Dept. of Human Services v. D. B.

Opinion

No. 847 September 2, 2026 711

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of H. D. L. B., a Child.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent,

v. D. B., Appellant.

Lane County Circuit Court 22JU00066; A189786 (Control)

In the Matter of L. C. M. B., aka L. C. M. B., a Child.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent,

v. D. M. B., Appellant.

Lane County Circuit Court 22JU00067; A189787

Stephen W. Morgan, Judge. Submitted July 22, 2026. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Elena C. Stross, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

712 Dept. of Human Services v. D. B.

Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.* AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed.

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* Lagesen, Chief Judge, vice Pagán, Judge.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 711 (2026) 713

AOYAGI, P. J. In this consolidated juvenile dependency matter, father appeals judgments continuing the permanency plans of adoption for his children, L and H, who were 8 and 7 years old, respectively, at the time of the hearing. In ten assignments of error, father challenges the denial of his motion to change the children’s plans back to reunification. He contends that the juvenile court erred by (1) incorporating into the permanency judgments findings made in the separate termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) cases that were consolidated for hearing; (2) not finding that father had made sufficient progress for L and H to be safely returned to him, therefore concluding that no “compelling reason” existed to forgo or delay TPR proceedings, and therefore continuing the plans of adoption; and (3) entering the permanency judgments more than 20 days after the hearing. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

Incorporation by reference. Father first assigns error to the juvenile court “adopting and incorporating by reference ‘all of its factual findings and conclusion stated in its December 31st, 2025 Opinion and Order in father’s [TPR] case in 24JU03635,’ and relying in any way on those factual findings or conclusions” in the permanency judgments. We reject that claim of error.

The court held a consolidated hearing in the permanency cases and the TPR cases. During that hearing, the vast majority of the evidence was received for purposes of both the permanency and TPR cases, while a small amount of evidence was received only for purposes of the permanency cases. No evidence was received only for purposes of the TPR cases. Thus, all evidence received in the TPR cases was also properly before the court in the permanency cases (but the converse was not true). The court made its decision in both sets of cases on December 31, 2025. It entered permanency judgments in the children’s permanency cases at 1:24 p.m. and 1:26 p.m., respectively, continuing their existing plans of adoption, and it entered an opinion and order in the TPR cases at 1:29 p.m., ordering the termination of father’s parental rights. The permanency judgments 714 Dept. of Human Services v. D. B.

expressly incorporate by reference all of the court’s factual findings in the TPR opinion and order.1 Father challenges the propriety of the court’s incorporation by reference. He emphasizes the separateness of the permanency and TPR cases, takes issue with the order of entry, and points out that the opinion and order in the TPR cases is not part of the appellate record in the permanency cases. We are unpersuaded that the court erred. All of the TPR evidence was also evidence in the dependency cases, and there is no reason that the court could not make the same findings about the same evidence in four cases, at least so long as it accounted for varying standards of proof, as the court did here. Any findings not supported by the evidence in the record for the permanency cases were open to challenge. As for the court entering the permanency judgments first in time, with entry of the TPR opinion and order following three to five minutes later, we disagree that that was somehow fatal to incorporation by reference.

Finally, although it would have been better for the juvenile court to attach its findings to the dependency judgments , rather than incorporating them by reference to an order in a different case, we disagree that it was reversible error to incorporate by reference in these circumstances. The court was not relying on findings made in a different case on different evidence. The findings at issue were based on evidence admitted in a consolidated hearing for purposes of all four cases, and we understand the court to have made those same findings in all four cases. The incorporation by reference was simply a logistical shortcut. While not ideal, in that it requires us to take judicial notice of the TPR opinion and order to know what findings were incorporated into the permanency judgments, it is not reversible error.

Delayed entry of permanency judgments. We next address father’s challenge to the late entry of the permanency judgments. ORS 419B.476(5) provides that the juvenile court “shall enter an order within 20 days after the permanency hearing.” Here, the court entered the permanency 1 The incorporation refers to “all of its factual findings and conclusion.” It is unclear what the court meant by “conclusion” there. In practice, we understand it to have incorporated only its factual findings.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 711 (2026) 715

judgments 75 days after the conclusion of the hearing, i.e., 55 days late. That is obviously a violation of ORS 419B.476(5). Given the particular circumstances, however, we conclude that the error was harmless. The judgments at issue continued the existing plan of adoption, and the juvenile court held the TPR trial concurrently with the permanency hearing , such that the delay in entering the permanency judgments had no effect whatsoever on the case moving forward or the children achieving permanency. As for father’s point that circumstances may have changed during those 55 days, that is certainly possible, but it would be equally true if the judgments had been entered earlier, and father would be in no different position.

