DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek

528 N.W.2d 468, 191 Wis. 2d 46, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 14
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 10, 1995
Docket94-0440
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 528 N.W.2d 468 (DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek, 528 N.W.2d 468, 191 Wis. 2d 46, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

FINE, J.

The City of Oak Creek appeals from a permanent injunction entered by the trial court prohibiting Oak Creek from preventing DeRosso Landfill *49 Company and Gordon DeRosso, DeRosso Landfill's sole stockholder, from filling with clean fill a 300,000 cubic yard hole on ten acres owned by Gordon DeRosso. We reverse.

The facts are not disputed. The hole is currently filled with water, and is a pond. It was excavated to supply material needed to cap a forty-acre solid-waste landfill site owned by DeRosso Landfill in Oak Creek across the street. The landfill site was ordered capped and closed by the Department of Natural Resources in 1989. In its order, the Department required that DeRosso submit a plan for the land from which the capping material was to be excavated, known as the "borrow source." 1 In October of 1993, the Department gave approval to DeRosso to fill the borrow source with "[o]nly clean fill as defined in NR 500.08(2)(a), Wis. Adm. Code" ("clean soil, brick, building stone, concrete, reinforced concrete, broken pavement, and unpainted or untreated wood") so as "to restore the borrow source to its original grades." An Oak Creek ordinance prohibits DeRosso from doing this. The only issue on this appeal is whether Oak Creek's authority to prevent DeRosso from filling the borrow source is preempted by *50 state law. 2 This is a matter that we decide de novo. See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 2d 88, 96, 176 N.W.2d 580, 583 (1970) (application of law to undisputed facts).

The legislature has granted to municipalities significant powers of home rule. Thus, the common council of each municipality has the "power to act. . . for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, and may carry out its powers by license, regulation,... and other necessary or convenient means." Section 62.11(5), Stats. 3 Section 62.11(5) works in tandem with Article XI, § 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution, which permits municipalities to "determine their local affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to such enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect every city or every village." 4

*51 The power granted to municipalities by § 62.11(5), however, is broader than that granted by Article XI, § 3(1), because § 62.11(5) "would be a nullity if it were construed to confer on municipalities only that authority which related to 'local affairs' since that power is already constitutionally guaranteed by" Article XI, §3(1). Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v. Department of Natural Resources, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 533, 271 N.W.2d 69, 76 (1978). Thus, § 62.11(5) "does not limit a municipality's authority to act only in 'local affairs,'" and, accordingly, an "ordinance may be authorized by sec. 62.11(5), Stats., notwithstanding statewide concern in the matter it regulates." Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, City of Madison, 120 Wis. 2d 391, 395-396, 355 N.W.2d 234, 237 (1984). There is a four-part test in evaluating whether a municipality may regulate a matter of state-wide concern:

(1) whether the legislature has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities to act;
(2) whether the ordinance logically conflicts with the state legislation;
(3) whether the ordinance defeats the purpose of the state legislation; or
(4) whether the ordinance goes against the spirit of the state legislation.

Id., 120 Wis. 2d at 397, 355 N.W.2d at 238.

The establishment of solid-waste facilities is a matter of statewide concern. Section 144.445(5), STATS. The trial court found that DeRosso's plan to place clean *52 fill in the pond made the pond a solid-waste facility. None of the parties disagrees with this conclusion. Thus, as Oak Creek concedes in its brief, issues surrounding the use and future of the borrow source are matters of statewide concern. Nevertheless, Oak Creek has significant interests in protecting its community and the local environment. Oak Creek can protect those interests as long as that does not run afoul of the four-part Anchor Savings test, to which we now turn.

1. Has the legislature "expressly withdrawn the power" of Oak Creek to impose conditions on the restoration of the borrow source?

The legislature has specifically recognized that "the proper management" of solid-waste disposal sites "is necessary to prevent adverse effects on the environment and to protect public health and safety," § 144.445(l)(c), STATS., and that local authorities have significant responsibilities in this regard:

The legislature further finds that local authorities have the responsibility for promoting public health, safety, convenience and general welfare, encouraging planned and orderly land use development, recognizing the needs of industry and business, including solid waste disposal and the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste and that the reasonable decisions of local authorities should be considered in the siting of solid waste disposal facilities and hazardous waste facilities.

Section 144.445(l)(f), STATS. Thus, local communities have the right to have their interests considered in the siting and operation of solid-waste facilities that are subject to regulation by the Department. See §§ 144.445(5)-144.445(10), Stats. The Department, however, may exempt certain solid-waste facilities "from regulation under ss. 144.43 to 144.47." Section *53 144.44(7)(g), Stats. 5 Under this authority, the Department has, by rule, exempted clean-fill solid-waste disposal sites from "licensing and the requirements of chs. NR 500 to 522." Wis. Adm. Code NR § 500.08(2). 6 The trial court held that the borrow source is within *54 the scope of this exemption, and concluded that DeR-osso did not have to comply with Wis. Adm. Code NR § 512.06(1) and "apply for all applicable locaí approvals specified by a municipality under s. 144.44(lm)(b), Stats." 7 Accordingly, the trial court determined that the legislature had withdrawn Oak Creek's power to regulate the borrow source. We disagree.

Section 144.44(lm)(b), Stats., and Wis. Adm.

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528 N.W.2d 468, 191 Wis. 2d 46, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 14, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/derosso-landfill-co-v-city-of-oak-creek-wisctapp-1995.