NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0835-24
DERRICK HINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHOPRITE OF EAST ORANGE,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
VILLAGE SUPERMARKET OF NJ, LP,1
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent,
STERLING SECURITY,
Third-Party Defendant- Respondent. _____________________________
Submitted March 17, 2026 – Decided April 14, 2026
1 Improperly pled as Shoprite of East Orange. Before Judges Chase and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-1634-17.
Hinson Snipes, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Tracey C. Hinson, on the briefs).
Carey & Grossi PC, attorneys for respondent Village Supermarket of NJ, LP (Charles B. Carey, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Derrick Hinson appeals four Law Division orders: (1) the April
26, 2019 order denying plaintiff's motion to reopen and extend discovery; (2)
the June 21, 2019 order denying reconsideration of his motion to reopen
discovery; (3) the June 21, 2019 order granting summary judgment to defendant
ShopRite of East Orange; and (4) the October 24, 2024 order entering a directed
verdict to ShopRite's contracted security company, defendant Sterling
Securities.2 Although we affirm the orders denying reopening discovery and
reconsideration, as well as granting summary judgment to ShopRite, we vacate
the entry of the directed verdict to Sterling Securities, and remand for a new trial
in accordance with this decision.
I.
2 Sterling Securities has not filed a brief in this matter. A-0835-24 2 On March 8, 2015, plaintiff, his former fiancée, Gasafa Jean Charles, and
their two young children went to the ShopRite supermarket to buy groceries. As
plaintiff and his family stood at the checkout line at register nine, the cashier at
register ten, Terry McCoy, asked plaintiff what was on his hat, to which plaintiff
responded, "none of [your] business." After McCoy asked him again what was
on his hat and to tilt his hat, plaintiff replied, "I'm a grown man. I don't have to
tilt my []head for anybody." Plaintiff testified at trial that McCoy, who is
African American like him, became angry and began to curse at him stating, "I'll
f[**]k this n[****]r up."
As plaintiff and his family continued to check out their groceries, plaintiff
stepped into the aisle and McCoy left his register and walked around the other
checkout counters towards plaintiff. Plaintiff testified he looked towards the
exit for a second and saw a Sterling officer standing by the exit door who looked
at him right before McCoy left his register.
As McCoy was walking around the counters, plaintiff took off his jacket,
rolled up his sleeves, and got into a boxing position, preparing to fight. When
McCoy arrived where plaintiff was standing, the two engaged in a mutual fight.
One of the three Sterling guards working—but not the one who was alleged to
have made eye contact with plaintiff—Lydel Dorsey, testified that he was
standing nearby, and although he did not hear the verbal altercation take place,
A-0835-24 3 he realized an incident might occur when he saw plaintiff take his jacket off and
roll his sleeves up. At this point, Dorsey followed McCoy as he approached
plaintiff and radioed for backup security.
It took Dorsey five seconds to intervene in the fight. As Dorsey was trying
to break up the fight, the parties fell to the floor, with plaintiff on top. When
Dorsey pulled plaintiff up, McCoy took the opportunity to strike plaintiff. The
altercation ended with McCoy being pushed away and leaving through the front
door and plaintiff being taken back to an office. McCoy was subsequently
terminated for violating company policy by physically assaulting plaintiff. The
entire incident was captured on two video cameras.
Gary Bootes, one of Sterling's owners, testified that they have over 300
employees and provide security services to schools, malls, drug stores, and
supermarkets. He testified that his guards are supposed to follow certain
procedures or rules when performing their jobs and that if they hear a cashier
threatening a customer, they should intervene. Further, if they see a person
threatening a customer, and then approaching that customer, they should also
intervene.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against ShopRite in March 2017, alleging
vicarious liability, negligent supervision, and breach of its duty to maintain safe
premises. ShopRite answered and later filed a third-party complaint against
A-0835-24 4 Sterling Securities. At the end of April 2018, plaintiff sought, and the court
granted, permission to amend his complaint to add Sterling.
The initial discovery end date was in February 2018. Discovery was
extended on four occasions: pursuant to Rule 1: 24-1(c), the discovery end date
was extended an additional sixty days until April 2018; from April 2018 to July
2018, upon motion by defendant ShopRite; and from July 2018 to November
2018, with the joinder of Sterling as a new party pursuant to Rule 4:24-1(b). At
the end of December 2018, the court entered an order extending discovery an
additional ninety days to the end of March 2019 upon Sterling Securities' motion
to extend discovery.
