STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES CHILD SUPPORT
SERVICES, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
LAFE C. COLDWATER,
Defendant/Appellee,
and
ERICA ANN BUTLER, Custodian/Appellant.
¶1 Custodian/Appellant Erica Ann Butler1 appeals the decision of the trial
court ordering Defendant/Appellee Lafe Coldwater to pay $400 per month in child
support, denying her request for child support arrearages, and awarding legal
custody of C.M.B., the minor child, to Defendant/Appellee.2 Custodian/Appellant Erica Ann
Butler ("Mother") is the natural mother of C.M.B., a minor child born
out-of-wedlock. After the birth of the child, a paternity test determined
Defendant/Appellee Lafe Coldwater ("Father") was the father of C.M.B., and Child
Support Services filed an administrative action against Father to establish
paternity and support obligations.
¶2 Prior to the birth of the child, Mother and Father had a sexual
relationship, but were not a couple in a traditional sense. Mother lived with
her boyfriend at the time, Joshua Guidroz. During her pregnancy, Mother told
Father either he or Mr. Guidroz could be the father of the unborn child. C.M.B.
was born December 1, 2008, and Mr. Guidroz was listed as the child's father on
the birth certificate. Mother later filed a paternity action against Mr.
Guidroz, but a paternity test revealed Mr. Guidroz was not C.M.B.'s father.
Through an administrative proceeding initiated by Child Support Services, Father
was ordered to take a paternity test in May 2010. Father was informed sometime
in August or September 2010 that he was the biological father of C.M.B. Pursuant
to an order entered by the Office of Administrative Hearings: Child Support,
Father was ordered to pay child support to Mother beginning October 1, 2010.
Father was not ordered to pay any back child support to Mother for the time
period from C.M.B.'s birth through September 2010. Mother did not appeal this
administrative order to the district court, and it was docketed in district
court pursuant to 56 O.S. 2011
§237.10. Father filed a petition for joint custody on October 15, 2010 using
the same district court case number assigned to the docketed administrative
order.3
¶3 The parties agree Mother was the sole care giver for C.M.B. from the time
of birth until September 2010 (shortly after Father was informed he was the
child's biological father) when Father began having some visitation with the
child. After a temporary order hearing March 3, 2011, the trial court awarded
Mother legal and physical custody of C.M.B. subject to Father's visitation on
six (6) overnight visits out of every fourteen (14) days. The parties continued
this custody arrangement until a trial on the merits was held January 12 and 20,
2012.4
¶4 Testimony at trial showed the parties generally agreed the physical
custody arrangement was working well, but Mother and Father also agreed they had
problems communicating with each other. Father felt that Mother made unilateral
decisions regarding the minor child without consulting him while Mother felt
like Father unnecessarily questioned her parenting skills. Both parents agreed
it was in C.M.B.'s best interest if they were both involved in her life.
¶5 A guardian ad litem ("GAL") was appointed in this case. She
presented her report at trial and also testified. Her initial recommendation was
that joint custody would not work due to the lack of communication between
Mother and Father. She recommended that Father be given legal custody of C.M.B.
with each parent having equal physical custody. She based this decision on
Father's willingness to work with Mother in parenting C.M.B. and his willingness
to maintain C.M.B.'s relationship with her maternal family. The GAL also noted
Mother's apparent hostility to having Father involved in C.M.B.'s life because
the two fathers of her two other daughters were in no way involved in their
lives. After hearing all of the evidence at trial, the GAL changed her
recommendation and decided joint legal custody could work if Mother and Father
could communicate with each other. The GAL testified that both Mother and Father
were capable parents who had C.M.B.'s best interests in mind. At the conclusion
of all the testimony and evidence, including a home study of Mother's house
which found Mother's home to be safe, clean, and appropriate, the trial court
awarded legal custody to Father but granted the parties equal physical custody
of C.M.B. On appeal Mother argues the record does not support the trial court's
decision to award legal custody to Father.
