No. 782 August 19, 2026 297
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of K. F. R., a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
J. C. R.-W., Appellant.
Jackson County Circuit Court 25JU03935; A189204
Charles G. Kochlacs, Judge. Argued and submitted June 17, 2026. Elena C. Stross, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission.
Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and Leith, Senior Judge.
POWERS, J. Reversed.
298 Dept. of Human Services v. J. C. R.-W.
POWERS, J. In this juvenile dependency case, mother appeals from a judgment asserting dependency jurisdiction over her child, K, who was 14 years old at the time of the jurisdiction trial. In three assignments of error, she challenges each of the two individual bases on which the juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over the child, both related to domestic violence within the household, as well as the ultimate ruling to assert dependency jurisdiction over K. As explained below, even assuming that there was sufficient evidence to establish a generalized harm resulting from the repeated incidents of domestic violence in the home, there is no evidence addressing the reasonable likelihood that the harm will occur, let alone sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to conclude that the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the threat was current and nonspeculative or that there was a reasonable likelihood of specific harm to K’s welfare. Accordingly, we reverse.
Because mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the question before us is purely legal. We “view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit the outcome .” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App 708, 709, 425 P3d 775 (2018).
Although ODHS has been involved with the family in the past, this is the first time the juvenile court has determined K to be within its jurisdiction. The current involvement was precipitated by an incident in June 2025 in which the Ashland Police Department responded to a call regarding a domestic disturbance in the home between mother and her husband, W.1 Father died when K was four years old, and mother and K moved around “a lot.” In 2017, mother married W, and the couple had their “ups and downs.” After
1 At the jurisdictional trial, W described his relationship with K as “good friends,” rather than stepfather and stepson, and explained that he loves K and would do anything for him. Mother and W have been together since 2016. W has no legal relationship to K and is not a party to this case.
Cite as 352 Or App 297 (2026) 299
the June incident, the police department made a cross report to ODHS. ODHS began to investigate and then filed for and obtained a protective custody order in August 2025. K was placed in his own home with mother.
ODHS filed a dependency petition in which it alleged, in part, that mother’s “chaotic lifestyle interferes with her ability to safely parent the child, placing the child at risk of harm,” “[t]he child has been exposed to domestic violence by the mother, placing the child at risk of harm,” and “mother’s substance abuse impairs her ability to safely parent the child, placing the child at risk of harm.” The jurisdictional trial was held over three days in October.
Mother, W, and K lived together in a 600 square foot house. There is no dispute that there had been domestic violence between mother and W over the course of their relationship. Sergeant Vanderlip of the Ashland Police Department was one of the responding officers for the June incident. He testified that, from 2021 to the present, he had personally responded to situations with mother and W nine times for “domestic investigations” or reports of disorderly conduct, and that each of those times both mother and W were intoxicated. When asked about K’s demeanor when he responded to the June incident, Vanderlip observed that K “showed that he’s used to this” and thought that K seemed “a little bit more scared than times in the past, because [Vanderlip thought] this got a little bit more serious, physically , than some of the other times that [he had] responded.” Although Vanderlip believed that mother and W had likely been involved in a mutual physical altercation, he ultimately arrested mother because he believed her to be the primary aggressor.
Mother testified that there was “domestic violence”
in the relationship, which she described as “argumentativeness , being loud, yelling, and not really being—not being kind” and not using her skills “to deescalate a situation.” Mother has filed for divorce twice in Oregon—once in 2022 and again in 2024. Mother has also filed for protective orders against W in which she made allegations of abuse, and W has filed for a restraining order against mother. Mother and W have both been arrested at times throughout their 300 Dept. of Human Services v. J. C. R.-W.
relationship. According to mother, W has a long-standing problem with drinking alcohol. Mother denied having a problem with alcohol, but admitted to using it as a coping mechanism for the stressors in her life. She had stopped drinking alcohol and had at least four months of sobriety by the time of the trial.
Mother denied that exposing K to the domestic violence between her and W was detrimental to K; however, she acknowledged that “without proper intervention” it could be detrimental. Mother testified that she has discussions with K about how he is feeling, including “the concept of the interplay between trauma and how people can be triggered * * * and what positive communication looks like.” She told the juvenile court that K knows that he has the ability to speak up if he does not feel safe. She explained that they do activities together like taking the dogs for a walk or cooking —“things that show him that people have the capacity to get better.” Mother did not feel like the daily rhythm of life in the home was chaotic. In addition, when questioned about the domestic violence allegation in the dependency petition, she acknowledged that her history with W was not positive, but maintained that she did not “believe that it rises to the level such that [her] son is going to—is going to be exposed to it in a way that will cause him irreparable emotional harm.” According to mother, K has a B average in school, he has friends, and he does various extracurricular activities. K has a cell phone and has the ability to call law enforcement, a family friend, neighbors, his friends, and the father of one of his friends if he feels unsafe, and if things get uncomfortable or loud in the home, he can go to his room if he wants to.