In April 2019, after discovery ended, plaintiff moved to reopen and extend
discovery. The court denied this motion finding no exceptional circumstances
warranting another extension. The court noted the parties had over 700 days of
discovery; there had been four discovery extensions; and plaintiff did not file
any motions to compel discovery of the items he claimed he was still waiting
for. On June 21, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of this order was denied.
Almost a month after discovery ended, the court rescheduled an
arbitration date that was previously scheduled before discovery ended. Four
days before arbitration, ShopRite moved for summary judgment. On June 21,
2019, after oral argument, the court granted ShopRite's motion determining that
A-0835-24 5 plaintiff failed to show any evidence of negligent hiring and that ShopRite could
not be held vicariously liable for an employee's altercation with plaintiff since
McCoy's actions were clearly outside of his scope of employment.
Sterling then moved for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff failed to
serve an expert report, and thus, could not prevail on his negligence claim. The
court denied Sterling's motion, noting the standard of review was the reasonable
person standard and the jury did not need an expert, rather, they could use their
common knowledge to make the determination of whether the guards lack of
involvement until the fight was underway was negligent.
The claims against Sterling proceeded to trial. After the close of plaintiff's
case, Sterling moved for a directed verdict, arguing that plaintiff did not present
required expert testimony to establish a standard of care regarding negligent
security conduct. The trial court granted Sterling's motion and dismissed
plaintiff's claims with prejudice finding that an expert was required to opine
whether Sterling's guards intervened and de-escalated in a timely manner and
that the jury was unable to determine how quickly the guard should have
intervened by looking at the video.
This appeal follows.
A-0835-24 6 II.
A.
We first consider plaintiff's argument that the court erred when it denied
his motion to reopen and extend discovery. We disagree.
We review a decision denying a motion to reopen or extend discovery for
an abuse of discretion. Leitner v. Toms River Reg'l Schs., 392 N.J. Super. 80,
87 (App. Div. 2007). "That is, '[w]e generally defer to a trial court's disposition
of discovery matters unless the court has abused its discretion or its
determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law. '"
Pomerantz Paper Co. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011) (quoting
Rivers v. LSC P'ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div. 2005) (alteration in
original)).
Rule 4:24-1(c) requires a showing of "good cause" to support an
application to extend the time for discovery that is heard before the time for
discovery has expired. A more substantial showing, "exceptional
circumstances," is required to justify an extension once the discovery time has
expired and an arbitration or trial date is fixed. See R. 4:24-1(c); Hollywood
Café Diner v. Jaffee, 473 N.J. Super 210, 219-20 (App. Div. 2022).
In order to extend discovery based upon "exceptional circumstances," the moving party must satisfy four inquiries: (1) why discovery has not been completed
A-0835-24 7 within time and counsel's diligence in pursuing discovery during that time; (2) the additional discovery or disclosure sought is essential; (3) an explanation for counsel's failure to request an extension of the time for discovery within the original time period; and (4) the circumstances presented were clearly beyond the control of the attorney and litigant seeking the extension of time.
[Rivers, 378 N.J. Super. at 79 (citing Vitti v. Brown, 359 N.J. Super. 40, 51 (Law Div. 2003)).]
"Any attorney requesting additional time for discovery should establish
that they made effective use of the time permitted under the rules." Ibid. "A
failure to pursue discovery promptly, within the time permitted, would normally
be fatal to such a request." Ibid. (citing Vitti, 359 N.J. Super. at 51). "[W]here
the 'delay rests squarely on plaintiff's counsel's failure to retain an expert and
pursue discovery in a timely manner,' and the [above] factors are not present
there are no exceptional circumstances to warrant an extension." Bldg.
Materials Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 424 N.J. Super. 448, 479 (App. Div. 2012)
(quoting Rivers, 378 N.J. Super. at 79). The moving party must provide "[a]
precise explanation that details the cause of delay and what actions were taken
during the elapsed time." Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 429 (2006).
Measured against this standard, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
court's determination. The record supports the court's finding that plaintiff
failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the requested discovery
A-0835-24 8 extension, which was scheduled after discovery had ended and an arbitration
date had been set. See R. 4:24-1(c). Plaintiff's argument that the original
scheduled arbitration date occurred before discovery was completed does not
change this analysis because the rescheduled arbitration date occurred after
discovery was completed. Moreover, plaintiff did not demonstrate why, through
the exercise of due diligence, he could not complete discovery within the time
period allotted. As the motion court acknowledged, discovery remained open
for more than 700 days and was extended numerous times. Plaintiff served
initial discovery requests and pursued initial discovery, but he never followed
through with a formal motion to compel their production. Although plaintiff
speculated such documents might contain relevant information, the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request.
