Dept. of Human Services v. C. G.

335 Or. App. 155

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: September 18, 2024
• Docket: A183616
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

No. 664 September 18, 2024 155

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of E. R. E. G., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. C. G., Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 22JU00559; A183616

Thomas A. Goldman, Judge pro tempore. Submitted August 21, 2024. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Holly Telerant, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Emily N. Snook, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, Mooney, Judge, and DeVore, Senior Judge. LAGESEN, C. J. Affirmed. 156 Dept. of Human Services v. C. G.

LAGESEN, C. J. Mother appeals a permanency judgment changing the permanency plan for her daughter E from reunifica- tion to permanent guardianship under ORS 419B.365. See ORS 419B.476 (governing permanency plans). Reviewing to determine whether the juvenile court’s factual find- ings are supported by the record and for legal error, Dept. of Human Services v. M. S., 284 Or App 604, 606, 393 P3d 270 (2017), abrogated in part on other grounds by Dept. of Human Services v. S. J. M., 364 Or 37, 430 P3d 1021 (2018), we affirm. Mother assigns error to the juvenile court’s determi- nations that (1) the Department of Human Services (DHS) made reasonable efforts to enable E to “return safely home,” ORS 419B.476(2)(a); (2) mother had not “made sufficient progress to make it possible for the ward to return safely home,” id.; and (3) child’s permanency plan would be changed from reunification to permanent guardianship under ORS 419B.365. She contends that the evidence does not permit the first two determinations. She also contends that in determining that mother had not made sufficient progress for E to return safely home, the juvenile court impermissibly relied on facts extrinsic to the bases for jurisdiction. In response, DHS asserts that mother did not pre- serve her challenge to the reasonable-efforts determination; that, if preserved, the record supports the determination that DHS made reasonable reunification efforts; that the court’s determination regarding mother’s lack of progress is supported by the record; and that the court’s decision, in con- text, demonstrates that the court did not rely on facts extrin- sic to the bases for jurisdiction in an impermissible way. Having considered the record and the parties’ arguments, we conclude that, regardless of any issues with preservation, the record supports the juvenile court’s rea- sonable efforts determination, as well as its determination that mother had not made sufficient progress for E to return safely home. We also conclude that the court did not rely on facts extrinsic to the jurisdictional bases in evaluating mother’s Nonprecedential Memo Op: 335 Or App 155 (2024) 157

progress in a way that was legally impermissible. Mother’s argument on that point is that the court impermissibly required mother to prove that she had stable and indepen- dent housing, when mother’s housing situation was not a basis for jurisdiction. We do not understand the court to have done that. As we read its ruling, the court determined that mother’s mental health issues and lack of commitment to therapy contributed to her ongoing inability to obtain a stable living environment, thereby demonstrating that she had not made sufficient progress in addressing her mental health issues to permit E to return safely home. Affirmed.