Derrick Chatman v. State of Mississippi

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-KA-00170-COA

DERRICK CHATMAN APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/16/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEBRA W. BLACKWELL COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ADAMS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: EVERETT T. SANDERS AISHA ARLENE SANDERS

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DANIELLE LOVE BURKS

DISTRICT ATTORNEY: TIM COTTON NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/18/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Derrick Chatman was convicted of two counts of sexual battery in the Adams County Circuit Court. Chatman was sentenced to serve thirty years, with fifteen years suspended, for Count I and to serve thirty years, with fifteen years suspended, for Count II. The circuit court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Chatman appealed his convictions and sentences. Our Supreme Court found that there was “uncertainty as to the unanimity of the jury’s verdict with regard to the sexual-battery counts given that the jury also was instructed on the lesser- included offense of gratification of lust.” Chatman v. State (Chatman I), 395 So. 3d 991, 992 (¶2) (Miss. 2024). The Supreme Court held that “the trial court erred by not directing the jury

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to retire for further deliberations.” Id. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded Chatman’s case “for either a new trial on the sexual-battery charges or for re[-]sentencing on two counts of gratification of lust, at the option of the State.” Id. at 992 (¶13). ¶2. On remand, the State opted to pursue re-sentencing rather than proceed with a new trial. Chatman was sentenced for two counts of gratification of lust and ordered to serve two consecutive fifteen-year terms in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Aggrieved, Chatman appeals, arguing the circuit court judge erred by failing to recuse herself when the matter was remanded and by sentencing him to a “harsher sentence for appealing his conviction.” Finding no error, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. On August 29, 2024, our Supreme Court rendered an opinion reversing Chatman’s conviction and remanding for either a new trial or for re-sentencing for convictions of two counts of gratification of lust. On November 14, 2024, Chatman’s motion for rehearing was denied. ¶4. On December 5, 2024, the circuit court entered an order setting Chatman’s re- sentencing. On December 9, 2024, Chatman filed a “renewed motion to recuse,”1 raising the same issues as in the first motion to recuse. In the motion, Chatman claimed that the circuit

1 According to the re-sentencing hearing transcript, Chatman had unsuccessfully filed a motion to recuse during his trial. His counsel, Aisha Sanders, argued to the trial court that the judge made inappropriate comments to the newspaper about Sanders’s “ability as a lawyer” and during the original sentencing hearing. Nothing in the record indicates that Chatman appealed the judge’s order denying his motion to recuse.

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court judge “displayed conduct and made statements reflecting implicit bias against both the Defendant and defense counsel, thereby raising serious concerns regarding the judge’s impartiality.” He also argued that the judge made “several inappropriate comments during [Chatman’s] trial and before his trial.” On the same day, December 9, 2024, the circuit court entered an order denying Chatman’s motion to recuse. ¶5. During the re-sentencing hearing, the circuit court heard witness testimony, and a letter from the victim was read into the record. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court re-sentenced Chatman to serve fifteen years for his conviction of Count I and fifteen years for his conviction of Count II. The circuit court ordered Chatman to serve the sentences consecutively in MDOC’s custody. Aggrieved, Chatman appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Recusal ¶6. The circuit court judge who presided over the re-sentencing hearing had also presided over Chatman’s trial. Chatman argues that the judge should have recused herself when the matter was remanded. “This Court reviews the denial of a motion to recuse under an abuse- of-discretion standard.” Good v. Sanders, 418 So. 3d 1241, 1247 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Queen v. State, 325 So. 3d 656, 665 (¶37) (Miss. 2021)). ¶7. In Chatman’s renewed motion to recuse, he raised issues about comments the circuit court judge made prior to and during Chatman’s trial. The claims Chatman made in his motion to recuse were previously raised, argued, and denied during his trial. However,

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Chatman did not challenge the circuit court’s denial of his motion in his first appeal. Our Supreme Court has noted that an issue not raised in an original appeal is procedurally barred from being raised in subsequent proceedings. See Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 349 (¶181) (Miss. 1997) (finding that Holland accepted the trial court’s ruling by not raising any claims of error on appeal and that the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata). The claims Chatman raised in his renewed motion were previously determined by the circuit court, and Chatman did not appeal the circuit court’s denial of his motion to recuse in his original appeal.2 See M.R.A.P. 48B. Therefore, the issue is procedurally barred.

II. Re-sentencing ¶8. Chatman next argues that the circuit court erred in sentencing him to a “harsher sentence for appealing his conviction.” Our Supreme Court has held that “[s]entencing is within the complete discretion of the trial court and not subject to appellate review if it is within the limits prescribed by statute.” Hampton v. State, 148 So. 3d 992, 996 (¶11) (Miss. 2014); see also Sallie v. State, 237 So. 3d 749, 754 (¶21) (Miss. 2018) (holding that “when an original sentence has been vacated for illegality, a subsequent sentencing court has discretionary authority over the new sentence”). Chatman specifically argues that his due process rights were violated “due to a judge with a bias and vindictiveness” toward him. In

2 See Chatman I, 395 So. 3d at 992 (¶1) (“The only issue asserted by Chatman on appeal is that the jury’s verdict was ambiguous and ‘not fully responsive’ to the verdict forms submitted, which included the lesser-included offense of gratification of lust for both sexual-battery counts.”).

