Derrick Phipps v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 9, 2026
Docket1:25-cv-04754
StatusUnknown

This text of Derrick Phipps v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (Derrick Phipps v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Derrick Phipps v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DERRICK PHIPPS, Plaintiff, 25-CV-4754 (LLS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD INC., Defendant. LOUIS L STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. He contends that he was denied mortgages and personal loans because Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”) disclosed inaccurate personal information for him, including name variations, erroneous birth dates, and obsolete addresses, and failed to remove, within the statutory deadline, one or more accounts that creditors had charged off.1 By separate order, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis based on his indigency. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks

1 In Plaintiff’s first suit against the same defendant, he alleged that his year of birth was incorrectly listed as 1966, instead of 1965, in his internal credit file and consumer disclosures given to him. See Phipps v. Experian Info. Sol., LLC, No. 7:20-CV-3368-NSR-VR (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2023) (dismissed for lack of standing), aff’d, No. 23-7529-cv, 2024 WL 5001842, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2024) (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2024) (“To the extent the plaintiff has adequately set out arguments on appeal, the arguments lack merit . . . . Incorrect address information, a one-year disparity in birth year, and slight variations of the appellant’s name are the types of inaccuracies that do not, without more, ‘work any concrete harm’ by virtue of their dissemination alone.”). monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are drawn from the complaint.2 Plaintiff alleges that between 2020 and 2025, he sent “multiple formal disputes” to Experian identifying alleged errors in his consumer credit report. (ECF 1 at 4, ¶ 14.) In April 2025, Plaintiff obtained his credit disclosures which confirmed that Experian had persisted in disseminating inaccurate and outdated credit

data, including “variations of Plaintiff’s name, erroneous dates of birth, and obsolete addresses no longer associated with Plaintiff.” (Id.) Experian also “continued to report a tradeline reflecting a charged-off account from 2019 with derogatory status updates extending through 2025.” (Id.) It is unclear when the account charged off in 2019 first became delinquent, but Plaintiff contends that Experian “knew or should have known the correct date of delinquency from account level data readily available to it.” (Id. at ¶ 37.) Plaintiff also refers generally to multiple “obsolete negative credit entries” and “re-aged derogatory tradelines” (id. at 6, ¶ 21), and he therefore also appears to challenge account information in addition to the charged-off account from 2019. In April 2025, Plaintiff received “additional loan denial notifications.” (Id. at 4, ¶ 14.) His applications for credit from Rocket Mortgage, Freedom Plus and other lenders were rejected, and

he contends that the denials of mortgages and personal loans “directly resulted” from the “dissemination of these derogatory entries.” (Id. at 5, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff brings claims against Experian for allegedly: (1) failing to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information” in credit reports, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), and reporting information that should have been “obsolete” under the seven-year deadline in 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a); and (2) failing to reinvestigate upon dispute, as required by 15

2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. U.S.C. § 1681i(a). Plaintiff seeks damages, contending that Experian’s misconduct was willful, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, or negligent, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. DISCUSSION “[T]he FCRA ‘is not a strict liability statute.’” Suluki v. Credit One Bank, NA, 138 F.4th 709, 721 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Obabueki v. Choicepoint, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 278, 285

(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 319 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam)); Abdallah v. LexisNexis Risk Sols. FL Inc., No. 19-CV-3609 (MKB), 2021 WL 6197060, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2021) (“[M]erely reporting inaccurate information is insufficient to give rise to liability under the FCRA, as the Act is not a strict liability statute”).

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Derrick Phipps v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/derrick-phipps-v-experian-information-solutions-inc-nysd-2026.