ALD-157 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 20-3604 ___________
DERRICK WHITE, Appellant
v.
SP PLUS CORPORATION, doing business as SP+ Municipal Services, doing business as Standard Parking Corporation ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-20-cv-00021) District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson ____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 22, 2021
Before: MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 28, 2021) _________
OPINION* _________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Appellant Derrick White, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from
the District Court’s denial of his amended complaint. Because the appeal presents no
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
White filed a complaint alleging that he was fired in retaliation for taking medical
leave. See Complaint, ECF No. 1. The Magistrate Judge assigned to White’s case
screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Construing it to allege a
violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), the Judge determined that
White had failed to state a claim because, among other things, he had failed to describe
the factual circumstances surrounding his leave and termination. The Judge invited
White to file an amended complaint to correct the errors, noting what information he
needed to include to pursue an FMLA claim. See Order, ECF No. 5 at 7 n2.
White filed an amended complaint that lacked specific allegations but had various
documents attached to it, including a hospital intake form dated September 9, 2015,
stating that White sprained his wrist after he “slipped on oil and fell.” Am. Complaint,
ECF No. 9 at 9. There was also a doctor’s note requesting that White be excused from
work for two weeks from February 9, 2016, due to “recent hand surgery,” id. at 7, and
reports from an orthopedic practice stating that White could return to work with
restrictions on February 29, 2016, and without restrictions on April 11, 2016, id. at 11–
12. Also attached was a grant of unemployment benefits stating that White last worked 2 on February 8, 2016, and that he took a leave of absence for “health reasons.” Id. at 16.
Additionally, there was a document showing that White was hired as a part-time
employee in August 2014, see id. at 6, and an employer’s performance appraisal from
December 2015 evaluating White’s performance as “below expectations,” id. at 5. There
were no documents included pertaining to White’s request for medical leave.
Upon screening the amended complaint, the Magistrate Judge explained:
Although it is clear that Plaintiff feels like he was wrongfully terminated by his employer when he took time off to recover from hand surgery, it is not clear what federal claim or claims Plaintiff is seeking to bring in his Amended Complaint. . . . Plaintiff uses the words “wrongful termination,” “discrimination,” and “retaliation,” but does not identify what federal statute (FMLA, Americans with Disabilities Act [“ADA”], etc.) he is invoking or what claim or claims under these statutes he is attempting to assert (retaliation, interference, discrimination, failure to accommodate, etc.).
R&R, ECF No. 11 at 7. However, “based on the procedural history of the case,” the
Judge construed White’s amended complaint to allege retaliation and interference under
the FMLA. Id. at 8. He again determined that White had failed to state a claim and
recommended dismissal. Over White’s objections, the District Court adopted the
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and dismissed White’s amended
complaint. White appealed.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing White’s amended complaint
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
3 Whether a complaint should be dismissed under § 1915 because it fails to state a claim is
assessed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. In order to survive dismissal under that standard, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.
Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that, under this standard,
courts may consider documents attached to a complaint). We construe White’s pro se
amended complaint liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam).
III.
We agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss White’s amended
complaint. It is unlawful for an employer to interfere with an employee’s FMLA rights
or to retaliate against him on the basis of either requesting or taking FMLA leave. See
Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 508 (3d Cir. 2009). In both the
interference and retaliation contexts, a claimant must establish, among other things, that
he was protected under the FMLA and that he requested FMLA leave. See id. at 508–09.
To establish protection under the FMLA, a claimant must demonstrate that he “was an
eligible employee under the FMLA” and that he was “entitled to FMLA leave.” Capps v.
Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2017); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2611
(describing who qualifies as an “eligible employee” under the FMLA). 4 At the outset, we note that White’s amended complaint makes general, conclusory
allegations and requires the reader to cobble together the relevant facts from attached
documents. Although it is apparent that White took a leave of absence from work due to
a hand injury, he did not allege sufficient facts from which one could infer that he was
eligible for or entitled to FMLA leave, or that he even requested such leave. See
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2012)
(explaining the FLMA’s notice requirement). In the event that White was, in fact,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
ALD-157 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 20-3604 ___________
DERRICK WHITE, Appellant
v.
SP PLUS CORPORATION, doing business as SP+ Municipal Services, doing business as Standard Parking Corporation ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-20-cv-00021) District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson ____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 22, 2021
Before: MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 28, 2021) _________
OPINION* _________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Appellant Derrick White, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from
the District Court’s denial of his amended complaint. Because the appeal presents no
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
White filed a complaint alleging that he was fired in retaliation for taking medical
leave. See Complaint, ECF No. 1. The Magistrate Judge assigned to White’s case
screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Construing it to allege a
violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), the Judge determined that
White had failed to state a claim because, among other things, he had failed to describe
the factual circumstances surrounding his leave and termination. The Judge invited
White to file an amended complaint to correct the errors, noting what information he
needed to include to pursue an FMLA claim. See Order, ECF No. 5 at 7 n2.