¶6 The trial court's order also deviated from the child support guidelines by
reducing Father's obligation to Mother from the amount calculated by the
guidelines of $661.29 per month to $400 per month. Testimony showed Mother works
as a physical therapy assistant making approximately $9.00 per hour. Father has
a high paying job with an oil field services company. The trial court imputed
income to him of approximately $9,000 per month.5 To support this deviation, the trial
court's order stated:
Based on the parties' current income, a monthly credit of $800 that is
attributed to Mom supporting her two (2) older children, and the arguments
of counsel, Dad, as Obligor would normally pay to Mom a monthly child
support payment of $661.29 based on the Child Support Computation
Guideline. . .; however, the Court is deviating from the Child
Support Computation and is ordering Dad to pay Mom monthly child support
in the amount of $400.00 per month.
At trial Father testified he could more easily afford to send C.M.B. to
private Montessori school if his child support obligations were reduced. On
appeal Mother's second proposition is that the trial court failed to comply with
the mandate set forth in 43 O.S.
2011 §118H(B) requiring the trial court to justify any deviation with
specific findings that such deviation is in the best interests of the minor
child and the amount of support under the guidelines is "unjust or inappropriate
under the circumstances." Father argues the record supports the deviation even
if the specific findings were not included in the trial court's order.6
¶7 In her answer to Father's petition for joint custody, Mother requested a
judgment be entered representing the amount of child support Father owed from
the time of C.M.B.'s birth in December 2008 through the time he began paying
child support in October 2010. At trial Father argued, and the trial court
agreed, Mother's claim was barred by res judicata because the matter had
been settled in the administrative proceeding where Father argued Mother waived
her right to any child support arrearages. Mother argues the record does not
firmly establish the matter was litigated in administrative court and, even if
it was, she did not knowingly waive her right to child support arrearages as she
was unrepresented by counsel at the administrative level. Mother's third
appellate argument is that the trial court erred in the denial of her request
for payment for child support arrearages.
LEGAL CUSTODY OF C.M.B.
¶8 "On appeal, this Court will not disturb the trial court's judgment
regarding custody absent an abuse of discretion or a finding that the decision
is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence." Daniel v. Daniel, 2001 OK 117, ¶21, 42 P.3d 863. The burden is on the
appealing party to show that the decision is "erroneous and contrary to the
child's best interests." Id. "Absent such a showing, the trial court's
determinations are presumptively correct." Shaw v. Hoedebeck, 1997 OK CIV APP 69, ¶11, 948 P.2d 1240 (citing Carpenter
v. Carpenter, 1982 OK 38, 645 P.2d 476). We give deference to
the trial court in reviewing custody decisions because it "is better able to
determine controversial evidence by its observation of the parties, the
witnesses and their demeanor." Hoedebeck, 1997 OK CIV APP 69, ¶10.
¶9 Mother argues the trial court awarded Father legal custody of C.M.B. to
avoid having to require Father to pay child support to Mother and despite the
fact he ignored his paternal obligations until he was required to submit to a
paternity test per court order. Mother insists there was nothing in the record
to show it was in C.M.B.'s best interests that Father be granted legal
custody.
¶10 We disagree with Mother's interpretation of the facts and record. First,
the trial court ordered Father to pay child support negating Mother's first
argument. Second, the record does not show Father ignored his paternal
obligations until ordered to submit to a paternity test. Rather, Father had
little reason to suspect he was the father of C.M.B. even after Mother told him
it was a possibility. Mother had been living with another man around the time of
conception. This man was listed as the father on the birth certificate and a
paternity suit had also been filed against him. We recognize there is no dispute
that Father was not involved in C.M.B.'s life until she was approximately
eighteen (18) months old, but once Father confirmed his paternity of C.M.B., by
all accounts he became an active and involved parent.
