Derrick Coffelt v. Emily Pena

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 25, 2023
• Docket: 21-36019
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED APR 25 2023 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DERRICK DEAN COFFELT, No. 21-36019

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 6:20-cv-00637-AC

v. MEMORANDUM* EMILY PENA; JAMES WELSH,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 17, 2023**

Before: CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Derrick Dean Coffelt appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging false arrest and malicious

prosecution in connection with his alleged violation of court orders. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Gordon v. County of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Coffelt failed

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants lacked probable

cause to arrest him for violating court orders. See Yousefian v. City of Glendale,

779 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the absence of probable cause

is an essential element of § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims);

United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (probable cause for a

warrantless arrest exists “when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy

information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an

offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Coffelt’s motion for

appointment of counsel because Coffelt could adequately articulate his claims and

he failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d

1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for

appointment of counsel).

We reject Coffelt’s contention that the district court should have sua sponte

granted leave to amend instead of granting summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

2 21-36019