Dept. of Human Services v. L. M.

Opinion

840 September 10, 2026 No. 863

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of D. M.,

a Child.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent,

v. L. M., Appellant.

Malheur County Circuit Court 25JU04866; A190121

Erin K. Landis, Judge. Argued and submitted August 19, 2026. Tiffany Keast, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission.

Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General.

Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, Jacquot, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge.

JACQUOT, J. Affirmed.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 840 (2026) 841

JACQUOT, J. In this juvenile dependency case, father appeals a judgment asserting dependency jurisdiction over his child, D, who was four and one-half years old at the time of the jurisdictional trial. In three assignments of error, he challenges each individual basis on which the juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over the child, as well as the ultimate ruling to assert dependency jurisdiction over the child. We affirm.

Because father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence , the question before us is purely legal. We “view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit the outcome.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App 708, 709, 425 P3d 775 (2018).

The juvenile court is authorized to assert dependency jurisdiction over a child when the child’s condition and circumstances expose the child to a current threat of serious loss or injury that will likely be realized. ORS 419B.100(1)(c); Dept. of Human Services v. A. L., 268 Or App 391, 397-98, 342 P3d 174 (2015). The petitioner, the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS), bears the burden of proof. Id. at 398. That burden includes demonstrating a nexus between the child’s allegedly risk-causing conditions and circumstances, and a threat of harm to the child of the type, degree, and duration as to justify juvenile court intervention into the constitutionally protected family sphere. Dept. of Human Services v. S. D. I., 259 Or App 116, 121, 312 P3d 608 (2013). Proof of harm or risk at some point in the past is insufficient; the threat must be current at the time of trial. State v. S. T. S., 236 Or App 646, 654, 238 P3d 53 (2010). Nor can the risk be speculative; there must be a reasonable probability that the risk will be realized. Dept. of Human Services v. J. H., 292 Or App 733, 738, 425 P3d 791 (2018).

In this case, the juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over the child based on mother’s substance abuse 842 Dept. of Human Services v. L. M.

(4A) and father’s alleged inability to protect the child from mother’s neglectful behavior, including substance abuse (4B). Father argues that the court erred in doing so because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that those conditions and circumstances existed or that they exposed the child to a current and nonspeculative threat of serious loss or injury at the time of the jurisdictional trial.

Having reviewed the evidentiary record, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the assertion of dependency jurisdiction. ODHS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that mother’s frequent fentanyl use created a reasonable likelihood of a current threat of serious loss or injury to the child’s welfare. Additionally, the juvenile court found that father was unable to protect D from the mother’s behavior. There is evidence in the record to support that determination, including evidence that mother used fentanyl in a powder form, that even a miniscule amount of fentanyl can be deadly to young children , that mother cared for the child alone, and that father was unable to recognize and/or unwilling to intervene when mother had been using fentanyl.1 Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in asserting jurisdiction over D because father was unable to protect D from the risk of harm posed by mother’s fentanyl use. We therefore affirm.

Affirmed.

1 We are not creating a per se rule that any parent’s use of fentanyl automatically creates a reasonable likelihood of a current threat of serious loss or injury to the child’s welfare. However, in this case, there is sufficient evidence in the record, including mother’s almost daily use of fentanyl at work and the tasks of daily bathing and food preparation for the child after work, that this particular mother’s use creates a current threat of serious loss or injury to the child’s welfare.