White filed an amended complaint that lacked specific allegations but had various
documents attached to it, including a hospital intake form dated September 9, 2015,
stating that White sprained his wrist after he “slipped on oil and fell.” Am. Complaint,
ECF No. 9 at 9. There was also a doctor’s note requesting that White be excused from
work for two weeks from February 9, 2016, due to “recent hand surgery,” id. at 7, and
reports from an orthopedic practice stating that White could return to work with
restrictions on February 29, 2016, and without restrictions on April 11, 2016, id. at 11–
12. Also attached was a grant of unemployment benefits stating that White last worked 2 on February 8, 2016, and that he took a leave of absence for “health reasons.” Id. at 16.
Additionally, there was a document showing that White was hired as a part-time
employee in August 2014, see id. at 6, and an employer’s performance appraisal from
December 2015 evaluating White’s performance as “below expectations,” id. at 5. There
were no documents included pertaining to White’s request for medical leave.
Upon screening the amended complaint, the Magistrate Judge explained:
Although it is clear that Plaintiff feels like he was wrongfully terminated by his employer when he took time off to recover from hand surgery, it is not clear what federal claim or claims Plaintiff is seeking to bring in his Amended Complaint. . . . Plaintiff uses the words “wrongful termination,” “discrimination,” and “retaliation,” but does not identify what federal statute (FMLA, Americans with Disabilities Act [“ADA”], etc.) he is invoking or what claim or claims under these statutes he is attempting to assert (retaliation, interference, discrimination, failure to accommodate, etc.).
R&R, ECF No. 11 at 7. However, “based on the procedural history of the case,” the
Judge construed White’s amended complaint to allege retaliation and interference under
the FMLA. Id. at 8. He again determined that White had failed to state a claim and
recommended dismissal. Over White’s objections, the District Court adopted the
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and dismissed White’s amended
complaint. White appealed.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing White’s amended complaint
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
3 Whether a complaint should be dismissed under § 1915 because it fails to state a claim is
assessed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. In order to survive dismissal under that standard, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.
Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that, under this standard,
courts may consider documents attached to a complaint). We construe White’s pro se
amended complaint liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam).
III.
We agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss White’s amended
complaint. It is unlawful for an employer to interfere with an employee’s FMLA rights
or to retaliate against him on the basis of either requesting or taking FMLA leave. See
Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 508 (3d Cir. 2009). In both the
interference and retaliation contexts, a claimant must establish, among other things, that
he was protected under the FMLA and that he requested FMLA leave. See id. at 508–09.
To establish protection under the FMLA, a claimant must demonstrate that he “was an
eligible employee under the FMLA” and that he was “entitled to FMLA leave.” Capps v.
Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2017); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2611
(describing who qualifies as an “eligible employee” under the FMLA). 4 At the outset, we note that White’s amended complaint makes general, conclusory
allegations and requires the reader to cobble together the relevant facts from attached
documents. Although it is apparent that White took a leave of absence from work due to
a hand injury, he did not allege sufficient facts from which one could infer that he was
eligible for or entitled to FMLA leave, or that he even requested such leave. See
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2012)
(explaining the FLMA’s notice requirement). In the event that White was, in fact,
granted FMLA leave, he cannot now claim that he was denied FMLA benefits. See
Capps, 847 F.3d at 155. And in the event that White was entitled to and requested or
took FMLA leave, he nonetheless failed to allege that he was fired as a result of
requesting or taking such leave. See Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302 (explaining that a
claimant must demonstrate that he suffered an “adverse employment action” because he
invoked his rights under the FMLA). In fact, it is unclear whether White was even fired,
given that he was granted unemployment compensation following a determination of
eligibility under 43 Pa. Stat. § 802, which suggests that White left the job voluntarily.
See Am. Complaint, ECF No. 9 at 16. While White did generally allege that he was fired
as a result of taking medical leave in some of his other filings, he did not provide nearly
enough detail (such as the dates he requested leave, took leave, or was terminated) to
state a plausible FMLA claim.1
1 To the extent that White’s complaint could be liberally construed to allege discrimination or retaliation in violation of the ADA, he also failed to state such a claim. 5 Finally, the District Court did not err in declining to grant White leave to further
amend his complaint, as he had already amended his complaint once and further
amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108
(3d Cir. 2002). Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily
affirm.
See Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing the elements required to make a prima facie showing for an ADA discrimination claim); Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing the same for an ADA retaliation claim). 6