Three of the witnesses at trial were ODHS employees . ODHS child welfare worker Jaggers testified that she has had training on the effects that childhood exposure to domestic violence can have on a child. She explained that her training taught her that “[e]xposure to domestic violence can impact a child’s ability to develop and maintain healthy relationships in the future” and that it “can also impact their brain development.” She assisted the caseworker on this case once or twice and she interviewed K at his home while another caseworker interviewed mother and W in a different
Cite as 352 Or App 297 (2026) 301
room. K told Jaggers that his mother and W drink alcohol and use marijuana; he talked about domestic violence and described seeing bruises and scratches but did not see the acts that created those injuries. When asked whether K described whether he felt comfortable being in the home or wanting to stay in the home, Jaggers responded, “He did.”
ODHS child protective services caseworker Thomas testified. When asked if she had training regarding how domestic violence affects a child in the home, she replied that she did and explained, “Just what’s required of us, essentially how being exposed to physical and verbal altercations for long periods of time can have traumatic effects on kids. Isolation, social-isolation, traumas, PTSD [or posttraumatic stress disorder], sometimes night terrors, you know, things of that nature.” Thomas was also questioned about the specific jurisdictional allegations. As relevant to the issues raised on appeal, she was asked what the basis of her knowledge was for the allegation that that child has been exposed to domestic abuse by the mother, placing the child at risk of harm. She explained:
“[I]n this current situation, there’s a police report that states that a neighbor heard [K] screaming, get off my mom. And for the past eight years, according to criminal records and civil records and eCourts, there has been multiple incidents of domestic violence in the home where [K] has witnessed that and has talked about that.
“And so it’s all documented, showing years, showing a pattern of this behavior that [K] has been present.”
Later, after describing the underlying reasons for the other jurisdictional allegations and services offered, Thomas was asked how, taking all of these conditions together, K is under a current risk of harm if ODHS is not involved. She answered, “Well, again, this is a pattern of behavior. So the agency would like to say that [mother] is on a path to recovery, but we still have no acknowledgement of substance use issues. We still have no acknowledgement for her role in some of the domestic violen[ce] situations that took place throughout the last eight years. I don’t feel like we’re any further than we were at the start of this case.”
302 Dept. of Human Services v. J. C. R.-W.
Thomas also explained that ODHS believed it was in K’s best interest for the agency to have legal custody of K because they “believe that there’s still an active—active safety threat.” Thomas had not spoken with K; that is, although she had attempted to speak with K, K did not want to talk to her. Mother “was not interested” in talking to Thomas about K and did not provide updates.
The third ODHS employee to testify was Warne, who is a permanency caseworker, and the assigned ongoing caseworker for K. Warne had completed all of the training for her position, which included some specific training regarding the effects that domestic violence might have on a child or a child who is exposed to it. She explained that some of the effects on a child could be emotional and psychological stress, withdrawal, difficulties in school, and difficulties “with relationships ongoing.”
Warne was able to have a conversation with K in early October after mother encouraged him to speak to Warne. She and K talked about school, his friends, what he likes to do, and how he felt about what had been happening in the home since ODHS became involved. K told her that everything was going well; he also indicated that things had gotten better since ODHS had been involved.
At the end of the trial, ODHS asked the juvenile court for permission to amend the petition to add an allegation stating, “[t]he mother was subjected to domestic violence by her domestic associate, and the mother isn’t able to protect the child from exposure to this violence.” The juvenile court permitted ODHS to add that allegation. Ultimately, the juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over K based on two bases: (1) “[t]he child has been exposed to domestic violence by the mother, placing the child at risk of harm,” (basis 4B) and (2) “[t]he mother was subjected to domestic violence by her domestic associate, and the mother is unable to protect the child from exposure to this violence, or the risk of exposure to this violence,” (basis 4D). The court concluded that ODHS had not proved jurisdictional bases 4A (chaotic lifestyle) and 4C (substance abuse).