Continuing plans of adoption. We now address father’s claims of error relating to the merits of the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to change the children’s plans back to reunification. Father has not requested de novo review, and we do not exercise our discretion to provide it.2 We are therefore bound by the juvenile court’s express and implied factual findings so long as they are supported by evidence , and we review the court’s legal conclusions based on those facts for legal error. Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B., 372 Or 133, 136, 546 P3d 255 (2024). That “no compelling reason” exists to forgo or delay TPR proceedings is a legal conclusion. Dept. of Human Services v. S. J. M., 364 Or 37, 56-57, 430 P3d 1021 (2018).

At the time of the permanency hearing, the children ’s plans were adoption. Father moved to change their plans back to reunification. The juvenile court must “carefully evaluate” a proposed plan change and seek to make a decision “that is most likely to lead to a positive outcome for the child.” State ex rel DHS v. M. A. (A139693), 227 Or App 172, 183, 205 P3d 36 (2009). When a child’s plan is changed away from reunification, the parents lose their “status as the preferred placement for the child” and “an operating assumption that [the] child cannot safely return home” goes into effect. Dept. of Human Services v. T. L., 279

2 See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (allowing de novo review in this type of case in our “sole discretion”); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (providing for exercise of that discretion only in “exceptional cases”); ORAP 5.40(8)(d) (identifying nonexclusive considerations).

716 Dept. of Human Services v. D. B.

Or App 673, 680, 690, 379 P3d 741 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). But that does not mean that such a change is irreversible. Id. at 680. Upon request of a parent or any other party, the court must hold a permanency hearing to consider a request to change the child’s plan back to reunification. ORS 419B.470(6); Dept. of Human Services v. R. W. C., 324 Or App 598, 604, 526 P3d 1195, rev den, 371 Or 308 (2023). The moving party, here father, bears the burden of proof. T. L., 279 Or App at 691-92; S. J. M., 364 Or at 53-55.

As for what father needed to prove, ORS 419B.476(5)

requires the juvenile court to address certain issues in a permanency judgment. When the plan is adoption, under ORS 419B.476(5)(d) the court must address whether any of the circumstances in ORS 419B.498(2) apply. The circumstances in ORS 419B.498(2) are a list of reasons to forgo or delay TPR proceedings. One of those reasons is the child’s best interests, specifically that there exists a “compelling reason, which is documented in the case plan, for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child or ward.” ORS 419B.498(2)(b). The statute gives examples of compelling reasons, one of which is that “[t] he parent is successfully participating in services that will make it possible for the child or ward to safely return home within a reasonable time as provided in ORS 419B.476(5) (c).” ORS 419B.498(2)(b)(A). In this context, a “ ‘[r]easonable time’ means a period of time that is reasonable given a child or ward’s emotional and developmental needs and ability to form and maintain lasting attachments.” ORS 419A.004(27).

Father contends that he proved that he was successfully participating in services that would make it possible for L and H to safely return to him in a reasonable time, such that it was error for the juvenile court to conclude that no compelling reason existed to forgo or delay TPR proceedings and therefore continue the plans of adoption. Father does not challenge the court’s factual findings. Rather, he posits that, on this record and those findings, the court had to find that he carried his burden of proof.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we are unpersuaded that the juvenile court was required as a matter of law to rule in father’s favor and change the children’s plans

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 711 (2026) 717

back to reunification. L and H have been wards of the court for most of their lives and have cycled through multiple unsuccessful returns home. The juvenile court found that they needed permanency immediately, meaning any delay before they could safely return to father would exceed a “reasonable time” for them. The record supports that finding. The court also found that father had yet to make the necessary changes to safely parent these children. The record allowed those findings, even if it did not necessarily compel them. Father had made significant and important changes in his life since the children’s plans were first changed to adoption—including not using methamphetamine for 15 months and engaging in therapy and in domestic violence treatment—but the evidence did not compel a finding that the children could be safely returned to him immediately. The court could and did find on this record that, notwithstanding father’s recent progress, he was not yet in a position to provide a safe home for these children and meet their specific needs. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not commit legal error in denying father’s motion to change the plans back to reunification.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgments continuing the children’s permanency plans of adoption.

Affirmed.