Derrick Braxton v. State of Mississippi
This text of Derrick Braxton v. State of Mississippi (Derrick Braxton v. State of Mississippi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-CP-00051-COA
DERRICK BRAXTON APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/04/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. GERALD W. CHATHAM SR. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DERRICK BRAXTON (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/31/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.
WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Derrick Braxton appeals from the order of the DeSoto County Circuit Court denying
his motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). Finding no error, we affirm the circuit
court’s order.
FACTS
¶2. Braxton pled guilty as a nonviolent habitual offender to one count of possessing more
than two grams but less than ten grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. The circuit court
remanded Braxton’s six other indicted counts to the files and sentenced him as a nonviolent
habitual offender to serve seventeen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections. Braxton subsequently filed a pro se “Petition for an Order to Show Cause.” Although Braxton claimed he was not attacking the legality of his sentence, the substantive
portion of his petition sought relief from his conviction and sentence. Braxton not only
argued that he was improperly required to post two separate appearance bonds (one following
his arrest in 2020, and the second after his indictment in 2022), but he also asserted multiple
challenges to the proof underlying his conviction.
¶3. After determining that Braxton had asserted claims cognizable under the Uniform
Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, the circuit court treated Braxton’s filing as a PCR
motion. The circuit court first noted that Braxton appeared to mistakenly believe that his
2020 appearance bond had been improperly revoked. Instead, the circuit court explained that
the appearance bond had initially covered only the one charge stemming from Braxton’s
2020 arrest, and in accordance with Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.7(a), the bond
was later modified due to Braxton’s 2022 indictment, which had charged additional crimes
with enhancements.1
¶4. The circuit court next noted that Braxton alleged certain statements by a confidential
informant were untrue and that an unreasonable amount of time had passed between his
1 Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.7(a) states the following:
An appearance bond or release order issued to assure the defendant’s presence for proceedings following the filing of a charging affidavit shall automatically be transferred to the same, related, or lesser charge subsequently prosecuted by indictment unless, following indictment, the judge presiding, for good cause, shall order revocation or modification of the conditions of release, as provided in Rule 8.6(a) and (b).
2 arrest and the execution of a search warrant for his home. The circuit court concluded,
however, that by entering his guilty plea—the validity of which Braxton did not
challenge—Braxton waived these arguments regarding any alleged defects in the evidence
underlying his conviction. After determining that Braxton’s claims lacked merit, the circuit
court entered an order denying the PCR motion. Aggrieved, Braxton appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5. In reviewing “a circuit court’s dismissal or denial of a PCR motion, we decline to
reverse unless the circuit court’s decision is clearly erroneous. We review questions of law
de novo.” Farris v. State, 394 So. 3d 1028, 1030 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶6. “[I]t is well established that a pleading cognizable under the Uniform Post-Conviction
Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA) will be treated as a PCR motion that is subject to the
procedural rules promulgated therein, regardless of how the plaintiff has denominated or
characterized the pleading.” Pickle v. State, 351 So. 3d 464, 466 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)
(citation and internal quotation mark omitted). The State points out that although Braxton’s
petition for a show-cause order primarily attacked the propriety of his second appearance
bond, his requested relief was for the circuit court to “reinstate[]” his case “to the only
indictment in this [matter].” Moreover, on appeal, Braxton appears to take no issue with the
circuit court’s treatment of his petition as a PCR motion. In fact, Braxton asks this Court to
3 remand his case to the circuit court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. Given
Braxton’s requested relief and his apparent confirmation that he intended to file a PCR
motion, we find no error in the circuit court’s treatment of Braxton’s filing. See Copple v.
State, 196 So. 3d 189, 193 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (“Considering the nature of Copple’s
claim, the relief he sought, and his stated intent to file a PCR motion, his complaint for
discovery was subsumed by the UPCCRA.”).
¶7. For the first time on appeal, Braxton alleges that his guilty plea was involuntary and
that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance. “Issues not raised in a [PCR]
motion[,]” however, “are procedurally barred on appeal.” Roberts v. State, 402 So. 3d 192,
194 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Bland v. State, 312 So. 3d 417, 419 (¶11) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2021)). Braxton failed to raise these issues before the circuit court; therefore, they are
clearly procedurally barred. Id. As a result, we decline to further address them.
¶8. Because Braxton pled guilty to his indicted charge and is procedurally barred from
attacking the validity of that guilty plea for the first time on appeal, he has waived “all
non-jurisdictional rights or defects that are incident to trial.” Winters v. State, 359 So. 3d
242, 247 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). Thus, Braxton’s PCR claim challenging the proof
underlying his conviction is also barred. As our caselaw clearly holds, “a valid guilty plea
waives any evidentiary issue.” Rustin v. State, 138 So. 3d 270, 274 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶9. In his remaining issue on appeal, Braxton alleges that the revocation of his initial
4 appearance bond violated his right against double jeopardy and his right to due process. As
the State correctly notes, however, “Braxton’s complaint about [the] posting [of] two
appearance bonds is purely a pretrial procedural grievance, and such non-jurisdictional issues
cannot form the basis for [PCR] following a guilty plea.” Indeed, our caselaw holds that
when “a defendant pleads guilty to committing the charged offense, he may not thereafter
raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior
to the entry of the guilty plea.” Id. at 273 (¶8) (internal quotation mark omitted). Because
Braxton failed to raise any alleged pretrial violations of double jeopardy and due process
prior to entering his guilty plea, we find that the entry of his valid guilty plea procedurally
bars these claims on appeal.
¶10. Notwithstanding this procedural bar, we agree with the circuit court that Braxton is
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