Department of Transportation v. Sanchez

2025 IL App (4th) 231203-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 8, 2025
• Docket: 4-23-1203
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 231203-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-23-1203 January 8, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender th limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE ) Appeal from the STATE OF ILLINOIS, for and on behalf of the People of ) Circuit Court of the State of Illinois, ) Winnebago County Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 20ED4 v. ) ADOLFO TORRES SANCHEZ, ) Defendant-Appellant, ) and ) Honorable THE CITY OF ROCKFORD, ) Ronald A. Barch, Defendant. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s appeal was dismissed because of his failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶2 On May 7, 2020, plaintiff, the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), for

and on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois, filed a complaint for condemnation of the

property at issue in this appeal (parcel No. 2061355) and for a three-year temporary construction

easement over additional property (parcel No. 2061355/E). IDOT named defendant, Adolfo Torres

Sanchez, the property’s owner, and the City of Rockford (City), a lienholder, as defendants in the

case. IDOT alleged it was reconstructing a state highway running through Winnebago County,

Illinois, and acquiring Torres Sanchez’s property was necessary for the project. Citing section 4-

501 of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/4-501 (West 2020)), IDOT alleged it could acquire the property in accordance with the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 30/1-1-1 et seq. (West 2020)).

The trial court entered an order vesting title of the property to IDOT. After Torres Sanchez failed

to appear, the court awarded final just compensation for the property of $1,075. Thereafter, Torres

Sanchez filed this appeal, appearing pro se. Because of the deficiencies of Torres Sanchez’s

appellant’s brief, we strike his brief and dismiss the appeal.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 7, 2020, IDOT filed its condemnation complaint, alleging it had made a

good faith offer to purchase Torres Sanchez’s property but had been unable to reach an agreement.

On May 18, 2020, IDOT filed a motion for immediate vesting of title to the property under the

quick take provisions in article 20 of the Eminent Domain Act (id. § 20-5-5 et seq.).

¶5 On June 30, 2020, Torres Sanchez, appearing pro se, filed a broad response to

IDOT’s complaint, which contained sections purporting to be a general denial, a verified denial, a

“special exception,” a motion to dismiss, and affirmative defenses. According to Torres Sanchez,

IDOT’s claim arose from a crime committed by the City against him and his property, and IDOT

was complicit in cooperating with the City in the alleged crime. Torres Sanchez argued IDOT’s

purchase offer was not made in good faith because IDOT was trying to acquire the property at no

cost, despite IDOT receiving information from him about the City’s alleged criminal or fraudulent

acts. The crime or fraud alleged appeared to be related to an ongoing dispute with the City

concerning the previous demolition of a building that had stood on his property.

¶6 On August 4, 2020, IDOT responded, noting most of Torres Sanchez’s requested

remedies related to his ongoing legal disputes with the City. According to IDOT, Torres Sanchez’s

allegations that IDOT was not properly exercising its eminent domain authority should be

construed as a traverse and addressed before a determination of preliminary just compensation and

-2- entering of an order vesting title of the property. In the interest of judicial economy, IDOT asked

the trial court to allow it to establish the elements justifying the quick take of the property and

preliminary just compensation in a single hearing. The court scheduled a hearing for September

15, 2020.

¶7 At the hearing, Torres Sanchez appeared pro se and was provided a Spanish

interpreter. IDOT presented evidence establishing the value of the property and its offer made to

Torres Sanchez. Torres Sanchez argued the taking was improper and asserted the City had offered

him more money than IDOT. The trial court found IDOT had the authority to exercise the right of

eminent domain, the property was subject to IDOT’s exercise of its right, and IDOT was not

improperly exercising its right. Further, the court found the existence of a reasonable necessity for

taking the property in the manner requested by IDOT. Additionally, the court determined $1,075

would constitute preliminary just compensation for the property and easement. Moreover, the court

indicated IDOT would be vested with fee simple title to the property after depositing that amount

with the Winnebago County Treasurer, which IDOT later deposited on October 28, 2020. On

December 9, 2020, the court entered an order vesting title of the property to IDOT under section

20-5-15 of the Eminent Domain Act (id. § 20-5-15).

¶8 The setting of final just compensation did not occur until September 2023. Between

November 2020 and September 2023, Torres Sanchez filed numerous motions, continuing to

challenge IDOT’s authority to take the property. IDOT opposed the motions. On September 9,

2021, Torres Sanchez failed to appear, and the trial court granted IDOT’s motion to strike Torres

Sanchez’s motions.

¶9 The trial court set a discovery deadline of December 1, 2021. Torres Sanchez

continued to serve IDOT with discovery documents after the deadline. On June 1, 2022, the court

-3- granted IDOT’s motion for a protective order. Following that order, Torres Sanchez continued to

file motions challenging IDOT’s authority to take the property. On January 27, 2023, the court

noted Torres Sanchez had not appealed the September 2020 order vesting title of the property with

IDOT and found his motions were improper postjudgment motions. The court barred Torres

Sanchez from filing additional postjudgment motions.

¶ 10 In February 2023, Torres Sanchez filed an interlocutory appeal, which was

dismissed. Thereafter, he filed motions again challenging IDOT’s authority to take the property

and a motion to continue the trial, alleging he was ill due to being injected with graphene oxide

and exposed to electromagnetism from 5G antennas. Torres Sanchez failed to appear at a pretrial

conference, and the trial court denied his motions. In a written order, the court emphasized in red

letters that the trial would held on September 18, 2023, and should Torres Sanchez fail to appear,

a default judgment could be entered against him.

