6 see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (“Vindicating the public interest … is the function of Congress 7 and the Chief Executive.” (emphasis in original)). Instead, only the individual “prosecuted []or 8 threatened with prosecution” has “standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority[.]” 9 Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619. 10 A straightforward application of Linda R.S forecloses Petitioners’ claims. Petitioners seek 11 to compel federal law enforcement officials to prosecute purported violations of federal law. Dkt. 12 No. 1 at 14. Petitioners themselves are “neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution” and
13 thus have no standing to challenge the Department of Justice’s enforcement priorities or alleged 14 prosecutorial inaction. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619. To the extent Petitioners address Linda R.S. 15 in their briefs, they attempt to distinguish it by asserting that the various statutes they claim are 16 going unenforced impose a “statutory duty” on Respondents and confer a “legally protected 17 interest” on Petitioners. Dkt. No. 15 at 3–4. But even assuming the statutes Petitioners cite 18 purported to confer on them a right to sue (they do not), a statute could not convert the generic 19 “public interest in proper administration of the laws” into “an individual right” that suffices for 20 Article III standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. Plaintiffs have no legally cognizable interest in the 21 prosecution of another no matter what statute they seek to have enforced. 22 Ordinarily, a court will not dismiss a pro se case without leave to amend the pleading unless
23 “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies … could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 24 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1 1988)). Here, it is absolutely clear that no amendment could cure the fact that Petitioners lack 2 standing to pursue the relief they seek. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this case with prejudice 3 and without leave to amend the petition.
5 Respondents’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Dkt. No. 13. This case is DISMISSED 6 with prejudice and without leave to amend. 7 Dated this 16th day of March, 2026. 8 A 9 Kymberly K. Evanson 10 United S tates District Judge
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