Dept. of Human Services v. S. S.

347 Or. App. 345

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: A188535
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

No. 124 February 19, 2026 345

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of N. S., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. S. S., Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 24JU00304; A188535

Ann Marie Simmons, Judge. Submitted January 22, 2026. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Elena C. Stross, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. EGAN, J. Reversed and remanded. 346 Dept. of Human Services v. S. S.

EGAN, J. Mother appeals the juvenile court’s judgment changing the permanency plan for her child, N, from reuni- fication to adoption.1 Jurisdiction was based on (1) mother did not understand the basic needs of her child and lacked parenting skills necessary to safely parent the child; and (2) mother failed to, was unable to, unwilling to, or could not pro- vide the care and treatment necessary to address her child’s behavior. Mother raises three assignments of error. Mother argues that the Oregon Department of Human Services did not meet its burden in proving that mother had not pro- gressed in ameliorating the bases for jurisdiction and as such the trial court erred when it changed the permanency plan. Mother also contends that the trial court improperly relied on facts extrinsic to the adjudicated bases for jurisdic- tion in reaching its conclusion. Finally, mother assigns error to the juvenile court’s determination to change the perma- nency plan from reunification to adoption. Because we agree the juvenile court relied on facts extrinsic to the bases for jurisdiction, we reverse and remand. STANDARD OF REVIEW When reviewing a permanency judgment, this court reviews findings of fact for any evidence and conclusions of law for legal error. Dept. of Human Services v. T. F., 331 Or App 682, 684, 548 P3d 510 (2024). This court draws facts from the evidence that was before the juvenile court when it changed the permanency plan, and views that evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s disposition to determine whether it supports the juvenile court’s legal conclusions. Id. “[W]e review a legal conclusion that is heav- ily fact-dependent—such as a juvenile court’s determination of ‘sufficient progress’—to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support it.” Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B., 372 Or 133, 136, 546 P3d 255 (2024). The question of whether a juvenile court erred by relying on facts extrin- sic to a jurisdictional judgment is a legal question that this court reviews for legal error. Dept. of Human Services v. T. L., 287 Or App 753, 755, 403 P3d 488 (2017).

1 Mother gave birth to N in November 2023. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 345 (2026) 347

ANALYSIS Mother raises three assignments of error: that the juvenile court erred in determining that mother’s progress toward reunification with N was insufficient; that the juve- nile court relied on facts extrinsic to the adjudicated bases for jurisdiction to change the permanency plan; and that the juvenile court erred in changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. Because our decision on mother’s second assignment of error requires reversal, we do not reach mother’s first assignment of error. In her second assignment of error, mother claims the juvenile court improperly relied on facts extrinsic to the bases for jurisdiction to change the permanency plan. Mother correctly cites Dept. of Human Services v. G. E., 243 Or App 471, 480, 260 P3d 516, adh’d to as modified on recons, 246 Or App 136 (2011) to argue that “the bases for dependency jurisdiction provide the parent with ‘consti- tutionally adequate notice as to what, exactly he or she is supposed to be doing in order to terminate the authority of the state to act as the child’s surrogate parent.’ ” In its oral ruling, the juvenile court stated, among other things, that “[m]other needed to get honest about her substance use and how, and why she was using substances and explore that”; that “[mother] needed to get honest about her mental health; and that the consequence of those and the court’s other find- ings was that it determined “that mother ha[d] not amelio- rated the conditions that brought [child] into care.” “The proven facts depart from the petition so as to substantially affect a parent’s rights if a reasonable parent would not have had notice from the petition or the jurisdic- tional judgment as to what he or she must do in order to prevent the state from assuming or continuing jurisdiction over the child.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. M. S., 246 Or App 284, 296, 266 P3d 107 (2011) (quoting G. E., 243 Or App at 481). “[O]ur case law does not categorically preclude the admission of evidence of facts not pleaded as a basis for asserting jurisdiction.” Dept. of Human Services v. M. T. J., 304 Or App 148, 157, 466 P3d 702 (2020). “Facts are not ‘fairly implied’ by a jurisdictional judgment, and thus are ‘extrinsic’ to the jurisdictional judgment, if a reasonable 348 Dept. of Human Services v. S. S.

parent would not have known from the jurisdictional judg- ment that he or she needed to address the condition or cir- cumstance exemplified by those facts. T. L., 287 Or App at 763. Here, mother’s mental health and substance abuse were facts extrinsic to the adjudicated bases for jurisdiction. The adjudicated bases for jurisdiction were that mother did not “understand the basic needs of her child and lack[ed] parenting skills necessary to safely parent the child” and that she was “unable to, [ ] unwilling to, and/or [could] not provide the care and treatment necessary to address the child’s condition.” A reasonable person would not have known from these bases that they would need to specifically address mental health and substance abuse. As such, men- tal health and substance abuse were not fairly implied in the jurisdictional judgment and were, therefore, extrinsic to the adjudicated bases for jurisdiction. The juvenile court erred in relying on facts related to those conditions in rul- ing that mother’s progress was insufficient and changing N’s permanency plan from reunification to adoption. Reversed and remanded.