¶11 Our review of the record shows the trial court placed great weight on its
belief that Father was the best party to follow court orders and encourage a
relationship with the other parent when deciding to grant legal custody to
Father. Given our duty to defer to the trial court's consideration of witnesses
and evidence, we cannot say this decision was clearly contrary to the weight of
the evidence. We affirm the trial court's award of legal custody to Father.
CHILD SUPPORT DEVIATION
¶12 Oklahoma law provides for a rebuttable presumption that the amount of
child support calculated by the child support guidelines is the correct amount
of child support to be awarded. 43
O.S. 2011 §118(A). Section 118H(B) provides the trial court "may deviate"
from the amount of support indicated by the guidelines "if the deviation is in
the best interests of the child and the amount of support so indicated is unjust
or inappropriate under the circumstances." Should the trial court deviate from
the child support guidelines, it is required to "make specific findings of fact
supporting such action." 43 O.S.
2011 §118H(C) ("[T]he court shall make specific findings of
fact supporting such action.) (Emphasis added.) The findings of fact must
include the following:
1. The reasons the court deviated from the presumptive amount of child
support that would have been paid pursuant to the guidelines,
2. The amount of child support that would have been required under the
guidelines if the presumptive amount had not been rebutted, and
3. A finding by the court that states how, in its determination:
a. the best interests of the child who is subject to the support
award determination are served by deviation from the presumptive
guideline amount, and
b. application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in
the particular case before the
tribunal.
43 O.S. 2011 §118H(C). Under
the child support guidelines, Father's child support obligation to Mother was
$661.29 per month. The trial court reduced this amount to $400.00 per month but
failed to make specific findings of fact justifying the deviation as required by
43 O.S. 2011 §118H(C). Thus,
this portion of the trial court's order must be VACATED and REMANDED for a
determination of whether such facts exist to support the deviation, and, if so,
to articulate them as required by statute. See Kingery v. Kingery, 2011 OK CIV APP 122, ¶¶16-20, 270 P.3d 192 (reversing and
remanding a child support order which deviated from the guidelines for omission
of judge's signature and for not including factual findings explaining how the
child support obligation was derived).
CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES
¶13 Mother's allegation the trial court erred by finding her claim for child
support arrearages was barred by res judicata depends on whether the
issue was or could have been litigated at the administrative level.7 The doctrine of
res judicata, now commonly referred to as "claim preclusion," bars
relitigation of issues by parties or their privies which were or could have been
raised in a previous proceeding which resulted in a prior judgment on the
merits.8
State ex rel. Moshe Tal v. City of Oklahoma City, 2002 OK 97, ¶20, 61 P.3d 234. "The party against
whom it is interposed . . . must have had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the claim or critical issue." Id. "Oklahoma's jurisprudence has
foreshadowed a willingness to apply preclusion doctrine to final adjudicative
administrative decisions if appropriate and not subject to some
recognized exception." Feightner v. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A., 2003 OK 20 ¶13, 65 P.3d 624 (emphasis added).9 See also
Dority v. Green Country Castings Corp., 1986 OK 67, 727 P.2d 135510;
Bostwick v. Atlas Iron Masters, Inc., 1988 OK CIV APP 20, 780 P.2d 1184.11 "[A] person who has once
actually administratively litigated his claim, fully and fairly. . .and lost,
may not then move to a different forum and successively litigate the same claim
or issue again outside the confines of normal judicial review of administrative
decisions." Feightner, 2003
OK 20, ¶18.
¶14 Mother argues the issue was not litigated at the administrative level and
that she did not knowingly waive her right to child support arrearages because
she was not represented by counsel at the time. Thus, she argues, the doctrine
of claim preclusion cannot prevent her for making her claim at the district
court. However, Oklahoma law does not support the pro se exception Mother
argues. Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as an attorney.
Funnell v. Jones, 1985 OK
73, ¶4, 737 P.2d 105. Further,
Oklahoma's statutory child support enforcement scheme shows Mother was given the
opportunity to litigate the issue of child support arrearages at the
administrative level. Failing to do so bars Mother from later making her claim
in district court.