The juvenile court noted that, in its view, allegations 4B and 4D were “slam dunks” and that there was “clear proof”
Cite as 352 Or App 297 (2026) 303
that “there’s been domestic violence going on for many, many years.” The court observed that mother “shows no insight into the domestic violence that’s going on.” It continued:
“The current risk of harm, that is nonspeculative to me, is that there’s really no end in sight to the domestic violence. Things might have gotten better after [ODHS] intervention and [K] moving to Santa Barbara for a bit. We know for a fact that he’s been hearing the fighting, seeing the bruises. Vanderlip has gone to the house nine times. He’s quite familiar with the family. He heard [K] saying get off my mom. So I believe that.”
“* * * * * “Also this notion that [K,] he can protect himself by being able to call the police, by calling [the family friend who is the safety service provider] that’s also really unpersuasive . So the domestic violence has to occur, or about to occur to the extent of, well, he’s expected to call the cops, call a lady that lives potentially 10 hours of travel time away. I don’t think that that ameliorates the risk of harm which is basically perpetual witnessing. I mean, he’s seen the bruises, witnessing—hearing domestic violence while in the next room.
“I believe that, based on those findings and all the other evidence, so it’s not limited to what I just commented on, but the whole—the entirety of the evidence, to me proves there is a nexus between risk-causing conduct. The risk is present at the time of the hearing. It’s nonspeculative. Therefore, B and D have been proven in all respects.”2 On appeal, mother contends that, although ODHS’s theory of harm was that witnessing domestic violence could lead to negative outcomes for K, now or later in life, both the evidence and the theory of harm were insufficient to authorize dependency jurisdiction. She asserts that ODHS did not present any evidence that K was currently experiencing any of the potential harms that can occur from children 2 We note that the juvenile court appears to have mistakenly found that Vanderlip had testified that he heard K say “get off my mom.” The testimony was that a neighbor who called for emergency services reported hearing a child making that statement, and that is the call that prompted Vanderlip to respond to the family home. Mother and W testified that that overheard statement was a reference to the ashes of mother’s mother and was made by mother to W. The juvenile court, however, found mother’s and W’s explanations to be “unpersuasive.”
304 Dept. of Human Services v. J. C. R.-W.
witnessing domestic violence, nor did ODHS present any evidence of the likelihood of the harms it did identify happening to any child. In mother’s view, ODHS’s theory rose and fell on the simple possibility of those negative effects and that witnessing domestic violence was not good. According to mother, the likelihood and severity of harm demonstrated by the evidence was both speculative and of insufficient type, degree, and duration to authorize dependency jurisdiction.
In response, ODHS contends that the evidence in the record was sufficient for the juvenile court to determine that the exposure to domestic violence in the household presented a current, nonspeculative risk to K. In particular, ODHS points to mother’s lack of insight, failure to engage in treatment, and testimony by ODHS caseworkers that domestic violence can cause trauma, PTSD, emotional and psychological stress, and it can negatively impact a child’s ability to develop healthy relationships and could result in withdrawal and isolation. The difficulty with ODHS’s arguments , however, is that those generalities alone do not meet the burden required for dependency jurisdiction.
The juvenile court is authorized to assert dependency jurisdiction over a child when the child’s condition and circumstances expose the child to a current threat of serious loss or injury that will likely be realized. ORS 419B.100(1) (c); Dept. of Human Services v. A. L., 268 Or App 391, 397-98, 342 P3d 174 (2015). ODHS bears the burden of proof. Id. That burden includes demonstrating a nexus between the child’s allegedly risk-causing conditions and circumstances, and a threat of harm to the child of the type, degree, and duration as to justify juvenile court intervention into the constitutionally protected family sphere. Dept. of Human Services v. S. D. I., 259 Or App 116, 121, 312 P3d 608 (2013). Proof of harm or risk at some point in the past is insufficient; the threat must be current at the time of trial. State v. S. T. S., 236 Or App 646, 654, 238 P3d 53 (2010). Nor can the risk be speculative; there must be a reasonable probability that the risk will be realized. Dept. of Human Services v. J. H., 292 Or App 733, 738, 425 P3d 791 (2018).