B.
We also reject plaintiff's contention that the court should have granted his
motion for reconsideration of its denial to reopen discovery. Reconsideration is
a matter within the sound discretion of the court. Branch v. Cream-O-Land
Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). "It is not appropriate merely because a litigant
is dissatisfied with a prior ruling or wishes to reargue a motion[.]" Palombi v.
Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010). Instead, reconsideration
should be limited to those cases "in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its
A-0835-24 9 decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious
that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance
of probative, competent evidence." Ibid. (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J.
Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).
Plaintiff did not identify any controlling authority or material evidence
that the court overlooked. Instead, he repeated the same arguments advanced at
the original motion, including speculation about personnel or security
documents that he never sought to compel during the lengthy discovery period.
Because plaintiff offered no new facts, no change in the law, and no showing
that the court misapprehended the record; denial of reconsideration was within
the trial court's discretion. See Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. at 288.
C.
We next address plaintiff's claim that there were material facts in dispute
precluding the court from granting summary judgment. We are not persuaded.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). Summary
judgment is proper if the record demonstrates "no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment . . .
as a matter of law." Burnett v. Gloucester Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 409
N.J. Super. 219, 228 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). Issues of law are
A-0835-24 10 subject to the de novo standard of review, and the trial court's determination of
such issues is accorded no deference. Meade v. Twp. of Livingston, 249 N.J.
310, 326-27 (2021); Kaye v. Rosefielde, 223 N.J. 218, 229 (2015).
"To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court
must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving
party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 450, 472 (2020) (alteration in original)
(quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)). "The court's
function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Rios v. Meda Pharm.,
Inc., 247 N.J. 8, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 540).
Accordingly, this standard requires the court to conduct its analysis in
light of the elements and evidentiary standard governing the cause of action.
Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014). To establish a prima facie case of
negligence, plaintiff must show: (1) a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3)
actual and proximate causation; and (4) damages. Jersey Cent. Power & Light
Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 594 (2013).
Plaintiff stresses that where credibility is at issue, summary judgment is
inappropriate. In re Estate of DeFrank, 433 N.J. Super. 258, 266 (App. Div.
2013). He contends there are disputed issues of material facts as to whether
ShopRite was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee, McCoy;
A-0835-24 11 whether McCoy was acting within the scope of his employment; whether
ShopRite was negligent in the hiring, training, or supervising McCoy; and
whether ShopRite was negligent in hiring Sterling Securities to protect its
premises and customers.
Those assertions are unavailing. "The imposition of vicarious liability
upon employers for the acts of an employee, also known as the doctrine of
respondeat superior, is based upon the idea that the employee is the agent . . . of
the employer." G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 415 (2019). "Under respondeat
superior, an employer can be found liable for the negligence of an employee
causing injuries to third parties, if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee
was acting within the scope of his or her employment." Carter v. Reynolds, 175
N.J. 402, 408-09 (2003) (citing Lehmann v, Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 619
(1993)).
Courts consider four factors in determining whether an employee acted
within the scope of employment. Davis v. Devereux Found., 209 N.J. 269, 303
(2012). An employee's action is considered to be within the scope of
employment if: (1) "it is of the kind he is employed to perform"; (2) "it occurs
substantially within the authorized time and space limits"; (3) "it is actuated, at
least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer]"; and (4) "if force is
intentionally used by the [employee] against another, the use of the force is not
A-0835-24 12 unexpected by the [employer]." Ibid. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency,
§ 228 (Am. Law Inst. 1958)).
"Conversely, an employee's act is outside of the scope of his or her
employment 'if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the
authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the
master.'" Davis, 209 N.J. at 303 (quoting Restatement (Second) § 228(2)).
Rarely will intentional torts fall within the scope of employment. Ibid. (citing
Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 95 N.J. 530, 535 n.1
(1984)).
McCoy was not acting within the scope of his employment with ShopRite
when he engaged in a physical altercation with plaintiff. First, McCoy 's
altercation with plaintiff was in no way related to the kind of action that he was
employed to perform—to check out customers' groceries at the grocery store.
