Derewal v. Vance

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 29, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1040
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE A. DEREWAL,

Plaintiff, Case No. 25-cv-1040 (JMC)

v.

J.D. VANCE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Jane Derewal, proceeding pro se, has filed suit against Vice President J.D. Vance

and Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi. ECF 6. The Court addresses two procedural issues before

turning to the substance of Derewal’s case. First, to the extent that Derewal has moved for leave

to file an amended complaint, see ECF 6-1 (“Motion for Amended Complaint”), the Court

GRANTS that motion and considers ECF 6 to be the operative complaint. Second, to the extent

that Derewal’s “Response to Hon. Boasberg’s ‘Minute Order’ of April 17, 2025 RE: Proceed In

Forma Pseudonym,” ECF 5, is a renewed motion to proceed under pseudonym, that motion is

DENIED because it does not “identify[] the consequences that would likely befall [Plaintiff] if

forced to proceed in [her] own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

Absent that information, the Court cannot find “a concrete need for . . . secrecy” that overcomes

the usual “presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.” Id. at 325–26.

Turning to the complaint itself, Derewal alleges that the “25th Amendment must be invoked

due to this constitutional crisis of our lifetime from senior’s SSA improperly withheld to our

eco-damage and not honoring the role of POTUS,” and that “J.D. Vance, in his official-capacity,

must call for 25th Amendment vote of Cabinet and enforcement.” Id. at 1. She requests that this

1 Court enjoin the constitutional crisis “by calling for 25th Amendment vote and enforcement,” and

provide “any additional relief that th[e] Court deems just and proper.” Id. at 2. Even affording

Derewal the “liberal constru[ction]” appropriate to a pro se litigant, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), the Court

concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her suit and must therefore dismiss this case.

“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Indeed, federal courts are

“forbidden . . . from acting beyond our authority,” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120

(D.C. Cir. 2008), and, therefore, have “an affirmative obligation ‘to consider whether the

constitutional and statutory authority exist for us to hear each dispute,’” James Madison Ltd. ex

rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis.,

974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). “[S]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived,

and . . . courts may raise the issue sua sponte.” NetworkIP, LLC, 548 F.3d at 120 (quoting Athens

Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Absent subject-matter

jurisdiction over a case, the court must dismiss it. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,

506–07 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Standing is an essential element of subject matter jurisdiction. “[T]o establish standing, a

plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual

or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would

likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021).

Derewal’s complaint contains no factual allegations explaining how she has been concretely

injured by Defendants’ actions. Derewal states that “senior’s SSA [has been] improperly withheld”

2 and that there has been “eco-damage,” but does not allege that she has herself been affected by

either of these actions. Absent any allegations to suggest Derewal has some “particularized stake

in the litigation,” this suit presents “precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance

about the conduct of government” that courts may not hear. Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442

(2007). Furthermore, to the extent that Derewal’s sought-after relief is an injunction removing the

President from office under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Court has no power to issue such

an order. See Ballard v. Ohio Elections, No. 3:25-cv-8, 2025 WL 745184, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7,

2025) (dismissing pro se complaint requesting that the court “invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment

of the United States Constitution to forcibly remove the current President from office” because

“neither the Twenty-Fifth Amendment nor any federal statute gives the Court such a broad

power”). The Twenty-Fifth Amendment vests the Vice President and “a majority of . . . the

principal officers of the executive departments”—not this Court—with the discretion to initiate

any attempt to remove a sitting President. U.S. Const. amend. XXV, § 4.

Derewal has not alleged a concrete, particularized injury. Even if she had done so, her

injury would not be redressable because the Court lacks the power to grant her requested relief.

Derewal therefore lacks standing, and the Court must dismiss this action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506–07.

Finally, Derewal previously filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF 9.

To the extent that motion remains pending, it is DENIED as moot because Derewal later paid the

filing fee, and because the Court has determined that Derewal’s case must be dismissed.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED. A separate order accompanies this

memorandum opinion.

3 SO ORDERED.

__________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge

Date: May 29, 2025