As the parties appear to recognize, there is no per se rule that domestic violence in a home automatically means
Cite as 352 Or App 297 (2026) 305
that ODHS has carried its burden to prove a nonspeculative risk of harm to a child. We previously explained, “a child’s exposure to domestic violence does not necessarily create a risk of serious loss or injury to a child sufficient to warrant juvenile court intervention. See Dept. of Human Services v. K. C. F., 282 Or App 12, 20, 383 P3d 931 (2016) (reversing the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction where [ODHS] presented evidence that the children were exposed to and affected by the father’s emotional abuse of the mother, but the record lacked evidence of a present risk of serious harm to them). ‘[T]he state must establish both that the child is at risk of a certain severity of harm and that there is a reasonable likelihood that’ the risk will occur. S. D. I., 259 Or App at 121.” Dept. of Human Services v. D. W. M., 296 Or App 109, 121, 437 P3d 1186 (2019) (second brackets in original). Having reviewed the evidentiary record, we conclude that ODHS did not offer specific enough evidence that the domestic violence K witnessed presented a nonspeculative risk of harm to K.
ODHS’s evidence was lacking as to the specific harm to K. We explained in S. D. I. that ODHS “must establish both that the child is at risk of a certain severity of harm and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the risk will be realized.” 259 Or App at 121. “[A] court cannot take jurisdiction over a child based solely on a risk of some harm; the type, degree, and duration of the harm must be such that exposure to a reasonable likelihood of that harm justifies juvenile court jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Here, even assuming that there was sufficient evidence to establish a generalized risk of harm resulting from the repeated incidents of domestic violence in the home, ODHS presented no evidence addressing the reasonable likelihood that the harm will occur to K, let alone sufficient for the juvenile court to conclude that the agency had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the threat was current and nonspeculative or that there was a reasonable likelihood of harm to K’s welfare.3 3 Indeed, one of the problems with generalized evidence of harm is that it becomes difficult to determine when that generalized harm will occur without establishing a per se rule of harm, rather than the individualized evidence that is necessary to support the assertion of dependency jurisdiction. As we observed in T. L. H. S.:
306 Dept. of Human Services v. J. C. R.-W.
The testimony by Thomas described above regarding the current risk of harm to K is indicative of the lack of development throughout the record. She explained that K was at a current risk of harm because of the “pattern of behavior” and that there was still an “active safety threat.” At no point during her testimony, or testimony by any of the other ODHS caseworkers, was there evidence of the specific risk of harm to K or testimony connecting any of the exposure to domestic violence that K experienced to any type, degree, or duration of harm.
To the extent that ODHS points to testimony by ODHS caseworkers in which they explain how domestic violence can cause trauma, PTSD, and emotional and psychological stress, or impact a child’s brain development and ability to develop healthy relationships in the future, or result in withdrawal and isolation, a review of the record reveals that that generalized testimony is insufficient. First, none of those caseworkers testified to those potential harms being present in this case for K. Rather, the testimony came in response to ODHS’s attorney asking the caseworkers to talk about their own training, not about the type of domestic violence that was in K’s home or the risk of particular harms that K was exposed to as a result of the domestic violence in his home. More importantly, there is insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to conclude that the exposure to domestic violence that K experienced presented a risk of serious psychological or emotional harm that is reasonably likely to occur, let alone the degree or duration of that type of harm.4
“When [ODHS] fails to identify a specific type of harm, and instead relies on an amorphous risk of unspecified harm loosely tied to multiple allegations, it hinders parents’ ability to fully respond to the state’s case. It hinders the juvenile court in making appropriate fact findings and assessing whether [ODHS] has proven its case. And it makes it difficult for us to review whether there is any evidence to support the alleged nexus between the parent’s conduct and the specific harm at issue, as well as whether there is any evidence of a reasonable likelihood of that specific harm occurring or whether it is speculative.”
292 Or App at 716 (citations omitted).
4 ODHS also points out that K spent a lot of time in his bedroom, arguably to avoid the domestic violence in the home. Although that may be a permissible inference—K was avoiding domestic violence—that fact is not sufficient evidence to support a conclusion of any specific type of harm to K or the degree of harm.
Cite as 352 Or App 297 (2026) 307
Although the record here contains ample evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that there has been ongoing domestic violence in this household between mother and W and that mother lacks insight as to the potential effects that it has on K, ODHS did not meet its burden to show how the circumstances gave rise to a threat of a serious loss or injury to K. We do not mean to suggest by our conclusion that exposure to verbal and physical altercations between adults in a child’s home can never lead to a threat of serious emotional or psychological harm to that child. “In order to establish such a circumstance, however, [ODHS] must offer evidence, not only argument or conclusory statements ” of the current threat of serious loss or injury that is likely to be realized. J. H., 292 Or App at 742.
In short, we ultimately agree with mother’s argument that ODHS failed to produce legally sufficient evidence to prove a present risk of serious harm to K that is reasonably likely to occur.
Reversed.