STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1440
Derek Alexander Knapp, petitioner, Respondent,
vs.
Commissioner of Public Safety, Appellant.
Filed May 19, 2025 Reversed Ede, Judge
Washington County District Court File No. 82-CV-23-859
Robert M. Christensen, Robert M. Christensen, P.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Nicholas R. Moen, Ryan Pesch, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Bentley, Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. Under Vondrachek v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d 262 (Minn. App.
2017), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2018), the Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety
satisfies their prima facie burden to establish that DataMaster DMT-G (DMT) evidentiary
breath-test results are admissible by introducing evidence that a certified DMT operator
administered the test and that diagnostic checks showed that the DMT testing device was
in working order. 2. It is an abuse of discretion for a district court to determine that DMT test
results are unreliable and to rescind the revocation of driving privileges based solely on
evidence of an imperfect or improper pretest observation period, without evidence that the
driver ingested something or otherwise experienced a bodily function during the
observation period and without evidence that the driver’s ingestion or bodily function
affected the test results.
OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order rescinding the revocation of
respondent’s driving privileges, appellant argues that the court abused its discretion by
determining that appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for the admission of
chemical breath-test results and by determining that the test results were unreliable.
Because appellant met their prima facie burden of reliability to introduce the test results
and respondent failed to provide evidence that the test was unreliable, we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion and therefore reverse.
FACTS
Appellant Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety revoked respondent Derek
Alexander Knapp’s driving privileges after law enforcement stopped Knapp’s car in
February 2023. Knapp challenged the license revocation. The undisputed facts summarized
below stem from the record of the implied-consent hearing and the district court’s order
rescinding revocation.
2 Arrest, DataMaster DMT-G (DMT) Test, and Revocation
Law enforcement stopped Knapp to investigate an equipment violation, observed
indicia of impairment, and called a deputy to the scene to help investigate further. The
deputy asked Knapp to perform field sobriety tests. Knapp did not exhibit signs of
impairment during two of the tests, but did exhibit such signs during the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test. To confirm the signs of impairment that he had observed, the deputy
requested that Knapp complete a preliminary breath test, and Knapp agreed. The
preliminary breath test results showed that Knapp had an alcohol concentration of 0.09.
The deputy arrested Knapp and transported him to jail to conduct an evidentiary breath test
using the DMT device.
When the deputy and Knapp arrived at the jail, they were asked to wait in the
deputy’s squad car while another individual exited the intake area. During that time, the
deputy was sitting in the driver’s seat and Knapp was in the back passenger seat. There was
a Plexiglass partition between them that had an opening in the middle. As they waited to
enter the jail, the deputy asked Knapp to open his mouth and flip his tongue.
At midnight, while still in the squad car, the deputy read Knapp an advisory about
the breath test. At 12:02 a.m., the deputy finished reading the advisory. Afterward, the
deputy and Knapp walked into the intake area. Once inside, the deputy told a correctional
officer “that he wanted a test conducted at 12:15 [a.m.] on the dot, as the observation period
had commenced.” While Knapp was searched, the deputy walked over to a computer in the
same room as Knapp and the correctional officer.
3 The correctional officer administered the DMT test to Knapp. Before collecting a
breath sample from Knapp, the DMT testing device successfully completed a diagnostic
test, four air-blank tests, and a control-sample check. Knapp then provided two breath
samples. The breath test results reflected an alcohol concentration of 0.08. On that basis,
the commissioner revoked Knapp’s driving privileges. 1
Implied-Consent Hearing
Knapp petitioned the district court for judicial review of the revocation decision. He
requested that his driving privileges be reinstated because, among other things, the testing
method “was not valid or reliable, or the test result obtained was not accurately evaluated.” 2
At the implied-consent hearing, Knapp’s counsel clarified that Knapp was challenging the
admissibility of the DMT test results—not the validity of the test—and that Knapp’s
argument focused on the lack of an adequate observation period. The district court heard
testimony from the deputies involved in Knapp’s arrest and from the correctional officer
who administered the DMT test to Knapp.
