FINE, J.
The City of Oak Creek appeals from a permanent injunction entered by the trial court prohibiting Oak Creek from preventing DeRosso Landfill
Company and Gordon DeRosso, DeRosso Landfill's sole stockholder, from filling with clean fill a 300,000 cubic yard hole on ten acres owned by Gordon DeRosso. We reverse.
The facts are not disputed. The hole is currently filled with water, and is a pond. It was excavated to supply material needed to cap a forty-acre solid-waste landfill site owned by DeRosso Landfill in Oak Creek across the street. The landfill site was ordered capped and closed by the Department of Natural Resources in 1989. In its order, the Department required that DeRosso submit a plan for the land from which the capping material was to be excavated, known as the "borrow source."
In October of 1993, the Department gave approval to DeRosso to fill the borrow source with "[o]nly clean fill as defined in NR 500.08(2)(a), Wis. Adm. Code" ("clean soil, brick, building stone, concrete, reinforced concrete, broken pavement, and unpainted or untreated wood") so as "to restore the borrow source to its original grades." An Oak Creek ordinance prohibits DeRosso from doing this. The only issue on this appeal is whether Oak Creek's authority to prevent DeRosso from filling the borrow source is preempted by
state law.
This is a matter that we decide
de novo. See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Milwaukee,
47 Wis. 2d 88, 96, 176 N.W.2d 580, 583 (1970) (application of law to undisputed facts).
The legislature has granted to municipalities significant powers of home rule. Thus, the common council of each municipality has the "power to act. . . for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, and may carry out its powers by license, regulation,... and other necessary or convenient means." Section 62.11(5), Stats.
Section 62.11(5) works in tandem with Article XI, § 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution, which permits municipalities to "determine their local affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to such enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect every city or every village."
The power granted to municipalities by § 62.11(5), however, is broader than that granted by Article XI, § 3(1), because § 62.11(5) "would be a nullity if it were construed to confer on municipalities only that authority which related to 'local affairs' since that power is already constitutionally guaranteed by" Article XI, §3(1).
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v. Department of Natural Resources,
85 Wis. 2d 518, 533, 271 N.W.2d 69, 76 (1978). Thus, § 62.11(5) "does not limit a municipality's authority to act only in 'local affairs,'" and, accordingly, an "ordinance may be authorized by sec. 62.11(5), Stats., notwithstanding statewide concern in the matter it regulates."
Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, City of Madison,
120 Wis. 2d 391, 395-396, 355 N.W.2d 234, 237 (1984). There is a four-part test in evaluating whether a municipality may regulate a matter of state-wide concern:
(1) whether the legislature has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities to act;
(2) whether the ordinance logically conflicts with the state legislation;
(3) whether the ordinance defeats the purpose of the state legislation; or
(4) whether the ordinance goes against the spirit of the state legislation.
Id.,
120 Wis. 2d at 397, 355 N.W.2d at 238.
The establishment of solid-waste facilities is a matter of statewide concern. Section 144.445(5), STATS. The trial court found that DeRosso's plan to place clean
fill in the pond made the pond a solid-waste facility. None of the parties disagrees with this conclusion. Thus, as Oak Creek concedes in its brief, issues surrounding the use and future of the borrow source are matters of statewide concern. Nevertheless, Oak Creek has significant interests in protecting its community and the local environment. Oak Creek can protect those interests as long as that does not run afoul of the four-part
Anchor Savings
test, to which we now turn.
1.
Has the legislature "expressly withdrawn the power" of Oak Creek to impose conditions on the restoration of the borrow source?
The legislature has specifically recognized that "the proper management" of solid-waste disposal sites "is necessary to prevent adverse effects on the environment and to protect public health and safety," § 144.445(l)(c), STATS., and that local authorities have significant responsibilities in this regard:
The legislature further finds that local authorities have the responsibility for promoting public health, safety, convenience and general welfare, encouraging planned and orderly land use development, recognizing the needs of industry and business, including solid waste disposal and the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste and that the reasonable decisions of local authorities should be considered in the siting of solid waste disposal facilities and hazardous waste facilities.
Section 144.445(l)(f), STATS. Thus, local communities have the right to have their interests considered in the siting and operation of solid-waste facilities that are subject to regulation by the Department.