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support of his claim, Chatman relies on cases where an enhanced or harsher sentence was imposed after being remanded. However, that is not the case here. ¶9. Again, in the case before us, the circuit court originally sentenced Chatman to serve thirty years, with fifteen years suspended, for Count I and to serve thirty years, with fifteen years suspended, for Count II, which amounted to thirty years in MDOC’s custody because the circuit court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, our Supreme Court reversed and remanded Chatman’s case “for either a new trial on the sexual-battery charges or for re[-]sentencing on two counts of gratification of lust, at the option of the State.” Chatman I, 395 So. 3d at 992 (¶13). On remand, the circuit court sentenced Chatman to serve fifteen years for each count of gratification of lust and ordered them to run consecutively. ¶10. Similarly in Sallie, the Supreme Court affirmed our Court’s finding that there was no error when the circuit court did not change the number of years in Sallie’s original sentence. Sallie, 237 So. 3d at 752 (¶16). Here, Chatman was again sentenced to serve two fifteen-year terms totaling thirty years as imposed by the original sentence.3 Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-5-23(2) (Rev. 2020), the circuit court had the discretion to sentence

3 Notably, although Chatman was sentenced to the same number of years to serve, the circuit court sentenced Chatman to serve a total of thirty years for both counts of sexual battery in MDOC’s custody. The circuit court also suspended a total of thirty years in his original sentence. A suspended sentence is revocable and contingent upon a defendant’s good behavior. Allen v. State, 144 So. 3d 207, 211 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). However, after remand, Chatman would serve his complete sentence in MDOC’s custody without a conditional release. Therefore, he was essentially sentenced to half the amount of time as his original sentence.

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Chatman to serve the maximum term of fifteen years for his conviction of each count of gratification of lust. Additionally, the Supreme Court directed the circuit court, at the option of the State, to re-sentence Chatman under section 97-5-23(2).4 Accordingly, we find this claim is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶11. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s amended sentencing order. ¶12. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J. McDONALD, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

WESTBROOKS, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING:

¶13. Consistent with my separate opinion in Good v. Sanders, 418 So. 3d 1241, 1248 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (Westbrooks, J., specially concurring), I write to discuss why recusal was warranted in this case. This case involves the same trial judge and attorney as in Good. Here, as in Good, Judge Blackwell refused to recuse herself after excluding Chatman’s attorney Aisha Sanders from her courtroom and after publicly stating negative opinions about the attorney’s capabilities. Id. at 1249 (¶30). Judge Blackwell publicly stated: “I am not

4 Chatman also claims that his due process rights were violated by not being granted a new trial. Again, in Chatman I, the Supreme Court gave the State the option to re-sentence Chatman under section 97-5-23(2). Chatman I, 395 So. 3d at 996 (¶39). Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that when a case is remanded, it “shall be proceeded with in the court below according to the direction of the Supreme Court, or according to law in the absence of such directions.” Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Scott, 108 Miss. 871, 67 So. 491, 496 (1915).

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appointing Ms. Blackmon or Ms. Sanders to work in my courtroom. I do not approve of them. I have tried for two years to work with them . . . . One of them spends more time in my court on motions to withdraw than she does on resolutions to her cases.” Id. ¶14. Judges have a constitutional obligation to “impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon” them. Id. at (¶28) (quoting Miss. Const. art. 6, §155). Under Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E), “judges should disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all of the circumstances . . . .” A judge’s personal bias or prejudice is of such significant weight that parties are not allowed to waive disqualification on that ground. Good, 418 So. 3d at 1249 (¶29) (Westbrooks, J., specially concurring) (citing Miss. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(F)). As in Good, “the parties involved in this case have reason to question the impartiality [of] the judge presiding over their case in light of the judge’s active efforts to exclude the attorney from practicing in her courtroom and her public remarks about the attorney’s competence.” Id. at (¶31). ¶15. I concur with the majority that Chatman waived this issue by failing to appeal the denial of the initial motion to recuse. But I am compelled to note again, as our appellate courts have now repeatedly addressed, that Judge Blackwell has on multiple occasions failed to recuse herself when recusal was appropriate, including two occasions in which she was disqualified from presiding over proceedings of defendants she had previously prosecuted. See Bell v. State, 394 So. 3d 461, 462 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024); White v. State, 385 So. 3d

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1266, 1267 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). ¶16. I therefore specially concur.

LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.