The deputy testified as follows. Before a driver can submit to a DMT test, law
enforcement must conduct a 15-minute observation period. During this period, an officer
looks for burping, belching, or vomiting. The officer can perform a mouth check, during
which the officer opens the driver’s mouth to make sure there is no vomit or other
obstruction “in the mouth that could retain alcohol.” The officer must watch the driver the
1 See Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4 (2024). 2 See Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(10) (2024).
4 entire time and be within earshot of them. Officers are trained that they should not be
distracted during this time. The deputy did not recall the length of the pretest observation
period in this case, but noted that his training guidelines require a 15-minute observation
period “at minimum.” During the observation period, the deputy listened to Knapp and
looked at him through the rearview mirror. The deputy did not observe any burping,
belching, or vomiting.
The correctional officer testified that she is a trained and certified DMT operator.
She received her training from the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension and, on
the date of the incident, her DMT certification was current. The correctional officer stated
that the DMT testing device successfully completed a diagnostic test, four air-blank tests,
and a control-sample check. Following this testimony, the commissioner moved for the
admission of the DMT test results into evidence. Knapp’s counsel objected. The district
court acknowledged counsel’s objection, but still received the exhibit.
Post-Hearing Arguments and District Court Decision
After the hearing, both parties submitted written arguments to the district court.
Knapp asserted that the DMT test results were inadmissible because the commissioner had
“failed to establish a prima facie case that the test is reliable and that its administration
conformed to the procedures necessary to ensure reliability.” He maintained that the
deputy’s body-camera footage contradicts the deputy’s testimony that the deputy properly
observed Knapp during the 15-minute pretest observation period because the footage
shows that the deputy was not close enough to Knapp to detect burping or belching, that
Knapp’s face was shielded from the deputy’s view, and that the deputy could not see
5 Knapp’s mouth because the deputy was facing away from Knapp “in the front seat of his
darkened squad car with a seat partition between.”
The commissioner contended that their prima facie burden to establish the
admissibility of the DMT test results was met. Quoting Vondrachek v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 906 N.W.2d 262, 273 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2018), the
commissioner argued that caselaw requires only a showing “that a certified DMT operator
administered the test and that the diagnostic tests showed the DMT to be in working order.”
Because the commissioner introduced evidence to meet that standard, the commissioner
maintained that they had met their prima facie burden to establish that the DMT test results
were admissible. The commissioner also asserted that, even if there were a deficiency in
the observation period, such a deficiency would only go to the weight of the test-results
evidence, not its admissibility.
The district court filed an order rescinding the revocation of Knapp’s driving
privileges. Reasoning that the evidence about the observation period raised “questions as
to the reliability of the test results,” the district court determined that “[t]he record, which
includes video evidence, does not establish that [the deputy] continuously observed
[Knapp] for the duration of the observation period beginning at 12 a.m.” The district court
found that the deputy was facing away from Knapp in the squad car, that the deputy had to
rely on his rearview mirror, that the deputy’s perspective was limited by the Plexiglass
partition, and that the deputy’s location relative to Knapp was unclear after they entered
the jail. Based on those findings, the district court ruled that the commissioner had not
established that the deputy had been “able to observe burping or belching 15 minutes prior
6 to the administration of the DMT test.” Determining that the commissioner had “failed to
demonstrate a prima facie case that the administration of the test conformed to the
procedures necessary to ensure reliability” and that the DMT test results were therefore
unreliable, the district court rescinded the revocation of Knapp’s driving privileges.
The commissioner appeals.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by rescinding the revocation of Knapp’s
driving privileges?
ANALYSIS
The commissioner challenges the district court’s order rescinding the revocation of
Knapp’s driving privileges, arguing that the court abused its discretion because the
commissioner met their prima facie burden of establishing that the DMT test results are
admissible and because Knapp did not introduce any evidence to counter their prima facie
case.
“Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound discretion of the district court
and will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Vondrachek, 906
N.W.2d at 272 (quoting In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings, 816 N.W.2d 525, 537
(Minn. 2012)). The abuse-of-discretion standard also applies to our review of the district
court’s substantive decision to rescind or sustain the revocation of driving privileges. See
Thordson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 10 N.W.3d 310, 315 (Minn. App. 2024) (explaining
that, “in reviewing a district court’s compliance with statutory requirements and evaluation
of evidence—which presents a mixed question of law and fact—we have traditionally
7 applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review,” and that, “[b]ecause the abuse-of-
discretion standard encompasses correction of clearly erroneous findings of fact, this
approach is consistent with our clear-error review of a district court’s factual findings
underlying an implied-consent decision”); see also Short v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 422
N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. App. 1988) (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard of review in
affirming a district court’s order sustaining the revocation of driving privileges). “A district
court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736
(Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Before turning to the merits, we acknowledge the commissioner’s additional
contention that “[t]he district court abused its discretion in suppressing the DMT test
[results] because the district court’s decision was contrary to established law and
precedent.” (Emphasis added.) During the implied-consent hearing, however, the district
court “note[d] [Knapp’s] arguments . . . that [he was] challenging the observation period,
but . . . receive[d] [the DMT test results] into evidence.” (Emphasis added.) And in its
order, the district court reiterated that it had “received into evidence from [the
commissioner] . . . the DMT test [results].” (Emphasis added.) Thus, we do not analyze
whether the district court abused its discretion by “suppressing” the DMT test results
because the court did not do so—rather, it received the DMT test results into evidence.
That said, despite the district court’s repeated statements that it had received the
DMT test results into evidence, the court also wrote in its order that the commissioner had
“failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that the administration of the test conformed to
8 the procedures necessary to ensure reliability.” The district court’s reasoning appears to
have conflated the admissibility of the DMT test results with the court’s substantive
evaluation of the test results’ weight. In the interest of clarity and because the
commissioner’s prima facie burden relates to admissibility, we first (A) review whether the
district court abused its discretion in determining that the commissioner did not meet that
burden. We then review the district court’s substantive evaluation of the weight of the DMT
test-results evidence, analyzing (B) whether the court abused its discretion by determining
that the test-results evidence was unreliable and by rescinding the revocation of Knapp’s
driving privileges based solely on evidence of an imperfect pretest observation period.
A. The district court abused its discretion in determining that the commissioner had not met their prima facie burden to demonstrate the admissibility of the DMT test results.
The commissioner argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining
that they failed to meet their prima facie burden of proving admissibility, despite evidence
that “the test was administered by a trained and certified DMT operator,” and evidence that
“the instrument was functioning correctly as demonstrated by its successful completion of
the diagnostic test.” Knapp responds that the district court correctly determined that the
commissioner did not meet the burden of proving that the test was reliable because the
deputy did not conduct a complete pretest observation period. We agree with the
commissioner.
“Admissibility of a chemical test result depends upon ‘prima facie proof of the
trustworthiness of the test’s administration.’” Vondrachek, 906 N.W.2d at 272 (quoting
State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. 1977)). “The commissioner must make a prima
9 facie case that the test is reliable and that its administration in the particular instance
conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure reliability.” Id. (quotation omitted). In
Vondrachek, we reaffirmed our holding in Kramer v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 706 N.W.2d
231 (Minn. App. 2005), that the commissioner meets their prima facie burden of reliability
“by showing that a certified [DMT] operator administered the test and that diagnostic
checks showed that the [DMT] machine was in working order and the chemicals used were
in proper condition.” Vondrachek, 906 N.W.2d at 272 (alteration in original) (quoting
Kramer, 706 N.W.2d at 236). 3
During the implied-consent hearing in this case, the commissioner elicited
testimony about the correctional officer’s training and the condition of the machine. The
correctional officer testified that she is a trained and certified DMT operator and that, at
the time of the test, her DMT certification was up to date. And the correctional officer
testified that the machine successfully completed the diagnostic check, the four air-blank
tests, and the control-sample test. Faced with similar facts in Vondrachek, we concluded
that the commissioner had met their prima facie burden. 906 N.W.2d at 273.
