Derrick Lee Cardello-Smith v. Michigan State Police Department

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedMay 7, 2026
Docket1:25-cv-00823
StatusUnknown

This text of Derrick Lee Cardello-Smith v. Michigan State Police Department (Derrick Lee Cardello-Smith v. Michigan State Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Derrick Lee Cardello-Smith v. Michigan State Police Department, (W.D. Mich. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

DERRICK LEE CARDELLO-SMITH #267009,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-823

v. Hon. Paul L. Maloney

MICHIGAN STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT, ,

Defendants. _______________________________/ AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND AMENDED ORDER DISMISSING LAWSUIT AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS Plaintiff Derrick Lee Cardello-Smith currently serves a lengthy term of imprisonment under the control of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC).1 Proceeding without the assistance of counsel, Plaintiff has filed numerous civil lawsuits in both the Western and Eastern District of Michigan and in the state courts. In this district, the court placed Plaintiff on the restricted filer list after finding that he filed three frivolous lawsuits (three-strike rule). The Eastern District also imposed filing restrictions on Plaintiff. Plaintiff avoided the filing restrictions in this case by paying the filing fee. The court, nevertheless,

1 MDOC identifies Plaintiff by the name Derrick Lee Smith and notes that Plaintiff uses multiple aliases. The court uses the name Plaintiff provided in the caption for his complaint. concludes this lawsuit is yet another frivolous action. The court will dismiss the lawsuit and impose additional sanctions on Plaintiff using its inherent authority. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conducted an illegal search of his

prison cell. The court referred the action to the Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge issued a report with recommendations that would resolve eighteen pending motions (ECF No. 117):  Motions to dismiss by Defendants Joe Normandin, Michigan State Police (MSP), Cavan Berry, and Patricia Penman (ECF Nos. 30, 48, 53, and 87);

 Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 67, 76, 94, and 113);  Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 93);  Plaintiff’s search warrant motions (ECF Nos. 103, 104, and 110);  Plaintiff’s motions to compel documents, emails, phone records, and

communications (ECF Nos. 81 and 92);  Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default and default judgment (ECF Nos. 42 and 58);  Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendant Normandin’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 107); and

 Defendant Penman’s request for sanctions (ECF No. 87). The Magistrate Judge also recommends imposing sanctions on Plaintiff. Three motions have been filed since the Magistrate Judge issued his report. On March 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for the voluntary dismissal of his claims with prejudice (ECF No. 120). On March 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file over-sized objections to the report and recommendation (ECF No. 127). Finally, on April 23, 2026, a third party filed a motion to intervene as an interested party (ECF No. 131).

A. The court begins with Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss this lawsuit (ECF No. 120). Plaintiff moves to dismiss this case with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants Berry, Normandin, and MSP support dismissal with prejudice. Defendant Penman opposes dismissal, arguing that Plaintiff is using dismissal to

avoid sanctions. Under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs may dismiss their cases without a court order by filing “a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). When a plaintiff files such a notice before an opposing party files an answer or motion for summary judgment, “the court has no discretion to deny such a dismissal.”

, No. 17-5548, 2018 WL 1724560, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2018). Once a “plaintiff gives his notice, the lawsuit is no more.” , 1 F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 1993). The “dismissal is without prejudice” unless “the notice or stipulation states otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). In his (proposed) objections to the report and recommendation, Plaintiff clarifies that he seeks dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice (ECF

No. 128 PageID.730). Plaintiff’s Rule 41(a) motion functions to dismiss this lawsuit. The document meets the requirements for a Rule 41(a) notice. Rule 41(a) notices dismissing a lawsuit are self- executing and do not require judicial approval. , 90 F.4th 501, 504 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing , 718 F.3d 535, 540 (6th Cir. 2023)). Plaintiff filed this motion before any of the defendants filed an answer or

motion for summary judgment. While Plaintiff did not state whether the case should be dismissed with or without prejudice, he clarifies that he wants the case dismissed with prejudice in a subsequent submission to the court. B. Although Plaintiff has dismissed this lawsuit, the court exercises its inherent authority

and will impose sanctions on Plaintiff. District courts have inherent authority to impose injunctive sanctions on prolific litigants who pursue vexatious and harassing lawsuits. , No. 24-3365, 2024 WL 567311 at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 2024) (citations omitted); , No. 20-3896, 2021 WL 7160160, at *5 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2021) (citations omitted); , No. 18-5666, 2019 WL 2647494, at *3 (6th Cir. May 17, 2019) (citations omitted). The court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions

continues even after voluntary dismissal of a lawsuit under Rule 41(a). , 2024 WL 457311, at *3. The Supreme Court has “consistently held that federal courts retain jurisdiction over issues—such as sanctions—that are collateral” to resolution of the merits of a lawsuit. , 465 F.3d 642, 645 (6th Cir. 2006); , 496 U.S. 384 (1990).

Courts have the authority to impose pre-filing restraints on litigants with a history of filing repetitive, frivolous, or vexatious pleadings and may require those litigants to obtain court approval before filing further pleadings. , No. 23-5842, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024) (citations omitted); , 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998) (“There is nothing unusual about imposing prefiling restrictions in matters with a history of repetitive or vexatious litigation.”). “While

this court cannot absolutely foreclose an individual from initiating an action or pursuing an appeal in federal court, , 99 F.3d 807, 811 (6th Cir. 1996), the court may impose prefiling restrictions on an individual with a history of repetitive or vexatious litigation.” , 23 F. App’x 491, 493 (6th Cir. 2001). District courts have discretion to issue sanctions under their inherent authority.

, 307 F.3d 501, 517 (6th Cir. 2002). To use its inherent authority to impose sanctions, a court must find that the lawsuit or claim lacked merit and that the lawsuit or claim was filed for an improper purpose. at 519. The Sixth Circuit instructs that the latter element requires bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith. at 519.

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Derrick Lee Cardello-Smith v. Michigan State Police Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/derrick-lee-cardello-smith-v-michigan-state-police-department-miwd-2026.