Davis, 209 N.J. at 303. Although this altercation did occur during work time
and on the grocery store premises, this factor is not dispositive of whether this
altercation was within the scope of plaintiff's employment. Ibid. To the
contrary, the altercation between McCoy and plaintiff was purely personal:
McCoy asked plaintiff what was on his hat, and when plaintiff refused to tell
him twice, the verbal altercation escalated to physical violence. Thus, this was
not an altercation over McCoy's job responsibilities.
A-0835-24 13 McCoy's physical altercation with plaintiff was not furthering ShopRite's
purpose of selling groceries. McCoy was not cashing plaintiff out. Rather, this
altercation was likely to drive business away from ShopRite, as customers may
have been dissuaded from shopping at this ShopRite after witnessing an
employee fight a customer. Finally, ShopRite did not expect that a cashier
would risk their job to physically fight a customer in the store, as McCoy chose
to do, causing him to lose his job.
Plaintiff also failed to show ShopRite negligently hired, retained, or
supervised McCoy. "[T]he tort of negligent hiring has as its constituent
elements two fundamental requirements." Di Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 173
(1982). "The first involves the knowledge of the employer and foreseeability of
harm to third persons." Ibid. Regardless of whether the employee was acting
within the scope of employment, "[a]n employer will only be held responsible
for the torts of its employees . . . where it knew or [should have known] of the
particular unfitness, incompetence or dangerous attributes of the employee and
could reasonably have foreseen that such qualities created a risk of harm to
other[s]." Ibid. (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). "The second
required showing is that, through the negligence of the employer in hiring the
employee, the latter's incompetence, unfitness or dangerous characteristics
proximately caused the injury." Id. at 174.
A-0835-24 14 "[T]he duty owed by [a] negligent employer [is not] limited to situations
within the scope of the employment of [its] employees." Ibid. Rather, "the duty
owed is properly to be determined by whether the risk of harm from the
dangerous employee to . . . the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable as a result
of the employment." Ibid. "Thus, the issue of duty owed to a plaintiff is a
question of foreseeability." Id. at 175.
Plaintiff did not provide a scintilla of evidence to show that ShopRite was
negligent in hiring, retaining, or supervising McCoy. After five extensions, two
years, and over 700 days of discovery, plaintiff never filed a motion to compel
any documents relating to their negligent hiring claim. Thus, the court was
correct in granting ShopRite's summary judgment motion because all that
plaintiff had to support this claim is the fact that there was an absence of
documentation. The absence of documentation cannot be considered to prove a
prima facie case of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision.
Plaintiff also failed to show that ShopRite violated a non-delegable duty
to him. "[A]n owner of a building has a non-delegable duty to exercise
reasonable care for the safety of tenants and persons using the premises at his
invitation." De Los Santos v. Saddlehill, Inc., 211 N.J. Super. 253, 261 (App.
Div. 1986) (citing Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish Center, 38 N.J. 549, 555 (1962)).
However, in such cases, "[f]oreseeability of the risk that criminal acts of others
A-0835-24 15 would cause harm is the crucial factor." Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J.
270, 276 (1982). Also, when an employee causes such harm to an invitee on an
employer's property, the analysis shifts to a negligent hiring, training, or
supervising analysis. Pickett on behalf of Estate of Pickett v. Moore's Lounge,
464 N.J. Super. 549, 561 (2020). An employer cannot foresee an employee
choosing to partake in actions that will immediately get them fired. Butler, 89
N.J. 276. Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to show negligent hiring, retention,
or supervising; therefore, plaintiff's non-delegable duty claim also fails. Pickett,
464 N.J. Super. at 561.
D.
Next, plaintiff argues that the court erred in granting Sterling's motion for
directed verdict because he presented sufficient evidence to sustain a jury
verdict without the need for an expert. He claims the testimony and video
evidence presented at trial establishes that Sterling's guards witnessed the
escalating threats leading to the assault and they failed to intervene and de -
escalate despite having the opportunity to do so. Thus, he asserts the evidence
was clear enough to not be so esoteric that jurors of ordinary experience could
not evaluate it without an expert. We agree.
We review de novo a motion for a directed verdict by applying the same
standard as the trial court. See Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373,
A-0835-24 16 397 (2016). "Although we defer to the trial court's feel for the evidence, we owe
no special deference to the trial court's interpretation of the law." Lechler v. 303
Sunset Ave. Condo. Ass'n, 452 N.J. Super. 574, 582 (App. Div. 2017) (citing
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995)).
Pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b), the applicable standard for assessing a motion
for a directed verdict "is whether the evidence, together with legitimate
inferences that can be drawn from it, could sustain a judgment in favor of the
party opposing the motion." Furey v. Cnty. of Ocean, 273 N.J. Super. 300, 309
(App. Div. 1994); see also R. 4:37-2(b). "This includes accepting as true all
evidence supporting the party opposing the motion and according that party the
benefit of all favorable inferences, and if reasonable minds could differ, the
motion must be denied." Ibid. (citing Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969)).
If "no rational juror could conclude that the plaintiff marshaled sufficient
evidence to satisfy each prima facie element of a cause of action," the trial court
should grant defendant's motion. Smith, 225 N.J. at 397 (quoting Godfrey v.
Princeton Theological Seminary, 196 N.J. 178, 197 (2008)). However, "a judge
is not to consider 'the worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the
evidence,' but only review 'its existence, viewed most favorably to the party
A-0835-24 17 opposing the motion.'" Lechler, 452 N.J. Super. at 582 (quoting Dolson, 55 N.J.
at 5-6).
"In most negligence cases, the plaintiff is not required to establish the
applicable standard of care." Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J.
395, 406 (2014). In the majority of negligence cases, "[i]t is sufficient for [the]
plaintiff to show what the defendant did and what the circumstances were. The
applicable standard of conduct is then supplied by the jury[,] which is competent
to determine what precautions a reasonably prudent man in the position of the
defendant would have taken." Id. at 406-07 (alterations in original) (quoting
Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 134 (1961)). In cases that do not require
expert testimony, the facts are such that "a layperson's common knowledge is
sufficient to permit a jury to find that the duty of care has been breached without
the aid of an expert's opinion." Id. at 407 (quoting Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291
N.J. Super. 31, 43 (App. Div. 1996)).
However, in some instances, "the 'jury is not competent to supply the
standard by which to measure the defendant's conduct,' and the plaintiff must
instead 'establish the requisite standard of care and [the defendant's] deviation
from that standard' by 'present[ing] reliable expert testimony on the subject[.]"
Ibid. (first and second alteration in original) (citations omitted). To determine
whether expert testimony is required, a court should consider "whether the
A-0835-24 18 matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and
experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of the
[defendant] was reasonable." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Butler v.
Acme Mkts, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982)).
The common knowledge doctrine applies in circumstances "where 'jurors'
common knowledge as lay persons is sufficient to enable them, using ordinary
understanding and experience, to determine a defendant's negligence without the
benefit of the specialized knowledge of experts.'" Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J.
387, 394 (2001) (quoting Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr., 160 N.J.
454, 469 (1999)). "The most appropriate application of the common knowledge
doctrine involves situations where the carelessness of the defendant is readily
apparent to anyone of average intelligence and ordinary experience." Rosenberg
v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985).
Expert testimony is not required here, as jurors of average intelligence and
experience do not need specialized or technical knowledge to determine whether
the security guards were negligent in their speed in responding to the altercation.
Lucia v. Monmouth Med. Ctr., 341 N.J. Super. 95, 103 (App. Div. 2001). The
knowledge needed to make a decision on this is not "so esoteric that jurors of
common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether
the conduct of the [defendant] was reasonable." Davis, 219 N.J. at 407. Jurors
A-0835-24 19 heard several witnesses to the altercation testify on how quickly Sterling guards
came to assist and watched videos of the fight take place. The ability to
understand if a security guard came to another's assistance fast enough in a
moment of urgency should be considered so apparent that the person of "average
intelligence and ordinary experience" should recognize negligence or the lack
thereof without an expert. Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 325. Thus, it was error to grant
a directed verdict based on the lack of expert testimony.
E.
Because we find that no expert testimony was needed, we do not address
plaintiff's contention that the law of the case required the trial court to follow
the suppression court's ruling that no expert testimony was needed other than to
say: "[A]n order denying summary judgment is not subject to the law of the case
doctrine because it decides nothing and merely reserves issues for future
disposition." Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile Importing Co., 371 N.J. Super. 349, 356
(App. Div. 2004), aff'd on other grounds, 184 N.J. 415 (2005).
To the extent we have not addressed any arguments raised by plaintiff,
they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-0835-24 20