Deppe v. Vetter

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION

DENNIS G. DEPPE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-2098-JSS-UAM

JOHN C. VETTER, LINDA E. COCO, JEFFREY S. WEISS, SANDRA M. SOVINSKI, SVETLANA S. SHTROM, YOUNDY C. COOK, ELIZABETH A. KLONOFF, KAREN C. KLINE, ROBERT A. SWEETAPPLE, ALEN H. HSU, FLOYD E. ANDERSON, JOHN M. BUSTAMANTE, ARY M. CHANG, JOE F. SOUTHRON, ROBIN S. FORET, LATIKA K. EIFERT, DEBORAH V. VAN VECHTEN, JEFFREY M. SHAINLINE, MICHAEL D. GERHOLD, MILTON M. FENG, PAUL R. PINSUKANJANA, YUNPENG SONG, MARK W. BERANEK, CHARLES B. KUZNIA, HANNIBAL M. WARE, RON D. DESANTIS, MELINDA M. MIGUEL, ASHLEY M. MOODY, PAETRA T. BROWNLEE, ANGELA M. GALLAGHER, BAHAA E. SALEH, SABINE M. O’NEAL, ROBERT J. TAFT, TINA M. MAIER, MARK. S. SOLOMON, KEVIN A. KEELING, and JOHN M. TABOADA,

Defendants. ___________________________________/ ORDER Plaintiff moves to disqualify the undersigned. (Dkt. 172.) In that motion,

Plaintiff indicated that he planned to name the undersigned as a defendant in this matter. (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff has since moved to amend his amended complaint to, among other things, name the undersigned as a defendant. (See Dkts. 176, 176-1.) Recusal is mandatory where a judge is a party to the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i) (stating that a judge “shall . . . disqualify [her]self” when she “[i]s a party

to the proceeding”); see Davis v. Kvalheim, 261 F. App’x 231, 233 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Federal law states that a judge ‘shall disqualify h[er]self’ when [s]he is a party to the proceeding, and the parties cannot waive this provision.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i), (e))). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a judge to disqualify “[her]self in any proceeding in which h[er] impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988) (“The very purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.”). Because the undersigned is called to rule upon a motion that seeks to add her as a party to the action, the court finds that recusal is proper. See Zow v. Regions Fin. Corp., 595 F. App’x 887, 890 (2014)

(“A judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned if an objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about h[er] impartiality.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Second Motion to Disqualify Judge Sneed from the Court Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §455 (Dkt. 172) is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to reassign this case pursuant to its normal procedures. ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on March 25, 2025.

‘ he io 7 JUKIE S. SNEED = UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record Unrepresented Parties

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