See
§§ 144.445(5)-144.445(10), Stats. The Department, however, may exempt certain solid-waste facilities "from regulation under ss. 144.43 to 144.47." Section
144.44(7)(g), Stats.
Under this authority, the Department has, by rule, exempted clean-fill solid-waste disposal sites from "licensing and the requirements of chs. NR 500 to 522." Wis. Adm. Code NR § 500.08(2).
The trial court held that the borrow source is within
the scope of this exemption, and concluded that DeR-osso did not have to comply with Wis. Adm. Code NR § 512.06(1) and "apply for all applicable locaí approvals specified by a municipality under s. 144.44(lm)(b), Stats."
Accordingly, the trial court determined that the legislature had withdrawn Oak Creek's power to regulate the borrow source. We disagree.
Section 144.44(lm)(b), Stats., and Wis. Adm.
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FINE, J.
The City of Oak Creek appeals from a permanent injunction entered by the trial court prohibiting Oak Creek from preventing DeRosso Landfill
Company and Gordon DeRosso, DeRosso Landfill's sole stockholder, from filling with clean fill a 300,000 cubic yard hole on ten acres owned by Gordon DeRosso. We reverse.
The facts are not disputed. The hole is currently filled with water, and is a pond. It was excavated to supply material needed to cap a forty-acre solid-waste landfill site owned by DeRosso Landfill in Oak Creek across the street. The landfill site was ordered capped and closed by the Department of Natural Resources in 1989. In its order, the Department required that DeRosso submit a plan for the land from which the capping material was to be excavated, known as the "borrow source."
In October of 1993, the Department gave approval to DeRosso to fill the borrow source with "[o]nly clean fill as defined in NR 500.08(2)(a), Wis. Adm. Code" ("clean soil, brick, building stone, concrete, reinforced concrete, broken pavement, and unpainted or untreated wood") so as "to restore the borrow source to its original grades." An Oak Creek ordinance prohibits DeRosso from doing this. The only issue on this appeal is whether Oak Creek's authority to prevent DeRosso from filling the borrow source is preempted by
state law.
This is a matter that we decide
de novo. See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Milwaukee,
47 Wis. 2d 88, 96, 176 N.W.2d 580, 583 (1970) (application of law to undisputed facts).
The legislature has granted to municipalities significant powers of home rule. Thus, the common council of each municipality has the "power to act. . . for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, and may carry out its powers by license, regulation,... and other necessary or convenient means." Section 62.11(5), Stats.
Section 62.11(5) works in tandem with Article XI, § 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution, which permits municipalities to "determine their local affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to such enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect every city or every village."
The power granted to municipalities by § 62.11(5), however, is broader than that granted by Article XI, § 3(1), because § 62.11(5) "would be a nullity if it were construed to confer on municipalities only that authority which related to 'local affairs' since that power is already constitutionally guaranteed by" Article XI, §3(1).
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v. Department of Natural Resources,
85 Wis. 2d 518, 533, 271 N.W.2d 69, 76 (1978). Thus, § 62.11(5) "does not limit a municipality's authority to act only in 'local affairs,'" and, accordingly, an "ordinance may be authorized by sec. 62.11(5), Stats., notwithstanding statewide concern in the matter it regulates."
Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, City of Madison,
120 Wis. 2d 391, 395-396, 355 N.W.2d 234, 237 (1984). There is a four-part test in evaluating whether a municipality may regulate a matter of state-wide concern:
(1) whether the legislature has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities to act;
(2) whether the ordinance logically conflicts with the state legislation;
(3) whether the ordinance defeats the purpose of the state legislation; or
(4) whether the ordinance goes against the spirit of the state legislation.
Id.,
120 Wis. 2d at 397, 355 N.W.2d at 238.
The establishment of solid-waste facilities is a matter of statewide concern. Section 144.445(5), STATS. The trial court found that DeRosso's plan to place clean
fill in the pond made the pond a solid-waste facility. None of the parties disagrees with this conclusion. Thus, as Oak Creek concedes in its brief, issues surrounding the use and future of the borrow source are matters of statewide concern. Nevertheless, Oak Creek has significant interests in protecting its community and the local environment. Oak Creek can protect those interests as long as that does not run afoul of the four-part
Anchor Savings
test, to which we now turn.