In Vondrachek, the officer who administered the test was a properly trained and
certified DMT operator. Id. Before appellant driver provided a breath sample, the DMT
testing device performed a diagnostic check and ran air-blank tests, which produced results
within acceptable limits. Id. at 267, 273. On those facts, we concluded that the
commissioner “met its burden by showing that [the officer who administered the test] was
3 See also Minn. Stat. § 634.16 (2024).
10 a certified operator and that the machine was in working order.” Id. at 273. In Kramer, we
similarly held that the commissioner met their prima facie burden when they demonstrated
“that a certified Intoxilyzer operator administered the test” and provided evidence “that
diagnostic checks showed that the Intoxilyzer machine was in working order and the
chemicals used were in proper condition.” 4 Kramer, 706 N.W.2d at 236; see also State,
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Habisch, 313 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. 1981) (stating that the supreme
court has held that “testimony of the reading obtained by a Breathalyzer test conducted by
a certified operator may be admitted without antecedent expert testimony if it is established
that the machine was in proper working order and the chemicals in proper condition”
(citing State, City of St. Louis v. Quinn, 182 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1971))).
Knapp nonetheless insists that the commissioner did not meet their prima facie
burden because the deputy did not conduct a complete pretest observation period. But we
have “consistently indicated that a deficiency in observation of the subject does not of itself
invalidate the test.” Melin v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 384 N.W.2d 474, 476 (Minn. App.
1986). Several of our cases illustrate this point.
For example, in Falaas v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, we reversed the district court’s
decision to rescind the revocation of respondent’s driving privileges based on an
inadequate observation period because the commissioner had met their prima facie burden.
388 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Minn. App. 1986). Likewise, in Melin, we held that the district court
4 Both the Intoxilyzer and the DMT are approved methods of determining the alcohol concentration of a breath sample and both employ infrared technology to measure alcohol concentration. See Minn. R. 7502.0425, subp. 1-3 (2023).
11 “erred in requiring the Commissioner to show a continuous 15-minute period of
observation in order to make a prima facie showing of reliability.” 384 N.W.2d at 476. And
in State v. Wickern, we agreed with the state’s argument that the district court “erred in
suppressing the [breath] test because an alleged deficiency in the observation period goes
solely to the weight to be given to the test by the trier of fact, and does not preclude the
admissibility of the test results.” 411 N.W.2d 597, 599 (Minn. App. 1987). We therefore
disagree with Knapp’s argument that the commissioner must introduce evidence of a
proper pretest observation period to meet their prima facie burden of reliability and
admissibility for DMT test results. 5
Instead, we hold that, under Vondrachek, the commissioner satisfies their prima
facie burden to establish that DMT evidentiary breath-test results are admissible by
introducing evidence that a certified DMT operator administered the test and that
diagnostic checks showed that the DMT testing device was in working order. Here, because
the commissioner introduced evidence that the correctional officer was a certified DMT
5 During oral argument before this court, Knapp referred to a recent North Dakota Supreme Court opinion, asserting without further citation that the decision supports his contention that the commissioner must introduce evidence of a proper pretest observation period to meet their prima facie burden. “Arguments are forfeited if they are presented in a summary and conclusory form, do not cite to applicable law, and fail to analyze the law when claiming that errors of law occurred.” State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 477 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted). And even absent forfeiture, while such extraterritorial state appellate authority may be persuasive, it is not binding. See State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 695 (Minn. App. 2021) (holding that “a precedential opinion of this court is binding authority for this court”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 10, 2021); see also Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003) (explaining that this court is bound by decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court).
12 operator and that the DMT testing device was functioning properly, we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion by determining that the commissioner failed to meet
their prima facie burden.
B. The district court abused its discretion by determining that the DMT test-results evidence was unreliable and by rescinding the revocation of Knapp’s driving privileges based solely on evidence of an imperfect pretest observation period.