¶15 The Oklahoma Department of Human Services ("DHS") is the state agency
responsible for administering the child support enforcement program for the
State of Oklahoma. 56 O.S. 2011 §§
237(A), 237.7(1). Oklahoma law gives DHS the authority to conduct child
support enforcement administrative proceedings through the Office of
Administrative Hearings: Child Support ("OAH").12 Id. at §237.7(3). Such
hearings are conducted before administrative law judges ("ALJ"). Id. at
§237.7(3). After evidence has been presented at an administrative hearing, the
ALJ shall enter a written order containing findings of fact and conclusions of
law as to each contested issue. Id. at §237.8. OAH is authorized to issue
orders detailing the current support obligation and past due support
obligations. See id. at §237A(A)(2). Final orders shall be appealable
directly to the district court in the same manner as provided in the Oklahoma
Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at §240.3(A)(1). See also 75
O.S. 2011 §§318-323. But see Dept. of Human Services v. Hernandez, 2003 OK CIV APP 35, ¶3, 68 P.3d 229.13 Such administrative
orders shall be docketed in the district court and "shall be enforced by the
district court in the same manner as an order of the district court." 56 O.S. 2011 §237.10.14 See
also Okla. Admin. Code §340:2-28-50.
¶16 The administrative order in the record is a pre-printed form with
handwritten entries to complete the required information. The order confirms the
paternity of Father and orders him to pay child support in the amount of $756.25
per month starting October 2010. Paragraph 8 provides a blank space for a
judgment to be entered against Father for any past due support for the time
period preceding October 2010. The term "N/A" is entered in this space. Whether
this entry shows the issue was litigated before the administrative court and no
support was ordered or whether it shows the issue was not presented at the
administrative level is irrelevant. The issue could have been litigated
at the administrative hearing.
¶17 We see no reason why an analysis similar to that applied in
Feightner and Bostwick, supra, should not apply to the case at
bar. The administrative order entered by OAH addressed the issues of paternity
and support obligations and was thus a "final" order within the meaning of
§240.3(A)(1).15 No other issues remained to be litigated between
the parties at the administrative level. See footnote 12, supra.
Because DHS was providing child support services to Mother, the claim was
appropriately pursued at the administrative level.16 56 O.S. 2011 §237(B)(3). Mother had
the opportunity to request a judgment for prior support obligations at the
administrative level but either failed to present the issue or was otherwise
denied such a judgment. Mother did not appeal the administrative order to the
district court. 56 O.S. 2011
§240.3(A)(1). Once she failed to appeal, her right to a review of the issues
addressed by the administrative order ended. See 75 O.S. 2011 §§318, 323. Similar to
the proceedings in Feightner and Bostwick, the administrative
remedies available to Mother were not her only means of seeking relief, but once
she pursued administrative remedies through OAH, she was bound by those
procedures. See Feightner, 2003 OK 20, ¶¶17-19;
Bostwick, 1988 OK CIV APP
20, ¶¶8-9.
¶18 Oklahoma's child support enforcement scheme does not provide a statutory
exception to giving OAH decisions preclusive effect. Rather, it establishes
procedures to appeal from an adverse administrative decision, 56 O.S. 2011 §240.3(A)(1), and
states such decisions "shall be enforced by the district court in the same
manner as an order of the district court." Id. at §237.10. These appeal
procedures were the appropriate avenue for Mother to pursue judicial review of
the denial of her claim for child support arrearages. See Feightner, 2003 OK 20, ¶18. The doctrine of
claim preclusion, the purpose of which includes "conserv[ing] judicial resources
and prevent[ing] inconsistent decisions," id. at ¶15, prohibits Mother
from presenting the same issue in a different forum. Id. at ¶18. The
trial court correctly barred Mother from relitigating the issue of child support
arrearages in the district court action because the issue could have been
litigated at the administrative level.
¶19 Consistent with the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
consistent with this opinion.
BELL, P.J., and GOREE, J., concur.