1.
Has the legislature "expressly withdrawn the power" of Oak Creek to impose conditions on the restoration of the borrow source?
The legislature has specifically recognized that "the proper management" of solid-waste disposal sites "is necessary to prevent adverse effects on the environment and to protect public health and safety," § 144.445(l)(c), STATS., and that local authorities have significant responsibilities in this regard:
The legislature further finds that local authorities have the responsibility for promoting public health, safety, convenience and general welfare, encouraging planned and orderly land use development, recognizing the needs of industry and business, including solid waste disposal and the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste and that the reasonable decisions of local authorities should be considered in the siting of solid waste disposal facilities and hazardous waste facilities.
Section 144.445(l)(f), STATS. Thus, local communities have the right to have their interests considered in the siting and operation of solid-waste facilities that are subject to regulation by the Department.
See
§§ 144.445(5)-144.445(10), Stats. The Department, however, may exempt certain solid-waste facilities "from regulation under ss. 144.43 to 144.47." Section
144.44(7)(g), Stats.
Under this authority, the Department has, by rule, exempted clean-fill solid-waste disposal sites from "licensing and the requirements of chs. NR 500 to 522." Wis. Adm. Code NR § 500.08(2).
The trial court held that the borrow source is within
the scope of this exemption, and concluded that DeR-osso did not have to comply with Wis. Adm. Code NR § 512.06(1) and "apply for all applicable locaí approvals specified by a municipality under s. 144.44(lm)(b), Stats."
Accordingly, the trial court determined that the legislature had withdrawn Oak Creek's power to regulate the borrow source. We disagree.
Section 144.44(lm)(b), Stats., and Wis. Adm. Code NR § 512.06(1) require those who seek to operate a solid-waste facility to request from "each affected municipality" a list of local laws that would affect or regulate that facility ("local approvals"). This request triggers the negotiation, mediation, and arbitration procedures imposed by §§ 144.445(5), (9) & (10), STATS. Under these provisions, however, an operator's compliance with local laws purporting to regulate the sites is hardly compelled (except for local regulations that predate "by at least 15 months" the earlier of an applicant's submission of either a feasibility report or an initial site report, unless the local regulations are "specified as inapplicable in a negotiation agreement
approved under [§ 144.445] subd.(9) or an arbitration award issued under [§ 144.445]
subd.(lO)"
— see § 144.445(3)(fm) & (5)(c) & (d)). To the contrary, because the siting and operation of solid-waste facilities is a matter of statewide concern, the legislature — in an attempt to strike a balance between statewide and local interests — has subjected potential operators and localities to the forced resolution of their respective positions.
See Madison Landfills, Inc. v.
The Libby Landfill Negotiating Committee,
188 Wis. 2d 613, 618, 524 N.W.2d 883, 885 (1994) ("Binding arbi
tration is the final step in the statutory scheme for landfill siting.");
see also id.,
188 Wis. 2d at 628-634,
524 N.W.2d at 889-892. Exemption from the regulatory scheme under and authorized by §§ 144.43 to 144.47,
Stats., merely leaves the parties — the operators and the localities — in the same position with respect to the
exempt facilities as they would have been if that scheme did not exist. Rather than withdraw Oak
Creek's power to regulate the borrow source, as the trial court concluded, the exemption merely restores Oak Creek's pre-existing authority to regulate the use of land within its borders so as to promote and secure "the health, safety, and welfare" of its community.
See
§ 62.11(5), Stats.;
see also
Wis. CONST, art. XI, § 3(1);
see, e.g. Nelson v. Department of Natural
Resources, 88 Wis. 2d 1, 4, 10, 276 N.W.2d 302, 303-304, 306 (Ct. App. 1979) (under then-existing law, Department of Natural Resources did not have power to contravene county ordinances prohibiting use of certain lands as solid-waste disposal sites),
aff'd,
96 Wis. 2d 730, 292 N.W.2d 655. Thus, in its letter to DeRosso Landfill's consulting firm, the Department noted that its approval of DeR-osso's plans for the borrow source did not eliminate the need for DeRosso's compliance with,
inter alia,
"local ... zoning and regulatory requirements."