The commissioner maintains that the district court abused its discretion by
determining that the DMT test-results evidence was unreliable and by rescinding the
revocation of Knapp’s driving privileges. More specifically, the commissioner asserts that
it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to rely solely on evidence that the deputy
did not continuously observe Knapp throughout the pretest observation period, given that
Knapp did not offer any evidence to counter the commissioner’s prima facie case. The
commissioner’s argument is persuasive.
As explained above, the commissioner meets their prima facie burden by
introducing evidence that a certified DMT operator administered the test and that
diagnostic checks showed that the DMT testing device was in working order. “Once
reliability is established, the driver must produce evidence suggesting why the test was
untrustworthy.” Falaas, 388 N.W.2d at 42. “Specifically, the driver must present some
evidence beyond mere speculation that questions the trustworthiness of the” DMT test
results. Kramer, 706 N.W.2d at 236.
“Establishing that some impropriety or irregularity occurred during the observation
period which would render the test result invalid is . . . a proper basis for challenging the
13 test’s reliability.” Id. at 237. Yet “a deficiency in observation of the subject does not of
itself invalidate the test”—it “merely gives the driver an opportunity to suggest why such
a failure makes the test results unreliable.” Melin, 384 N.W.2d at 476; see also Kramer,
706 N.W.2d at 236 (explaining that an inquiry into the trustworthiness of the DMT test
results “affects the weight of the [results], not its admissibility”). “The argument that
something may have occurred during observation to affect the test result is speculation and
should not be used without supporting evidence as the basis for rescinding a revocation.”
Falaas, 388 N.W.2d at 42. A driver must prove that he ingested or regurgitated something
that affected the test results. Id.; see also Hounsell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 401 N.W.2d
94, 96 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Even if a driver can prove that he had something in his mouth,
he must also demonstrate that the substance actually affected his test results.”). We
therefore hold that it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to determine that DMT
test results are unreliable and to rescind the revocation of driving privileges based solely
on evidence of an imperfect or improper pretest observation period, without evidence that
the driver ingested something or otherwise experienced a bodily function during the
observation period and without evidence that the driver’s ingestion or bodily function
Our careful review of this record leads us to conclude that Knapp presented no
evidence to contradict the commissioner’s prima facie case. There is no evidence that
Knapp ingested something, regurgitated, burped, belched, or vomited. Instead, the record
reflects that the deputy did not observe any burping, belching, or vomiting, and that the
deputy checked whether anything was inside Knapp’s mouth before the correctional officer
14 administered the DMT test. Thus, even if Knapp had challenged the validity of the DMT
test results after the district court received that evidence—which he did not, given that he
specifically challenged only the admissibility of the DMT test results—he presented no
evidence to suggest that something occurred during the observation period that affected the
test results. We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
determining that the DMT test-results evidence was unreliable and by rescinding the
revocation of Knapp’s driving privileges based solely on evidence of an imperfect pretest
observation period, without evidence that Knapp had ingested something or otherwise
experienced a bodily function during the observation period that affected the test results.
See Falaas, 388 N.W.2d at 42; see also Hounsell, 401 N.W.2d at 96.
DECISION
The commissioner satisfies their prima facie burden to establish that DMT test
results are reliable and admissible by introducing evidence that a certified DMT operator
administered the test and that diagnostic checks showed that the DMT testing device was
in working order. Because the commissioner adduced evidence that the correctional officer
was a certified DMT operator and that the DMT testing device was functioning properly,
the district court abused its discretion by determining that the commissioner failed to meet
It is an abuse of discretion for a district court to determine that DMT test results are
unreliable and to rescind the revocation of driving privileges based solely on evidence of
an imperfect or improper pretest observation period, without evidence that the driver
ingested something or otherwise experienced a bodily function during the observation
15 period and without evidence that the driver’s ingestion or bodily function affected the test
results. Because Knapp did not produce evidence that he had ingested something or
otherwise experienced a bodily function during the observation period that affected the
DMT test results, the district court abused its discretion by determining that the test results
were unreliable and by rescinding the revocation of Knapp’s driving privileges based solely
on evidence of an imperfect pretest observation period.
Reversed.