¶ 11 On September 15, 2023, Torres Sanchez moved to reconsider the denial of his

motion to continue. The motion sought a bench trial and alleged a variety of unsubstantiated

claims, such as that he was involuntarily injected with a substance designed by “They” to create

“neuro-slavery and extermination,” and expressing concern about things such as “Algorithm

Artifacts (A.I.) of 5G Antennas.” Torres Sanchez attached over 300 pages of documents, many of

which were from a separate eminent domain action, and none of which provided medical

documentation to support his alleged illness.

¶ 12 On September 18, 2023, Torres Sanchez failed to appear for trial. The trial court

denied Torres Sanchez’s request to continue and granted IDOT’s motion for a default judgment

but required IDOT to present evidence supporting the final amount of just compensation. After

hearing IDOT’s evidence, the court entered a final judgment of just compensation in the amount

-4- of $1,075. The court denied Torres Sanchez’s motions to reconsider.

¶ 13 This appeal followed.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, in a difficult to follow and rambling brief, Torres Sanchez argues the

trial court lacked jurisdiction and erred in numerous respects. IDOT argues this court should

dismiss Torres Sanchez’s appeal because his appellant’s brief fails to comply with Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which governs the form of appellate briefs. We agree and

dismiss the appeal.

¶ 16 This court has the discretion to strike an appellant’s brief and dismiss an appeal

when the appellant’s brief does not comply with the requirements of Rule 341. Litwin v. County

of La Salle, 2021 IL App (3d) 200410, ¶ 11. This is a harsh but appropriate sanction when the

appellant’s violations of procedural rules hinder our review of the case. Id.

¶ 17 We recognize Torres Sanchez is appearing pro se, as he has throughout the

proceedings in the trial court. However, Illinois courts treat pro se litigants the same as licensed

attorneys. A pro se litigant must comply with the same rules and is held to the same standard as a

licensed attorney. Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 78. This is true in both the

trial court and this court of review. “[T]he procedural rules governing the content and form of

appellate briefs are mandatory and not suggestions.” Litwin, 2021 IL App (3d) 200410, ¶ 3. A

pro se appellant is not excused from following the requirements of Rule 431. Id.

¶ 18 “Failure to comply with the rules regarding appellate briefs is not an

inconsequential matter.” Burmac Metal Finishing Co. v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 356 Ill.

App. 3d 471, 478 (2005). The purpose of the rules is to require parties before a reviewing court to

present clear and orderly arguments so the court can properly ascertain and dispose of the issues

-5- involved. Zadrozny v. City Colleges of Chicago, 220 Ill. App. 3d 290, 292 (1991). A brief that

lacks any substantial conformity to the rules may justifiably be stricken. Tannenbaum v. Lincoln

National Bank, 143 Ill. App. 3d 572, 574 (1986).

¶ 19 Defendant’s appellate brief violates multiple rules that govern appeals. For

example, Rule 341(h)(6) requires an appellant’s brief contain a statement of the facts necessary to

an understanding of the case, stated fairly and without argument or comment, and with appropriate

citations to the record on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). “A reviewing court is

not obligated to search the record for evidence on which to base a reversal, and unless reference is

made to those portions of the record supporting reversal, the argument will not be considered.”

Webb v. Angell, 155 Ill. App. 3d 848, 854 (1987).

¶ 20 Here, Torres Sanchez provides rambling and unsubstantiated facts, many of which

contain equally rambling argument, with no citation to the record. When he does cite the record,

it often is in regard to the pages of a motion or order accompanied by argument concerning that

motion or order.

¶ 21 Further, Rule 341(h)(7) requires the brief contain an argument section, “which shall

contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities

and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). An appellant is

obligated to define issues clearly, cite pertinent authority, and present a cohesive legal argument.

Gandy v. Kimbrough, 406 Ill. App. 3d 867, 875 (2010). In much the same manner that this court

is not obligated to search the record to find reasons to reverse the trial court’s judgment, this court

is also not a depository into which an appellant may dump the burden of research and argument

with regard to the issues he raises on appeal. In re Marriage of Hundley, 2019 IL App (4th)

180380, ¶ 82. Instead, this court is “entitled to have the issues clearly defined and a cohesive legal

-6- argument presented.” Id. Contentions that are inadequately presented on appeal, such as by the

failure to provide coherent argument or cite pertinent authority, do not merit consideration.

Holmstrom v. Kunis, 221 Ill. App. 3d 317, 325 (1991).

¶ 22 Here, Torres Sanchez has scattered unsupported, conclusory, and outlandish

allegations of error throughout his brief. While he provides legal principles and cites cases, he

appears to have simply copied and pasted into his brief numerous sections of boilerplate from

seemingly irrelevant cases, with no explanation as to how the material is relevant to IDOT’s

eminent domain action against him. He has failed to provide any cogent or meaningful legal

analysis or relevant authority. As a result, under Rule 341(h)(7), Torres Sanchez forfeited every

allegation of error he included in his appellant’s brief. Regardless of forfeiture, to the extent we

understand Torres Sanchez’s contentions of error, his assertions appear meritless.

¶ 23 We recognize the dismissal of an appeal is a harsh sanction. However, we also note

this is the second time this court has dismissed an appeal from Torres Sanchez for failing to comply

with Rule 341. See Department of Transportation v. Torres Sanchez, 2023 IL App (4th) 220767-

U. Because of the deficiencies in Torres Sanchez’s appellant’s brief, including the forfeiture of

every assertion of error he raised on appeal, we find the dismissal of his appeal appropriate based

on the facts of this case.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we exercise our discretion and strike Torres Sanchez’s

brief and dismiss the appeal.

¶ 26 Appeal dismissed.

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