DeRosso argues that even though the borrow source may be exempt from regulation by the Department as a solid-waste facility,
its status
as a borrow source in connection with a solid-waste facility that is subject to Department regulation nevertheless makes the site's
restoration
also subject to Department regulation. The only support for this proposition is the agreement by a Department engineer in his deposition with a statement that the Department controls "what can be used to fill [a] borrow source," and a letter from a Department attorney that:
The Department has consistently taken the position that a clay borrow site developed in connection with a landfill is part of the landfill project over which DNR has jurisdiction. This is true whether or not the borrow source is adjacent to, or removed from, the area of solid waste disposal.
DeRosso, however, cites no applicable statute or regulation (and we have found none) that gives to the Department regulatory authority over the
filling
of borrow sources that are exempt from regulation by virtue of Wis. Adm. Code NR § 500.08(2), as opposed to control over the sites'
excavation. See
Wis. Adm. Code NR § 512.18. The only regulation DeRosso cites is Wis. Adm. Code NR § 504.05(10)(e), which requires that "[a] 11 borrow areas shall be abandoned in accordance with section 208.3 of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation standard specifications for road and
bridge construction." As a site exempt from "the requirements of chs. NR 500 to 522" by virtue of WlS. Adm. Code NR § 500.08(2), however, the borrow source at issue here is not governed by Wis. Adm. Code NR § 504.05(10)(e). Section NR § 504.05(10)(e) is thus not relevant to this appeal.
Although we give due deference to an agency's long-standing interpretations of its own regulations and the statutes under which the agency operates,
Metropolitan Greyhound Management Corp. v. Wisconsin Racing Board,
157 Wis. 2d 678, 688, 460 N.W.2d 802, 806-807 (Ct. App. 1990), that deference is not given when that interpretation is founded upon nothing but the opinions of the agency's subordinate employees,
Holton & Hunkel Greenhouse Co. v. State,
274 Wis. 337, 345, 80 N.W.2d 371, 376 (1957). There is no indication that the statements by the Department engineer and the Department attorney, insofar as they support DeRosso's pre-emption argument, either represent the
carefully considered policy of the agency or are based upon any statute, regulation, or rule. The overriding intent of the legislature to recognize and, insofar as is possible, accommodate local environmental and health concerns, must, therefore, control.
In sum, we conclude that when an operator proposes to use a borrow source for solid-waste disposal, and that proposed use is exempt from regulation by the Department of Natural Resources under Wis. Adm. Code NR § 500.08(2) because of the nature of the solid waste, that proposed use is subject to local regulation even though the Department had authority to regulate the borrow source's excavation. Under the circumstances here, the legislature has not expressly withdrawn the power of Oak Creek to regulate DeR-osso's proposed use of the borrow source, and, therefore, the ordinance at issue passes the first part of the
Anchor Savings
test.
2.
Does Oak Creek's ordinance "logically conflict,
"
"defeat the purpose
of,"
or "go against the spirit of the state legislation"?
Although phrased separately, parts two, three, and four of the four-part
Anchor Savings
test are essentially the same, at least in their application here: whether local regulation is repugnant to the purpose underlying the state's regulation of the matter of statewide concern.
See Local Union No. 487 v. City of Eau Claire
, 141 Wis. 2d 437, 445-446, 415 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Ct. App. 1987),
aff'd,
147 Wis. 2d 519, 433 N.W.2d 578 (1989). Here, contrary to the situation in
Anchor Savings
, where the municipality's attempted regulation of the lending practices of state chartered savings and loan institutions was on a "collision course" (120 Wis. 2d at 401, 355 N.W.2d at 240) with the legislature's "complex and comprehensive statutory structure dealing with all aspects of credit and lending" (120 Wis. 2d at 397-398, 355 N.W.2d at 238), the legislature has specifically recognized and attempted to accommodate local concerns in the siting and operation of solid-waste facilities,
see
§ 144.445, STATS. Permitting local regulatory control in those situations where the facilities are exempt from state regulation — the case here — is thus consistent with, and not repugnant to, the purpose and spirit of the state legislation. Accordingly, the ordinance satisfies the remainder of the
Anchor Savings
test.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Oak Creek's authority to regulate the borrow source is not preempted by state law.
By the Court.
— Order reversed.